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Abstract 
This thesis addresses issues in philosophy, politics and education. Its starting point is a review 
of some of the theoretical and practical approaches to the moral education of children that 
have achieved popularity in the last three or four decades of the twentieth century. Despite 
areas of evident divergence amongst these approaches, it is argued that they nonetheless share 
similar philosophical underpinnings. Building upon some initial criticisms of these positions, 
the thesis subsequently explores some of the more recent philosophical challenges they have 
faced. From this basis, a broadly Aristotelian model of moral thought and practice is 
discussed and advocated across two chapters. This account pays particular attention to the 
role of the affective domain and the 'education of the emotions'. 
In the second half of the thesis, the focus moves towards the political suitability of this 
preferred conception of the nature of morality and moral education. It is argued that the 
essential interdependence of moral development and the moral character of political society -
such a central part of Aristotle's account - is ill-appreciated by much popular and academic 
comment of recent times. By means of a discussion of the distinction between skills and 
virtues, techne and arete, the possible consequences of a full appreciation of this 
interdependence are debated. The remaining two chapters address two ways of answering the 
question which arises: "Can we have a true education of the virtues in the political context of 
contemporary pluralist societies?" In the first of these chapters, the thought of Alasdair 
MacIntyre is considered as an exemplar of the negative response to this question. In the 
second, some contemporary examples ofliberal political thought are interrogated in the hope 
of discovering a positive response. It is concluded that the so-called 'liberal perfectionism' of 
Joseph Raz provides us with some reason to think that such a response may be both legitimate 
and attractive. 
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Preface 
In these times as in others, education is commonly alleged to have failed our children. This 
failure is thought to take many forms, evidenced variously by the shifting economic 
performance, political culture and moral standards of our society. In this thesis I will 
primarily address one of these issues - relating to moral education - but will be concerned to 
investigate how our hopes here are affected importantly by the influence of the political and 
economic shape of society. As we will see, it is far from clear that the regeneration of all of 
these areas of concern can be accomplished simultaneously, if at all. 
In the first part of the thesis, I will focus attention upon the philosophy of moral education. 
Chapter One provides a critical review of three theoretical approaches that have sought to 
guide our practice in this area in response to the changing nature of contemporary developed 
societies. Impressed by the breakdown in the last three or four decades of an apparently broad 
social consensus about moral values, these approaches have all seen this development to 
necessitate a radical revision of our traditional efforts at morally educating the young. In their 
different ways, Values Clarificationism, Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive developmental ism, 
and John Wilson's 'moral components' approach have all attempted to accomplish this 
revisionary task. By means of a discussion of the roots or underpinnings of these theories in 
twentieth century analytic philosophy (notably that ofRM Hare) I will claim that, despite 
certain important differences, all three share important areas of commonality. This, I will 
charge, equips them all with a merely partial appreciation of the nature of moral thought and 
practice and renders them ineffective as approaches to moral education. 
Chapter Two begins a search for alternative philosophical foundations for moral education, 
all of which show promise of elucidating those aspects of thought and practice which were 
elided by the ideas considered in the first chapter. I consider three broadly defined sources of 
an alternative view. The first of these, 'analytic' critique, encompasses both the so-called 
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'naturalist' views of Hare's contemporaries such as Philippa Foot and Peter Geach, and the 
more recent moral 'cognitivist' or 'realist' work in the British tradition as represented notably 
by John McDowell and David Wiggins. In the second category I discuss recent examples of 
moral philosophy from Charles Taylor, Bernard Williams and Alasdair Maclntyre which may 
be considered more as 'historicist' than analytic. And thirdly, I turn to those such as Carol 
Gilligan and Nel Noddings, whose criticisms ofneo-Kantian moral philosophy of the kind 
represented by Kohlberg and Hare are built upon an analysis of gender difference in moral 
thinking, leading to the articulation of' an ethic of care'. From these discussions, I will 
investigate the way in which we may wish to undermine one of the chief assumptions of 
contemporary moral education theory, concerning the role of moral principles, and develop 
an alternative account based instead upon an appreciation of moral particularity. 
Across the next two chapters I seek to develop and defend a broadly Aristotelian 
understanding of moral thought. practice and education. I will be concerned to stress those 
aspects of this understanding which have been ignored by many contemporary moral 
educationalists; namely judgement, moral 'perception' and the role of the emotions. These 
help to comprise an account of the development of virtue in children. Importantly, I consider 
ways in which this account is in some ways difficult to reconcile immediately with the 
dominant social and political practices of contemporary states. This prepares the ground for 
the reflections contained in the second part of the thesis. 
In this part I move away from the defence of a philosophical account of moral education and 
begin to address areas of concern about its practical viability. And, as a matter of necessity, 
this involves a shift of focus towards the political. Chapter Five serves as an introduction to 
these issues by discussing the consequences of the way in which the interdependence of 
politics and moral education has been ill-appreciated by much recent popular and academic 
comment. This encompasses both those approaches considered previously and the arguments 
of many who think themselves to be offering an alternative akin to the model I have 
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advocated in the first part of the thesis. By means ofa consideration of the Aristotelian 
distinction between virtues and skills, arete and techne, I draw attention to some ways in 
which the interdependence of politics, morality and education make our project greatly more 
difficult than many commentators have imagined. The chapter ends with a question: "Can we 
have a true education of the virtues (or an education of the true virtues) in the political context 
of contemporary pluralist societies?" The final two chapters assess divergent ways in which 
this question may be answered. 
In Chapter Six I consider the work of Alasdair MacIntyre as an exemplar of a negative 
answer. As we will see, his contention is that any attachment to a recognisable Aristotelian 
understanding of the virtues and their development is irreconcilable with the theory and 
practice of liberal modernity. We may have one but not both, and must choose which we 
prefer. In this sense, MacIntyre's claim is at one with the arguments of the majority ofliberal 
thinkers during this era. But, of course, MacIntyre's conclusion is different, for he considers 
the claims of virtue to be such that we must reject the superficial attractions of our liberal 
societies, and hope for a "new dark ages" in which virtue could again take life. I will argue 
that the choice posed by MacIntyre is needlessly stark, and that this starkness is built upon a 
contestable interpretation of Aristotelian thought which indicates his own attachment to the 
religious worldview of St Thomas Aquinas. An alternative interpretation of Aristotle's ethics, 
drawing upon the work of Wiggins and McDowell amongst others, is shown to permit a 
greater degree of possible accommodation between virtue and pluralist liberal modernity. 
Given these signs of hope, the concluding chapter looks to examples of contemporary liberal 
political thought to provide an account of how we may provide a 'liberal home for virtue'. 
Contrasting the most recent work of John Rawls with that of Joseph Raz, I argue that the 
'liberal perfectionism' of the latter suggests an attractive means of accommodation. It is 
acknowledged that this accommodation cannot hope to regenerate the virtues of Aristotle's 
polis, or to leave us without difficult questions concerning our attachment to certain liberal 
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values. Nonetheless I hope that it has potential to provide us with a means of discharging our 
responsibilities for the moral education of the young without eliding either the plurality of 
society and its values, or the richness and complexity of moral character. 
Vlll 
Chapter One 
The Philosophy of Moral Education: Recent Orthodoxy 
If one were to judge by the amount of material published concerning this topic it would 
seem that moral education has only become an issue of particular theoretical interest and 
controversy in recent years. Of course, major figures of the history of philosophy from 
Plato and Aristotle to Locke and Rousseau had laid particular emphasis upon the centrality 
of a preferred variety of education to their ideas, but this approach became increasingly 
rare in the twentieth century. At the level of practice, it would similarly appear that moral 
education presented no particular problems. Crudely speaking, one might say that the moral 
role of the educator was considered to be one of replicating in the minds and actions of 
their pupils the morality of society, which in the traditional British context meant that 
children were largely taught to know their place and be pleased with it, whether this meant 
having a duty to rule or a duty to obey. Little concern was therefore shown to the nature of 
this morality (as opposed to the pedagogic means of its replication) and to what extent it 
was in the interests of all pupils to be in possession of it. 
The social upheavals of the post-war years have exerted a powerful destabilising influence 
upon the traditional social order which had supported this degree of moral consensus. The 
declining influence of established Christianity, the rapid growth of mass public education, 
and the increasingly multi-ethnic nature of British culture and society have all served to 
erode the degree of confidence in there being a single shared moral code that could be 
uncontroversially promulgated in schools. This new found uncertainty concerning the ends 
and means of moral education became a matter of increasing concern for educationalists, 
and by the 1960s and 1970s had resulted in a great flurry of theoretical interest in the 
development of new forms more appropriate to the distinctive nature of contemporary 
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moral life. In this chapter I shall adumbrate some of the major attempts that have been 
made to construct such theories, and investigate the cogency of their (explicit and implicit) 
philosophical underpinnings. In doing so I shall point towards a series of challenges that 
have been raised against all of them - challenges which may indicate the potential for an 
alternative, and perhaps more satisfactory, account of the nature of moral education. 
I will concern myself with three different theories of moral education, all of which have 
achieved popularity during this period amongst educationalists and have achieved a near 
orthodoxical status in teacher training institutions. I Firstly, I shall discuss what has become 
known as 'Values Clarificationism' (,VC') - a program developed from the mid-1960s by a 
variety of American educationalists (most especially Louis Raths and Sidney Simon) and 
furthered in the 1970s by Howard Kirschenbaum. Despite it being perhaps the most 
theoretically unsophisticated approach of the three, it has nevertheless exerted a 
considerable effect upon educational practice (especially in North America), and represents 
a general response to moral pluralism and uncertainty that is evident in many contemporary 
classrooms. Yet despite the degree to which its underlying assumptions are still evident in 
the views of many teachers, VC has largely fallen from favour amongst educationalists to 
be replaced by the concurrently formulated approach of Lawrence Kohlberg and his 
associates. As Barry Chazan felt justified in remarking in the mid-1980s, "the most 
prominent name in the contemporary renaissance of moral education is Lawrence 
Kohlberg ... there are few discussions of moral education today at academic conferences or 
at informal gatherings in which [his] name does not appear ... 2 His theory will therefore be 
my second area of concern. Finally, I shall discuss the ideas of the British philosopher of 
education John Wilson who, in association with the Farmington Trust, has developed 
proposals for moral education which rest explicitly upon work within analytical 
philosophy.3 
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Much of the academic debate about moral education in the past thirty years or so has 
proceeded on the assumption that these three approaches (and similar variants) are 
exhaustive of the possible responses to the nature of contemporary moral life. But although 
the work of Kohlberg, for example, has almost uniformly been presented in sharp 
contradistinction to the ideas underpinning VC, I would argue that in fact the similarities 
between these approaches far outweigh their differences. This is not, of course, to deny that 
there exist important areas where these approaches do not fully concur. There is certainly 
some disagreement over topics such as the relationship of rationality to feeling in the 
process of moral judgement or the question of whether there exists a 'logic' of such 
judgement which can be easily identified and taught. Yet despite these differences, the base 
meta-ethical presupposition that moral judgements are essentially 'non-cognitive' (incapable 
of having a truth value) and that values are therefore not anything real or objective is 
essentially shared. 
In conceiving of values as though they were matters of personal subjective preference. the 
teaching of any particular moral code is rejected as inappropriate and indoctrinatory - a 
violation of the right of the individual to make up his or her own mind concerning such 
matters. We do not think people should be taught to enjoy coffee more than tea, or to prefer 
new Labour to old, so why should we accept teachers telling people that it would be wrong 
for them to have sex outside marriage? In trying to avoid claiming that there is any real 
distinction between these domains of free choice, both educational approaches have tried to 
define the role of the moral educator as one of developing capacities thought to assist the 
making of autonomous reasoned judgements, capacities which are shared across differing 
moral perspectives and which are neutral between them. It is not the moral content of any 
evaluative judgement that is the proper concern of the teacher (for what authority could he 
or she possess to know best what a child should value), but the means which have facilitated 
it. 
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I would like to investigate the possibility that the debate concerning moral education is 
needlessly and harmfully polarised between the ideas I have outlined here and those 
conservative critics who seek a resuscitation of an 'old order'. In doing so I hope to point to 
ways in which a return to traditional models of the inculcation of moral rules and codes 
(,ten commandments' style) is not the only alternative for those critical of the way in which 
the dominant modern approaches understand the nature of moral judgement and moral 
education. Before elaborating upon these claims, however, I should first discuss these 
theories in a little more depth. 
Values Clarification 
The various writings that are standardly taken together to comprise this approach developed 
from an intensely sceptical critique of allegedly indoctrinatory modes of moral education. 
VC rejects not only any claims on behalf of the moral authority and expertise of the 
teacher, but also the very idea that anyone moral point of view can be said to be superior 
in any way to another - for morality is simply considered to be an "area that isn't a matter 
of proof or consensus" . 4 The end product of moral evaluation is of no concern (indeed the 
teacher is explicitly barred from attempting to affect this) as long as the process is deemed 
satisfactory. The development of the latter is thus the focus of the espoused pedagogical 
techniques of VC. These are open-ended in the extreme, involving children in situations 
(whether individually or in groups) which will "evoke a value-clarifying response and 
enable them to sort matters out for themselves" .5 Whatever the exercise might be ('role-
play' and self-analytical ranking exercises are particularly favoured), their intention is to aid 
the transition of a child's preferred moral judgements to the status of a fully-fledged 'value'. 
This process is judged according to success in meeting seven criteria - no belief being 
properly considered a 'value' unless it is: 
1. chosen freely 
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2. chosen from among a number of alternatives 
3. chosen after thoughtful consideration of the consequences 
4. prized and cherished 
5. publicly affirmed 
6. acted upon in reality 
7. acted upon repeatedly6 
For the advocates of VC, the purpose of moral education is not the discovery or application 
of moral truth (for there cannot be any such truth in these matters), but the development of 
a child's valuing process to whatever end he or she prefers. For, as Schon defends this 
approach, "we cannot give children an absolute set of values, but we can give them 
something better ... a system that they can use to arrive at their own values". 7 A Socratic 
mode of moral enquiry proceeding dialectically through rational challenge and response, for 
example, can only result in the unnecessary creation of intense classroom conflict over 
issues of controversy - a so-called 'pressure cooker' environment that cannot foster the 
well-being of children. All there is to hope for is that we can help children choose a value, 
any value, rather than see them fall into the nihilistic abyss. This account of modern moral 
life presents the educator with a very stark choice, but it is a choice that many teachers 
have been willing to make. Yet despite this, there are a number of ways in which the 
starkness of this choice may be due to the reliance of VC upon some rather questionable 
theoretical foundations. These are worthy of some consideration here. 
Even if one were to accept the extremely sceptical response to modern moral diversity that 
VC avows, it is by no means clear that its preferred pedagogical strategies cohere very well 
with even this particular world-view. Given that no particular moral value or framework of 
values can be said to be superior to any other, the VC teacher is expected to be thoroughly 
neutral in their treatment of such issues - all values should be on an equal footing in the 
classroom. The teacher should see his or her role as being a kind of therapeutic technician, 
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facilitating psychological effectiveness in the valuing process. However, the aim of 
neutrality can result in different approaches depending upon how it is interpreted. It could 
mean that the teacher should refrain from referring to contestable issues of value 
completely, or ensure that if this proves impossible then no one value is given favour or 
priority over any other. Alternatively, the neutral teacher could be concerned that education 
should produce an environment in which different and competing values could be 
considered as equals, even if this is not the situation which originally pertains. Such a 
conception of neutrality would therefore license some considerable departures from the 
requirements of a solely procedural neutrality in order to correct the imbalances that may 
be imported to the classroom. Given that VC is opposed to the idea that morality could be 
seen as social conformity or conventional behaviour determined by influences outside of the 
individual and his or her personal valuing process, this second interpretation of the 
requirements of neutrality would be unavailable for its advocates or practitioners. 
The results of this may be quite considerable. Children will inevitably bring with them to 
the classroom certain opinions from elsewhere. Parents may often attempt to guide their 
children toward some certain set of values. Popular media may reinforce these or offer 
another conflicting set. Even other school lessons may affect the standing of certain value 
options - science for example, would tend (perhaps inadvertently) to question the validity of 
world-views that did not fit its particular conception of rationality. This is what is often 
referred to as the 'hidden curriculum' operative within educational institutions. All of these 
external influences would serve to make the VC teacher's procedural neutrality become a 
means of reinforcing the heteronomy of the valuing process, rather than a facilitation of 
individual free choice. Also, according to John Stewart, this effect is merely furthered by 
the requirement that real values must be publicly affirmed. This creates strong peer 
pressure which serves only to undermine any truly personal preferences that an individual 
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may initially have. Thus, even though VC sets out as a critique of moral conventionalism it 
ends as an abdicatory means of cementing it.8 
One might also express doubts concerning the extent to which a 'clarified' value is, or is 
likely to be, applied outside of the moral education classroom. It would not seem difficult to 
imagine that a child could prize and affirm the value of, say, tolerance or benevolence to an 
extent which successfully met the seven necessary criteria, but not exhibit these values at all 
when they are called for in ordinary life. Although criteria 6 and 7 are intended to cover 
this issue, we might still doubt whether VC could ever be truly effective in creating the sort 
of people who do good for its own sake rather than for some ulterior reward. Any approach 
to moral education short of brain-washing will of course face the problem that children may 
not always act in the way they should, but the very 'staged' conception of morality that is at 
work in VC would seem to heighten the chances of this becoming a major obstacle. 
Morality becomes like Shakespearean English - an obscure, idiosyncratic language learnt 
for the purpose of dramatic performance with the vague hope that it may have civilising 
effects upon its students. We would surely hope for moral education to have a rather more 
direct impact upon character and behaviour (in all circumstances) than this. Taken together 
with the difficulties concerning neutrality, what we see here is that VC simultaneously 
exaggerates the insulation of the classroom from the effects of the outside world, and the 
likelihood that the values that arise from VC will be transferred to actual behaviour in that 
very same world. These are tendencies which evidently run in conflicting directions. 
Critics of VC might also argue that there are some serious deficiencies with the subjectivist 
understanding of morality upon which it is reliant. However well values are clarified one 
might still question the extent to which these values accurately represent the subject matter 
of moral education at all. It is hard to understand how an approach that stresses the need for 
developing values from increased self-awareness, apart from social others, and would make 
no distinction between the values of Frederick West and Mahatma Gandhi9, can in any way 
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be dealing with something we would recognise as 'morality'. The self-evidence of certain 
evaluative distinctions is the bedrock upon which our sense of the importance of morality is 
built. If we could make no moral judgement in such extreme cases why would we think 
moral education is worth our while? 
As well as not marking a clear difference between some moral judgements and others, VC 
is similarly unable to distinguish between the moral and the non-moral. The decision of 
whether or not to report a bully or racist teacher possesses just the same status as the choice 
of school dinner or training shoe style. They are both simply values, with no categorical 
difference between them. To stress the importance of one type of choice or the triviality of 
another is simply to engage in the type of indoctrinatory activity that VC disallows. The 
limitation of the role of the moral educator to this degree seems heavily counter-intuitive. 
As Robert Sandin remarks, " ... an education that does not distinguish between such choices 
from a moral point of view only confuses the nature of moral decision" 10, and the 
promotion of confusion is surely not the aim of any form of education, even when it does 
concern issues of controversy. 
It may be, however, that to continue to lambaste VC is somewhat akin to the savaging of a 
straw man, in that this approach has almost completely fallen from favour amongst 
educational theorists. Its rejection of moral indoctrination may have represented a form of 
recognition for the changing and diversified nature of our moral environment, but there is 
little doubt that the repercussions of this were greatly exaggerated. Its only response to the 
lack of moral consensus was to advocate complete subjectivism in education, and to reduce 
the status of all moral judgements to the level of personal preference. I I For a form of moral 
education that is more responsive to the true nature of our moral lives one must look 
elsewhere. 
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Kohlberg's Cognitive Developmentalism 
The central 'guiding thread' of Kohlberg's work across the various domains of philosophy, 
psychology, sociology and educational theory was his rejection of relativism (of the sort 
that underpinned VC) as a coherent foundation for a theory of moral development and 
education. The relativity of moral judgements cannot be inferred simply from the existence 
of cultural variance - it must also be supported by proper philosophical argumentation and it 
is this he finds lacking. Kohlberg proposed that we should be guided by a principle of 
'methodological non-relativism' in ethics. Educators should consequently avoid both the 
indoctrination of dominant social values, and the idea that moral education can be simply 
guided by a child's own personal preference. Instead, they should grant primacy to 
universal or universalizable ethical principles in shaping the proper form of education. 
Kohlberg's defence of this idea lay in his development of Piaget's earlier work on the 
psychological evolution of the various stages of moral reasoning. This had suggested that 
children's conceptions of the physical and social world necessarily progresses through an 
invariant sequence of thought levels. Using these ideas, Kohlberg (after studying the 
responses of children to a variety of hypothetical moral dilemmas) claimed to have 
identified six stages of moral development forming three levels or categories of moral 
reasoning. This model combined a psychological theory of development with a normative 
philosophical argument for the necessary superiority of certain moral outlooks over others. 
As he claimed himself; "the scientific theory as to why people factually do move upward 
from stage to stage, and why they factually do prefer a higher stage to a lower, is broadly 
the same as a moral theory as to why people should prefer a higher stage to a lower. " 12 The 
proper aim of the moral educator (in all cultures) is to effect the transition of children 
upward through the various rungs of this schema - any alternative aim serving only to 
obstruct and delay their proper moral development. 13 
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The first (and lowest) of the three levels is characterised by a firm moral realism. Kohlberg 
termed this 'pre-conventional', and argued that the child at this level of reasoning will tend 
to conceive of moral values as possessing an objective, external status requiring mere 
compliance. Reasoning at this level moves through two distinct stages; firstly the 
'punishment and obedience' orientation (the child merely aiming to avoid reprimand and 
punishment), and secondly the 'instrumental-relativist' orientation which sees the child 
seeking more to do what is socially acceptable in the hope of securing praise. At this base 
level therefore, the child's moral understanding and behaviour is notably egoistic. 
The second, 'conventional' level of reasoning consists similarly of two stages. At the first 
of these, the so-called 'good-boy - nice-girl' orientation, the child's interest in gaining 
approval becomes less egoistic, and "the very idea of seeking to please assumes greater 
moral significance." 14 From this stage, according to Kohlberg, the child should proceed to 
having a loyalty to general themes of 'authority' and 'law and order' as invested with this 
same moral significance. At this second stage, therefore, the child progresses to understand 
the socially cohesive and ordering functions of morality, but still retains a largely compliant 
attitude towards them. 
It is only at the 'post-conventional, autonomous or principled' level, however, that 
genuinely moral forms of reasoning are apparently involved. At the first of its two stages, 
the 'contractual-legal' orientation, children grasp the idea that moral rules have the nature 
of man-made laws or conventions. This is characterised by moral reasoning of a social 
contract or rights based style. The sixth and highest stage of the developmental scheme is 
attained with the transition to 'universal ethical principle' orientations with allegiance being 
granted less to social rules or agreements, but to the moral principles that override them. 
Ideal moral reasoners are therefore fully autonomous rational actors of the kind we 
encounter in the political philosophy of John Rawls. Kohlberg cemented such a comparison 
by maintaining that the principle of justice is the key to satisfying the criterion of 
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universalizability (that valid moral principles are valid for all actors in all situations), and 
thus represents the pinnacle of ethical thought. IS The Kohlbergian morally educated person 
is thus, in Barry Chazan's words, 
... a person who draws upon a combination of characteristics to confront a moral 
situation: reflection, principles, the value of justice a disposition to act, and the 
awareness of and interaction with a social setting. The morally educated person 
has learned how to reflect on a (moral) problem that arises in a social setting, 
consider the various alternatives, reach a resolution in terms of the most general 
principle of justice (rather than on the basis of custom, law, or whim) and 
translate this deliberation into a deed. The morally educated person for Kohlberg 
has learned the process of moral deliberation and judgement, and operationalizes 
the process so as to realise the principle of justice in the world.16 
In facilitating the progression of their students to this ideal stage of moral development, the 
Kohlbergian teacher will make use of those very Socratic strategies that were derided by 
proponents of VC as leading to a counter-productive 'pressure-cooker' environment. 
Rather than encouraging the affirmation of currently held values, the teacher (assuming that 
the class is not wholly operating at stage six) should focus specifically upon areas of moral 
conflict. The use of hypothetical moral dilemmas is a particularly favoured means of doing 
this - Kohlberg's most famous example presenting the case of someone faced with the 
choice of whether or not to steal a prohibitively expensive drug from a local doctor to save 
his mortally ill wife. In the consideration of such conflictual situations, the teacher should 
encourage students to reflect upon the different possible ways in which the issue could be 
resolved ethically and the potential pitfalls of these. This serves to distance the student from 
mere received morality and to stress the importance of meta-ethical reflection. Utilising the 
Socratic means of critical questioning, the teacher should then seek to present the 
advantages of resolving such moral conflicts in a way belonging to a moral stage at least 
one stage higher than that at which the students had been operating. In the aforementioned 
dilemma, for example, the teacher should stress how the right to life will always 'trump' 
the right to property. This will ideally have the effect of promoting the moral development 
of at least some of the students towards a higher stage of reasoning .17 
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In many ways, the popularity that Kohlberg's ideas have enjoyed is not wholly surprising. 
He rejected the subjectivist and relativist underpinnings of VC that have appeared so 
fragile, and stressed the possibility of moral agreement and development. He boldly 
asserted the need for moral educators to involve themselves directly in the moral 
development of their students, and showed how such involvement can improve the 
standards of their moral reasoning. He also offered the vision of a just and egalitarian 
society as the ideal end-point towards which the efforts of teacher can lead us. There has, 
however, been a growth in the amount of criticism his ideas have received. I shall consider 
such criticism in two main categories, the first of which will address the charge that 
Kohlberg's developmental account of morality improperly prioritises one particular 
conception of the 'moral point of view' over others. The second category will concern the 
argument that he gives insufficient attention to affective and habitual aspects of moral 
judgement, action and learning (most especially characterised in the 'virtue ethics' 
tradition). I shall not, however, discuss the criticism levelled at Kohlberg by the work of 
Carol Gilligan under these categories. I shall later make more extensive reference to her 
ideas in terms of a possible critique of conventional forms of moral theorising (of which 
Kohlberg's is an example). 
Kohlberg's attack on relativism rests upon a strong isomorphism between psychological and 
moral development. This in turn requires his notion of stage six to function as its fe/os, an 
end-point where all moral disagreements can be resolved and relativism is no longer an 
issue. One of the main criticisms of Kohlberg's work is that this ideal stage does not 
actually represent a final stage of actual psychological development, but is simply preferred 
a priori. It represents merely his attachment to Kant's ideas about the nature of morality 
conjoined with the theories of later neo-Kantians such as Hare, Rawls and Habermas. 
Universalizability, prescriptivity and impartiality, it is argued, are not necessarily improper 
philosophical ideas upon which to build a theory of moral development and education, but 
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Kohlberg writes as though they arise out of his empirical work. Moreover, as a result 
Kohlberg ignores other possible foundations for such work. Utilitarianism, for example, is 
consigned to the status of stage four morality, with Kohlberg maintaining that its 
characteristic procedures of moral reasoning are encompassed and superseded by superior 
stages. This would seem to seriously underestimate the real issues of controversy between 
utilitarian and deontological ethics. Given the strong similarities between their ideas (which 
I shall detail later), one wonders quite what Kohlberg would have made of Hare's recent 
development of his position into a strong form of utilitarianism. IS Would this imply the 
retrogressive move which Kohlberg's 'lock-step' methodology refuses to allow? Indeed, his 
description of stage six morality forecloses upon many areas of debate in moral philosophy 
- are principles the centrepiece of moral knowledge? Does the principle of justice 
encompass all of morality? Does justice differ from impartiality? Can moral conflict be 
wholly eliminable? Does (as he supposes) correct moral reasoning necessitate correct moral 
action? How do we understand the akratic or morally weak? I will in due course give rather 
more sustained attention to some of these issues in a wider context. 
Kohlberg seems merely to take for granted the assumption that the educator's proper 
concern is with the formal processes of moral reasoning. It is the form rather than the 
content of the morality that is the subject of development. Although the final stage of 
development is meant to produce a specific moral content -that of the ideal principle of 
justice - the worth of other stages is assessed only in terms of their form. This would imply 
that a Nazi reasoning at stage three (social conventionalism) is comparable to someone who 
reasons in a way conventional to a more civilised society. Laurence Thomas argues that it 
would be strongly counter-intuitive to claim that these two stage three moral reasoners were 
making equally good progress towards the just moral content of stage six - " ... if the virtue 
of kindness is an instance of moral betterment, one certainly does not contribute to this end 
by teaching people how to treat others ruthlessly and sadistically ... 19 He concludes that the 
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notion of moral development can make little sense without a more substantive content about 
right and wrong behaviour than Kohlberg allows for, and that this entails an emphasis upon 
the partly habitual and affective character of morality. Furthermore, his intellectualist 
conception of moral development and education does not, as John Kleinig has remarked, 
"explain why we should care to engage in what they call genuine moral reasoning, nor 
why, when we have engaged in it, we should care enough to act on it. " 20 Morality is surely 
not just another school subject like mathematics, or even moral philosophy, but is more 
intimately connected with our relationships with other people, and those aspects of 
character exhibited in these relationships. It is more than just a matter of knowing the rules. 
This stress upon the importance of moral character is not meant to imply that abstract moral 
principles and procedures of moral reasoning have no place in our moral experience - they 
clearly do - but rather claims that Kohlberg improperly conceives of them as being 
exhaustive of morality and thus of moral education. Critics such as Don Locke and RS 
Peters have argued that we should not be expected to engage in full moral reasoning each 
time we perform a moral action as such a requirement distorts the ways in which we 
characteristically act according to reasoned habits. We may unthinkingly and habitually wait 
to hold open a door if an infirm person is following us into a building, but this does not 
mean that this habit is unresponsive to reasons - merely that we do not needlessly engage in 
the same act of reasoning every time we perform the action. As Locke maintains; 
... habits need not be blind habits, and to the extent that the agent would notice relevant 
changes in the circumstances, and modify or interrupt his habit accordingly, his habit is 
sensitive to moral reasons. And this is entirely compatible with his taking no account 
whatsoever of those circumstances, provided they do remain as usual.21 
Kohlberg, however, associated notions of habit and character with the cultural transmission 
model of moral education which, along with relativism, he had sought to reject. He 
intentionally opposed his idealisation of an ethics of principle and duty to those approaches 
he saw as promoting, to use his own term, a mere 'bag of virtues' - a selection of desired 
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character traits. He argued that the huge number and variance of such possible traits (from 
Aristotle's magnificence and temperance to the 'monkish virtues' of humility and chastity) 
made them wholly relative to cultural circumstance, and that even if we could agree on a 
certain set, the 1930s studies of Hartshorne and May had suggested that children do not 
tend to display the consistent aspects of character appropriate to virtue22 • His wholesale 
rejection of the virtue ethics tradition along with the very idea of a moral training or 
apprenticeship left Kohlberg with a strongly unbalanced, over-intellectualised account of 
moral judgement and action. He sought to transport both teacher and student from the 
relativity of their ordinary moral experience to a domain of autonomous abstract reasoning 
but left no point of contact other than faith in psychological development to carry us there. 
We have strong reasons to doubt whether we could arrive there by such means or that it 
would even prove to be such a wonderful destination. 
Wilson's 'Moral Components' 
Other writers who have criticised Kohlberg's developmental methodology have not seen 
reason to lose faith in the delights of its destination. John Wilson has expressed strongly 
sceptical doubts about the notion that the understanding of moral concepts and procedures is 
tied to chronological stages of psychological development. He argues that even the very 
youngest child can comprehend these concepts in some useful form and that "if there are 
'stages' through which children must pass before being able to learn [what counts in moral 
reasoning], either they occur very early or I am not clear what they are. " 23 Despite these 
disagreements, however, Wilson's conception of the task of moral education has strong 
affinities with that of Kohlberg. 
Throughout his lengthy career, Wilson has shown little patience with those who see 
morality as being in some way 'too hot to handle' educationally. This reluctance (or 
'resistance' as he peculiarly likes to term it) stems from what he sees as an inability to 
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conceive of morality as being a curriculum subject like any other, possessing its own 
particular rational procedures. The moral educator, Wilson believes, should be concerned 
to establish "what equipment the morally educated person logically requires and, from that, 
how to assess such equipment and how to generate practical methods to enhance it." 24 He 
maintains that such a focus upon these second order features of moral reasoning thus avoids 
both a relativism which rejects any notion of 'right answers' in morality as well as an 
association with any particular moral content. The facilitation of these logical procedures of 
moral thinking will therefore allow the morally educated person to choose their own moral 
views and commitments in a rational way. 
As for Kohlberg, the ideal form of moral reasoning is principled. The solutions of moral 
quandaries are available via the rational formulation of moral principles that are overriding, 
prescriptive and universalizable. Overriding in that they exhaust the realm of legitimate 
action guiding considerations (trumping all others such as emulation, authority, faith or 
preference). Prescriptive in that they recommend a certain course of action (as opposed to 
being descriptive and merely presenting details of a factual situation). And lastly, 
universalizable in that choosing a principle to govern our own behaviour commits us to 
accepting that all other peoples behaviour should also be legitimately governed by it (thus 
causing us to see that our own interests count for no more and no less than the interests of 
anybody else). To live one's life according to such principles of one's own rational 
construction is to be autonomous. Once this form of moral reasoning is recognised, 
educators may seek to facilitate its development by paying attention to those kinds of 
knowledge, dispositions and skills which enable it to be utilised in practical situations. 
Wilson identifies four broad categories of these 'moral components'. PHIL involves having 
the concept of a person, using it in the formulation of principles as described above and 
having feelings which support such principles. EMP is the ability to conceptualise and 
identify emotions both in others and in oneself. GIG is knowledge of the facts of a given 
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moral situation and the skills of communicating both verbally and non-verbally in such 
situations. Lastly, KRAT involves utilising these different forms of appreciation in the 
forming of considered rational principles, and having the ability and commitment to act on 
these in practice. He provides an example of a possible topic concerning 'old people'. This 
would attempt to convey 'hard' facts about these people and the conditions under which 
they live (GIG); an understanding of how they feel (EMP) and why they are just as 
important as anybody else (PHIL); and an ability to make moral decisions and take action in 
such a context (KRA T).25 As long as both practitioners and theorists are clear about the 
kind of thinking that moral educators should be concerned with developing and the 
components which enable it to so develop, the practical means which facilitate it are judged 
largely according to their empirical success (a concept with which Wilson has little 
difficulty). This may involve direct teaching of the philosophical procedures of moral 
thinking, or (perhaps for younger children), the use of role-play and moral dilemmas to 
promote understanding. As for Kohlberg, Wilson has more recently stressed the importance 
of creating a communal atmosphere that best contributes to the success of moral education 
by avoiding obvious counter examples in whole-school practice, and allowing the 
opportunity for children to put their newly learnt procedures of moral reasoning into 
practice in a collective setting,26 Yet this does not indicate any real change in Wilson's 
understanding of the nature of moral reasoning - these more recent thoughts concern the 
best ways in which we may support moral education the locus of which still lies with the 
autonomous reasoner. 
Evidently, the similarity of his vision of moral education to that provided by Kohlberg will 
mean that many of the criticisms that were directed towards him hit equally hard against 
Wilson. Their shared conception of morality as a matter of principled action where any 
particular moral choice can be subsumed under a particular governing principle is, as I have 
argued above, somewhat contentious. It lacks an acknowledgement of an affective 
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dimension of moral judgement in which emotional response is not something to be simply 
governed by reason, but rather is an important part of what it is to be moral in that given 
instance. This concentration upon the formal procedures of moral reasoning considers, at 
most, only part of the picture about morality. Even if Wilson and Kohlberg were to have 
been right about what these procedures are (and I doubt that they were), they ignore too 
much of importance to provide sound theories of moral education. We are left in some 
doubt concerning the motivations of children to behave according to the moral principles 
which their lessons will encourage them to form. They may have the ability to construct 
these principles, but the knowledge of where and when moral action is called for (thus 
when to call upon one's principles), the perception of the salient facts in the situation which 
calls for such action, and the integrity and courage to act in the way we know to be right 
are equally important. It is these further aspects of moral decision and behaviour that I 
believe calls for an understanding of the issues raised by the idea of character and its 
development. I shall in due course return to the implications of these issues. 
Although he has been criticised for his concentration on the purely formal 'second-order 
logic' of moral language, Wilson has also faced the charge that he has smuggled into this 
category first-order normative ethics. Whilst Kohlberg stressed how moral development 
would lead to an end-state of a distinctly Kantian (and Rawlsian) morality, Wilson would 
seem to have imported some of the central ideas of utilitarianism into his supposedly 
content-neutral analysis of 'moral components'. This is evident in his identification of PHIL 
- "the degree to which one can identify with the people in the sense of being such that other 
people's feelings and interests actually count or weigh with one" .27 We may appreciate that 
an awareness of other people and a concern for them is an important part of morality, but 
when conjoined with the requirements to form overriding, prescriptive and universalizable 
principles and to possess feeling to support these it becomes its sole concern. We might well 
ask why values such as truthfulness, loyalty or Kohlberg's justice cannot be similarly 
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overriding. In the guise of a formal analysis of morality, Wilson has thus prescribed a 
monistic morality based upon a supposedly universal sentiment of benevolence - namely 
utilitarianism.28 
Wilson is consequently open to attack not only from those who oppose his stated intention 
to provide proposals for moral education based upon a formal account of the logic of moral 
language, but also from the opponents of the normative morality we find embedded within 
his account. Utilitarianism has of course been attacked in many different ways. Its monistic 
interpretation of the morally good life as the promotion of pleasure and the avoidance of 
pain (or other less hedonistic forms of utility), and the apparently counter-intuitive nature of 
its answers to certain moral dilemmas have proved to be particularly contentious. But for 
our purposes it would seem that its greatest downfall is the extent to which it appears to 
misrepresent some of the essential features of our ordinary moral experience. Bernard 
Williams has famously focused upon this 'self-denying' aspect of utilitarianism in asserting 
that it would force us to neglect the importance of our close personal relationships of care 
and responsibility in order to retain the sanctity of the impartial utility promoter's viewpoint 
as the exemplar of moral agency. Thus if one were presented with a dilemma such that one 
could save from certain death either (but not both) a great philanthropist or one's wife, one 
should reason on the basis of which action was going to have the best impartial results in 
terms of the maximisation of utility. One would therefore have a moral duty to save the 
philanthropist. Williams argues that this would be to ask 'one question too many' - that the 
truly moral person would not even think before rushing to save their wife - and that to think 
this improper is to neglect the importance of our personal relationships to the foundation of 
morality. The same kind of argument has also been presented by Joseph Raz who claims 
that certain values by their very nature preclude instrumental reasoning. To weigh up the 
value of friendship against, say, economic utility is not to adopt the moral role of the 
impartial spectator, but is simply to misunderstand the nature of friendship. To submit all 
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our personal values, projects and relationships to such calculation would be, as Stephen 
Lukes puts it, "itself an expression of the weakening or absence of those very relationships 
or else a degraded simulacrum of them" .29 Only those people who would not even think to 
engage in this sort of reasoning are truly capable of possessing friends. The general claim 
here is that utilitarianism misses something essential and irreducible about the moral 
experience (the phenomenology of morality) and that it would be improper for us to 
advocate any programme of moral education based upon such foundations. 
The specific issue of utilitarianism is particular to the criticism of Wilson's approach. 30 The 
general aim of this section has not been to focus upon every negative aspect of the three 
theories discussed, but to point towards ways in which they may be linked in terms of their 
philosophical outlook despite the efforts of the theorists involved to disassociate their ideas 
from each other. At the beginning of this chapter I claimed that the degree of commonality 
between the most popular contemporary approaches to moral education had long been 
underestimated. I hope that the foregoing discussion has provided some initial justification 
for that claim. Despite the degree to which Kohlberg and Wilson are critical of the vulgar 
relativism they see to underlie Values Clarification, and endeavour to present their own 
theories in sharp contradistinction to it, they evidently share some notable common features. 
Predominant amongst these is an emphasis upon the priority of the generalform of moral 
concepts over their particular moral contents, and upon the intellectual nature of such 
concepts at the expense of their situation within the broader context of the entire character 
of the virtuous moral agent. In the next chapter I shall develop this argument with a 
consideration of some theoretical approaches which differ with regard to such issues, and 
which may provide some firmer ground for the development of an approach to moral 
education which avoids many of the failings I have discussed up to this point. Before this, 
however, I shall investigate some of the ways in which contemporary philosophy has helped 
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to engender this particularly one-sided understanding of the purpose of an education in 
morality. 
Philosophical Underpinnings 
The contemporary philosopher whose work is most closely linked to these theories of moral 
education is undoubtedly R M Hare. John Wilson appeals directly to Hare's work on many 
occasions, and Hare himself has written of his approval for Kohlberg's work as largely 
supportive of his own. His understanding of the nature of moral language, largely defining 
the 'school' known as 'prescriptivism', is set firmly within the heritage of post-Kantian 
analytical philosophy. Although having long since passed out of fashion in the ivory towers 
of pure philosophy (its heyday having been in the 1960s), the traces of something very 
much akin to prescriptivist views are discernible in virtually all of those programmes for 
moral education that have self-consciously sought to reject traditional incu1catory models. 
Indeed, David Carr has recently remarked that 
... its [prescriptivism's] influence is still strong in educational philosophy which 
like some other areas of 'applied' philosophy has tended to lag somewhat behind 
the mainstream of academic philosophical work and, beyond educational 
philosophical circles as such, various rather confused versions of the prescriptivist 
viewpoint are readily enough encountered from time to time in 'official' 
educational policy documents from state departments of education. 31 
The genesis of precriptivism is perhaps best understood in terms of its response to the 
popular account of moral meaning offered in a variety of ways by philosophers such as AJ 
Ayer and Charles Stevenson in the 1930s and 40s. This 'emotivist' theory was constructed 
upon two philosophical pillars - a logical positivist conception of meaning and a Humeanism 
concerning the relationship between reason and desire. The first stressed that only those 
statements that were empirically verifiable by reference to sensory experience or were 
analytic explications of grammatical structures could be said to possess any real meaning or 
truth value. The second, Humean aspect of the emotivist theory lay in its assumption that 
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reason alone cannot motivate action as this is the function of passion or emotion (the so-
called 'belief-desire thesis ') .32 
Taken together, these assumptions led to the view that moral (or other evaluative) 
judgements could not report anything about the world other than the emotive state of those 
who issue them. The meaning of these judgements was not to be understood in terms of 
their reports, but in terms of the emotive function which the judgements themselves serve. 
According to this line of thought we would not be using terms such as 'good', 'bad, 
'righteous' or 'evil' to express any kind of truth claim at all, but would instead be 
expressing our emotional feelings towards some object or course of action. These terms are 
therefore reduced to the same status as utterances like 'boo' and 'hiss'. Although some have 
attempted to broaden the scope of emotivism to include more general forms of 'pro-attitude' 
as well as base emotion, the core features of the doctrine remained more or less the same. 
This non-cognitivist denial that moral claims could be true or false in the way that empirical 
statements can thus preserves our understanding of morality as essentially action-guiding -
allowing us to see something strange in the behaviour of someone who pronounced a certain 
practice to be evil yet continued to engage in it. 
This account of the nature of moral language - one which evidently has great affinities with 
many of the presuppositions of Values-Clarification - seems instantly to be rather counter-
intuitive. When we make a moral judgement we certainly feel as though we are doing rather 
more than expressing our emotional response to its object. Indeed we are likely to see such 
a suggestion as something of an affront. If the use of terms such as 'good' and 'evil' served 
only to express approval or disapproval, why would we need phrases other than 'I approve' 
or 'I disapprove'? In using this former kind of moral language we surely think ourselves to 
be doing more than merely expressing a preference, but to be appealing to some moral 
court of appeal that exists outside of our own subjectivity. It not simply that we experience 
a 'gut feeling' that there exists a real difference between mere expression of taste or 
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preference and a bona fide moral judgement. The distinction would seem to rest upon rather 
firmer ground than this (as it would need to). For instance, someone who said that they 
enjoyed the flavour, texture and effects of olives but did not like to eat them would be asked 
a number of clarifying questions in order to set the matter of their tastes aright. There 
would initially appear to be something distinctly odd about their position. It is doubtful 
however that we would have so much difficulty in accepting someone's opinion that 
although martyrdom was a very fine and admirable thing, they did not actually wish to 
become a martyr. 
Our acceptance that this disjuncture between judgement and action may be a sign of 
something other than irrationality in the latter instance reflects our understanding that it is a 
fundamentally more difficult arena of choice. One would hardly imagine that the failure to 
eat olives could be the result of a weakness of the agent's will rather than their logic, 
although this might be our first choice of explanation to explain the avoidance of death on 
behalf of someone who believed that their cause merited the loss of their own life.33 Also, 
and somewhat conversely, although the non-eater of olives might well provoke more 
demand for reasons to explain the puzzling disjuncture between their beliefs and actions, 
the latter judgement (that martyrdom is a good practice) would ordinarily require more 
extensive and objective reasons to command agreement from others. We may be happy that 
someone's preference for olives is explained merely by the fact that they 'like them'. but 
we would not agree with support for martyrdom on the same basis - the first is intrinsically 
a more subjective matter. It is distinctions of this kind between different types of judgement 
that emotivism, in reducing all judgements to the expression of preference cannot account 
for. And this is a failure which contributes to rendering it unsatisfactory as an account of 
the meaning of moral language. 
The account of morality that largely superseded that of emotivism was provided by RM 
Hare. He retained the Humean non-cognitivist assertion that moral language does not 
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describe any features of the natural (or non-natural) world together with the internalist 
claim that to accept a certain moral view is to be motivated by it. Yet, despite this, he 
rejected the view that morality represented nothing more than a set of emotive responses or 
attitudes. The prescriptivist theory that he offered in its stead is evident in the critiques of 
Values Clarificationism offered by the proponents of Kohlberg's moral developmentalism in 
that he insists that moral judgement, whilst certainly non-cognitive and non-descriptive, is 
nonetheless a rational activity. The focus now moves to the identification, analysis, and in 
an educational context the development, of these logical forms of moral reasoning. Indeed, 
Hare himself has maintained that" ... if parents first, and then children, understand better 
the jomzai character of morality, and of the moral concepts, there would be little need to 
bother, ultimately, about the content of our children's moral principles, for if the form is 
really and clearly understood, the content will look after itself." 34 
Once more to situate moral philosophy in the context of wider theories of meaning, the 
origins of prescriptivism are perhaps best understood against the background of the 
criticisms of logical positivism made in the later work of the Cambridge philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein. He famously maintained that philosophy is misled if it accepts the 
assumption (shared by the logical positivists) that the purpose of language is solely to 
describe the world. The meaning of language cannot therefore be understood merely by 
reference to its grammatical structure, but must be considered in the context of those 
concrete situations (or more widely, 'forms of life') in which it is necessarily implicated. 
Any theoretical study of language which neglects reference to the context of its use is 
therefore no longer considering real language at all, but rather 'language on holiday'. 
The influence of these criticisms was particularly strong at Oxford University where, 
against the background of the ensuing 'ordinary language' school (as represented by Austin, 
Ryle, Strawson and others) Hare developed his theory.35 He shared with the emotivists the 
view that moral terms such as 'right', 'good' and 'ought' are not descriptive but rejected the 
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idea that they were irrational emotional responses. Instead, he argued that judgements 
employing such terms were predominantly used to guide action and were thus prescriptive -
entailing moral imperatives that told people what to do. Such prescriptions, being rational 
judgements, had to be supported by reasons (although these were logically distinct from 
factual discourse). Following Kant, Hare saw the logic inherent in the proper use of the 
moral 'ought' as insisting that our judgements commit us to universalizable principles -
prescriptions that could apply equally to all those acting in similar circumstances. We do 
not have our moral prescriptions overruled by someone who merely describes new facts to 
us, as no evaluative conclusions necessarily follow from descriptive conclusions (this is the 
'fact/value' distinction at the heart of non-cognitivism). Although we may change our 
evaluations once we learn of new facts (such as learning that someone we thought of as 
honest had told a lie), there is no reason why people may not agree on all the facts of the 
case yet differ greatly in their evaluations. What we are subject to however is the logic 
inherent in moral prescription, in that we could not accept that two people were alike in all 
the morally relevant features yet evaluate them differently. For example, we could not 
consistently claim that although A and B performed similarly kind acts, only A could be 
considered to be a kind person because B had large feet. This kind of moral inconsistency 
would violate the requirements of universalizability. As would someone who thought it 
right to exploit his workforce, but would not be prepared to be exploited himself, even 
though there was no relevant difference between himself and his employees. Although they 
do not appeal to any form of moral reality for ultimate justification, a person's moral 
attitudes must be internally consistent.36 
However, whereas" Kant appears to have thought that by the right exercise of human 
reason in moral matters we could discern or establish a moral with a genuine claim to 
absolute or universal authority over any rational being irrespective of his local or personal 
circumstances" 37, prescriptivists allowed the social and linguistic relativity of the content of 
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moral judgements. Indeed, this was often seen to be one of the main advantages of the 
theory. Although the objectivity of the universalisation criterion was unquestioned, they 
maintained that such universalisations would not necessarily produce the same results for all 
people. Hare argued in an oft-cited passage that, 
... if asked to justify as completely as possible any decision, we have to bring in 
both effects - to give content to the decision - and principles, and the effects in 
general of observing those principles, and so on, until we have satisfied our 
inquirer. Thus a complete justification of a decision would consist of a complete 
account of its effects, together with a complete account of the principles which it 
observed, and the effects of observing those principles ... Thus, if pressed to 
justify a decision completely, we have to give a complete specification of the way 
of life of which it is a part. .. If the inquirer stilI goes on asking 'But why should I 
live like that?' then there is no further answer to give him ... We can only ask him 
to make up his own mind which way he ought to live; for in the end everything 
rests upon such a decision of principle. He has to decide whether to accept that 
way of life or not; if he accepts it then we can proceed to justify the decisions that 
are based upon it; if he does not accept it, then let him accept some other, and try 
to live by it.38 
A certain amount of rational variety of morality, particularly across cultures, was therefore 
to be expected. This allowed the theory to cope with some of the challenges posed by the 
degree to which value pluralism seems to have become an endemic part of the modern 
world. But in accepting that moral justification was in the final instance a matter of personal 
preference, Hare exposed himself to the criticism that all manner of amoralists or fanatics 
could adopt a set of internally consistent prescriptions that the rest of us would find 
distinctly unpalatable. Were the only grounds upon which we could criticise a Nazi those of 
consistency, or were their particular kinds of prescription wrong in some more fundamental 
sense? In response, Hare claimed that fanatical and socially-pathological prescriptions 
would simply never prove attractive when considered in the light of the requirements of 
universalizability - despite holding that Jews should be exterminated, the Nazi would be 
unlikely to hold that he should be available to be killed on the grounds of some similar 
morally irrelevant characteristic. In other words, any fanatic who thought rationally enough 
about their position would most probably come to revise it. Many critics have expressed 
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doubts concerning the likelihood that the exposed inconsistency of certain moral ideas is 
sufficient to remove the possibility that people would find them attractive - that the strange 
sounding 'principled Nazi' is perhaps not such a remote idea.39 
Just as emotivism seemed to underlie the theory and practice of Values Clarificationism, we 
can now see the extent to which prescriptivism serves much the same function for the ideas 
of Kohlberg and Wilson. In conceiving of morality as essentially non-cognitive but subject 
to distinct criteria of rational usage, their primary emphasis was placed on the construction 
and observance of principles under which individual moral quandaries may be subsumed. 
The ideal moral actors being equal and autonomous choosers of their own ends, reasoning 
in an impartial manner, and with such ratiocination being sufficient for the production of 
consistent moral prescriptions. There is, however, an extent to which both writers diverge 
from the letter of Hare's work. The isomorphism between psychological and moral 
development, leading to an embracing of the 'justice perspective', that is proposed by 
Kohlberg would certainly seem to move beyond the reluctance shown by Hare in his early 
work to claim any universal justification for a particular normative ethic (or that any such 
ethic could be so justified). As he was engaged in a purely second-order investigation of the 
logic of moral statements, to extract first-order conclusions from this investigation would be 
to transgress the fact/value gap (to the existence of which he is committed). Although his 
analysis is at the very least suggestive of certain kinds of substantive morality, this 
reluctance also distinguishes his early work from Wilson's monistic confidence in the 
primacy of benevolence and thus, when universalized, of a form of utilitarianism. 
Matters have altered more recently. In his 1981 work Moral Thinking40 Hare not only 
distinguished for the first time between two distinct 'levels' of moral thought, but 
maintained that at the higher level universal prescriptivism will lead us inevitably towards 
certain evaluative conclusions. Splitting moral thought in this way seemingly allows Hare to 
avoid the criticism that his theory misrepresents the ordinary usage of moral language in 
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insisting that we engage in the construction of universal prescriptive principles every time 
we indulge in evaluation. This is a demand which would appear to make morality so all-
pervasive that it left little time for us to pursue our ordinary personal projects without its 
interference. He countered this suggestion by arguing that ordinary lower-level moral 
thinking (that of the 'prole ') differs from the upper-level's (that of the' Archangel') in being 
characterised by an intuitive appreciation of, and obedience to, the general moral principles 
that have shaped our upbringing. These have been internalised and their importance is 
heavily felt. Recourse to the higher level, however, enables us to subject these received 
opinions to revisionary criticism. When the principles we ordinarily obey come into 
conflict, or uncertainty grows concerning their application, we adopt the role of the 
Archangel as far as we can - to become creatures that are wholly impartial and in 
possession of a full command of logic and the facts of the situation. We now assess the 
merit of such principles by imagining ourselves to be in the position of all those agents who 
would be affected, and taking their preferences equally into account. The thought of the 
Archangel is no longer thought to produce answers that are subject to a certain degree of 
ineliminable moral relativity, but instead accords with a utilitarian normative ethic. For 
Hare therefore, universal prescriptivism now generates the justification for a particular set 
of moral answers. 41 
This would seem would seem to be rather more in accord with Wilson's understanding of 
the implications of prescriptivism for moral education, than with that of Kohlberg who 
consigns utilitarian thinking to an inferior stage of development. If we recall, Wilson's 
model of moral education advocated the development of those 'components' that facilitated 
the formulation of prescriptive, overriding and universalizable principles. Among these 
components was that of PHIL which we have identified as "the degree to which one can 
identify with the people in the sense of being such that other people's feelings and interests 
actually count or weigh with one" .42 Hare would now seem committed to postulating along 
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with Wilson the existence of some shared motive or sentiment of benevolence. Without this, 
there would seem to be little reason to be sure that people would indeed want to assume the 
role of the Archangel, or that if they did assume it, that they would reach mutually 
beneficial (as opposed to mutually harmful) conclusions. There is, however, no mention in 
Wilson's work of any more than one level of thinking. He argues that we are fairly certain 
what the logical requirements of using moral language are, and that we may properly 
educate children of all ages in them; 
.. , it is fairly clear from the results of research that some, at least, of the types of 
reasoning required are well within the grasp of quite young children. If we 
consider the moral components one by one, we shall not think it too rash to say, 
on general or a priori grounds, that the vast majority of children, even within the 
primary school age range, will be capable of understanding each individually, and 
of understanding how they all relate to one's eventual moral behaviour. 43 
Only such an education in the logic of morality has, for Wilson, the right to be termed a 
moral education at all, since it is the only methodology that aims to increase the rational 
autonomy of the pupil. Any approach that sought to develop moral dispositions or habits in 
children44, or to inculcate obedience to supposed moral authorities, is thus debarred on 
educational grounds. This would appear to make an education in Hare's higher level of 
'critical thinking' the only legitimate option. We must seek to produce Archangels and not 
proles. Yet this would seem to rob Hare's two-level approach of much of its force. He does 
not want to argue that the lower-level of thinking somehow inheres in people naturally. It is 
a means of understanding and thought that is just as much in need of being acquired through 
education as the upper level. He therefore concedes that the best way to bring children up 
to be moral may well be to inculcate them with moral feelings. 45 
Of course, a satisfactory moral education will naturally also involve an introduction to the 
thought of the higher level, but Hare does not discuss whether this would be concurrent 
with lower level education, and if not, when and for whom it would be appropriate. 
Although our lower level moral intuitions are subject to criticism and revision in terms of 
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principles of the upper level (which has priority), Hare hopes that they avoid some of the 
excessive demands of utilitarian calculation that I have previously discussed, by allowing us 
to pursue a plurality of moral goods and avoid the 'overload' of benevolent duty 
overwhelming our personal projects until our moral practice comes in need of specification 
or resolution of conflict. Strange as it may seem, Hare allows that we may actually justify 
this release from the demands of the utilitarian life on indirectly utilitarian grounds. But 
whatever the stability of Hare's claims here, Wilson's reliance upon a single definition of 
morality ignores any of their possible advantages in 'finessing' some of the standard 
criticisms of utilitarianism. 
This is not the place to discuss in any more depth the details of Hare's reformulated theory. 
Whatever the relation of moral education theorists to the more precise arguments of this 
particular moral philosopher, it is clear that Wilson and Kohlberg belong squarely in the 
intellectual tradition of which Hare is the most well-known recent member. Through their 
work (and that of other related writers), it has dominated the domain of moral education in 
the last 30 or so years. This heritage, which owes its principal philosophical debts to the 
work of Hume and Kant, shares certain central features which I have outlined previously. 
In the next chapter, I shall move on to discuss those various sources of criticism of this way 
of thinking that might potentially offer resources of use in rethinking moral phenomenology 
and moral education in a more satisfactory manner. 
I This is not to claim, of course, that such approaches are actually being utilised to their full extent in all schools. 
It is clear that the desires of educational theorists (supporting whichever approach) count for little when compared 
with the demands of an increasingly troubled economy that has less need for autonomous moral reasoners than for 
compliant workers (or indeed compliant non-workers). 
2 Chazan, B Contemporary Approaches to Moral Education (1985, New York, Teacher's College Press) p. 68. 
3 Other approaches to moral education developed in the UK include the 'Lifelines' materials of Peter McPhail et 
al e.g. Moral Education in/he Secondary School (1972, London, Longman), and the neutralist methodology for 
the treatment of controversial issues espoused by Lawrence Stenhouse and the School's Council Humanities 
Project e.g. The Schools CouncillNuffield Foundation The Humanities Project: An Introduction (1972, London, 
Heinemann). 
4 Raths, L, Harmin, M and Simon, S Vallles and Teaching (1966, Columbus Ohio, Charles E. Merrill).p. ix. 
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5 Simpson, E Good Lives and Moral Education (1989, New York, Peter Lang) p. 105. 
6 Scharf, P (ed.) Readings in Moral Education (1978, Minneapolis, Winston Press) p. 25. 
7 Simon, Sand Olds, S Helping Your Child Learn Right/ram Wrong: A Guide /0 Values Clarification (1976, New 
York, Simon and Schuster) p. 17. 
8 Stewart, J 'Problems and Contradictions of Values Clarification' in Phi Delta Kappan LVI 10 1975. 
9 "It is not impossible to conceive of someone going through the seven value criteria and deciding that he values 
intolerance or thievery. What is to be done? Our position is that we respect his right to decide upon that value." 
Raths, L, Harmin, M and Simon, Sop. cit. p. 227. 
10 Sandin, R The Rehabilitation 0/ Virtue: Foundations 0/ Moral Education (1992, New York, Pracgcr) p. 59. 
11 In his attempts to develop the VC approach, Howard Kirschenbaum has been willing to accept that there are 
actually some values that it prizes over others. Critical thinking, autonomy, justice and equality are amongst these. 
He refuses to claim, however, that such values can have any rational foundation, and that they may actually be 
more important than a preference for the flavour of vanilla over strawberry. See his Advanced Values Clarification 
(1977, La Jolla CA, University Associates). 
12 Kohlberg, L Essays on Moral Development; vo\. I The Philosophy o/Moral Development: Moral Stages and 
the Idea 0/ Justice (1981, New York, Harper and Row) p. 131. 
13 It is not claimed that all children will necessarily reach the highest level of moral reasoning, merely that 
development will progress sequentially through the levels to its eventual end-point whethcr this is the ideal of 
level six or not. 
14 Carr, D Educating the Virtues (1990, London, Routledge) p. 161. 
15 Kohlberg's more recent work has exhibited strong similarities to Jurgen Habermas's ideas about discourse 
ethics and communicative action. Habermas has also used Kohlberg's empirical work as a foundation for his 
theorising. 
16 Chazan, B op. cit. p. 83. 
17 In his more recent work, Kohlberg has developed his interactionist methodology beyond techniques of one on 
one (or one to class) Socratic questioning to encompass more holistic themes. He has stressed the importance of 
the school representing what he calls a 'just community' to best facilitate moral development. Nonetheless, his 
characterisation of this development remains the same. 
18 Hare, RM Moral Thinking (1981, Oxford, Oxford University Press). 
19 Thomas, L 'Morality and Psychological Development' in Singer, P (ed.) A Companion to Ethics (1991, Oxford, 
Blackwell) p. 472. 
20 Kleinig, J PhilosophicallsslIes in Edllcation (1982, Melbourne, Croom Helm) p. 252. 
21 Locke, D 'Moral Reasons and Moral Action' in Locke, D and Weinrich-Haste, H (eds.) Morality in the Making: 
Thought, Action and the Social Context (1983, Chichester, John Wilcy and Sons) p. 123. 
22 Although it is not clear why we should expect children to have fully settled moral disposition when their moral 
training is incomplete. 
23 Sandin, R op. cif. p. 83. 
24 Wilson, J 'First Steps in Moral Education' in JOII/'l1al o/Moral Education vo!. 25 no. I 1996. 
25 Wilson, J A New Introduction to Moral Education (1990, London, Cassell) p. 172. 
261bid. passim. Cf. Wilson, J 'First Steps in Moral Education' op. cit. p. 88. 
27 Wilson, J Williams, Nand Sugarman, 8 Introduction to Moral Education (1968, London, Penguin) p. 192. 
28 It is ironic that one of Wilson's main criticisms of Kohlberg has been that his prioritisation of 'justice' ignores 
the variety of moral concerns that we have in actuality, and thus illegitimately delimits moral education to the 
mere clarification of that concept. This variety of concerns will always for Wilson be reducible to the terms of 
utility. Cf. Wilson, J 'Philosophical Difficulties and Moral Development' in Munsey, 8 (ed.) Moral Development, 
Moral Edllcation and Kohlberg: Basic Issues in Philosophy, Psychology, Religion and Edllcation (1980, 
Birmingham AL, Religious Education Press). 
29 Lukes, S 'Making Sense of Moral Conflict' in Rosenblum, N (ed.) Liheralism and the Moral Life (1989, 
Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press) p. 139. 
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30 However, the line of criticism that concerns the supposedly self-denying aspects of utilitarianism is also often 
offered against deontological forms of moral theory (i.e. those that concentrate, on the 'right' rather than the 
maximisation of the 'good'). M ichael Stocker, for example, claims that the demands of impartial reason identified 
by both brands of theory are not ful1 enough for anyone to actual1y live a ful1 human life according to them. In 
neglecting (and indeed precluding) the domain of personal caring relationships they induce a kind of 
'schizophrenia' by aiding the progressive divergence of accepted moral reasons and our ordinary moral 
motivations. The effects of this are claimed to be profoundly dispiriting. I wil1 subsequently return to this variety 
of argument concerning the shape of modem ethical theory in toto. Sce Stoeker, M 'The Schizophrenia of Modem 
Ethical Theories' in Journal of Philosophy no. 73 1976. 
31 Carr, D Educating the Virtues op. cit. p. 96. 
32 "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to 
serve and obey them" Hume, D A Treatise of Human Nature 11. 111.3 . Contemporary Hume scholars often play 
down such aspects of his so-cal1ed 'official theory' in favour of themes less amenable to many contemporary non-
cognitivists. e.g. " .. in his later works Hume is content to cal1 the complex of capabilities exercised in moral 
judgement ... 'simply a more enlarged and more cultivated reason'" Baier, A 'Moral Sentiments and The 
Difference They Make' in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1995 p. 26. Sce also her A Progress of 
Sentiments (1991, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press). 
33 Michael Stocker has notably argued that this disjuncture ( or 'schizophrenia' as he tcrms it) is particularly 
prevalent in contemporary moral life and philosophy. Cf. his 'The Schizophrenia of Modem Ethical Theories' op. 
cit. 
34 Hare R.M. 'Language and Moral Education' in Cochrane, D, Hamm, C and Kazepides, A (eds.) The Domain of 
Moral Education (1979, Toronto, OISE Press) p. 104. 
35 Other writers who have sought to bring the insights of the later Wittgenstein to bear on the subject matter of 
ethics have rejected Hare's rationalism for a focus on the social conventional status of rules within particular 
'forms of life'. Those philosophers chiefly associated with philosophy in Wales, such as RW Beardsmore, Howard 
Mounce, DZ Phillips, and Peter Winch are central here. 
36 Some critics have pressed the claim that universalizability requirements force the moral agent to overlook the 
particular requirements of individual cases, especially of a tragic nature. Peter Winch, for example, argues that 
Captain Vere in Melville's Billy Budd makes a moral choice in condemning Billy to death, but not one that he 
would have wished to have been universalized. Hare responds, however, by distinguishing between 'generality' 
and 'universality' of principles, the latter admitting of especially detailed characterisations which need not extend 
to a wide variety of cases. Although they may not include proper names or dcfinite descriptions, they may apply to 
only one person as long as that person may be specified in 'universal qualitative' terms (e.g. 'mother of .. .') In fact, 
these very specific universal prescriptions are taken by Hare to be exemplary. Cf. Winch, P Ethics and Action 
(1972, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul) pp. 196-214, Hare, RM Freedom and Reason (1963, Oxford, OUP) 
pp. 38-9. 
37 Carr, D Educating the Virtues op. cit. p. 95. 
38 Hare, RM The Language of Morals (1952, Oxford, OUP) p. 69. 
39 Maclntyre, A A Short History of Ethics (1968, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul) p. 262. 
40 Hare, RM op.cit. 
41 In his earlier work, Hare had claimed that the requirements ofprescriptivity and universality produce a 'formal 
foundation' for utilitarianism, but did not go so far as to argue that they led to it. Cf. Freedom and Reason op. cit. 
p.123. 
42 W ilson, J Williams Nand Sugarman, B Introduction to Moral Edllcation (1968, London, Penguin) p. 192. 
43 Wilson, J A New Introduction to Moral Education (1990, London, Cassell) p. 193. 
44 Wilson's distinction between habit and reason in morality seems to me heavily overdrawn. He ignores the 
extent to which habits need not be 'blind' - they may be greatly responsive to reasons without having to admit of 
the full process of his preferred model of moral reasoning in every instance. To those who reject this preferred 
model, the role of habit in morality becomes even more central. I will return to a consideration of this issue in the 
next chapter. 
45 Hare, RM Moral Thinking op. cit. pp. 197-8. 
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Chapter Two 
Sources of Philosophical Challenge 
The last chapter provided a critical survey of some of the major theories of moral education 
in the second half of the twentieth century and discussed the ways in which these were 
theoretically indebted to particular and controversial views in moral philosophy. In 
attempting to discover some more adequate form of moral pedagogy, it is therefore 
reasonable for us to start at the level of 'underpinnings' and look towards those varieties of 
moral philosophy which are opposed to the paradigms we encountered in the previous 
discussion. I will, in this chapter, consider three broad stands of thought which have, in 
recent decades, held out the promise of providing a different and more satisfactory 
understanding of the nature of ethical thought and action, and the forms of education which 
may promise to be in service of this. 
The first of these is the 'analytical'l criticism of neo-Kantian moral philosophy offered both 
by the so-called 'naturalist' (or 'neo-naturalist') philosophers such as Philippa Foot, 
Geoffrey Warnock and Peter Geach, and in more recent 'moral realist' or 'cognitivist' work 
of John McDowell, David Wiggins and (to an extent) Jonathan Dancy. I shall then focus 
upon the ideas of Bernard Williams, Charles Taylor and (especially) Alasdair MacIntyre, all 
of whom have offered various forms of an 'historicist' critique which has sought to explain 
the predominance of a certain way of conceiving of morality in terms of a historical account 
of its genesis. Lastly, I will discuss the ideas of those further writers, most notably Carol 
Gilligan and Nel Noddings, who have sought to conjoin a critical analysis of the failings of 
contemporary moral philosophy with a psychological theory of gender difference. Without 
making any particular claim about the connectivity of these various ideas (they in many 
ways oppose each other as we shall see), I hope that they will point us toward new ways of 
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thinking about moral education which may avoid the flaws of those which we have 
discussed so far. One such avenue I shall pursue here will be concerned with the proper 
place of principles in our ethical thinking. 
The Analytical Challenge 
We have seen that one of the more counter-intuitive aspects of Hare's theory concerns his 
restriction of our possible lines of response to 'the fanatic' (this being the moral agent who 
is willing to abide by the universalized logic of his own antisocial prescriptions). His 
commitment to the fact-value distinction (which cements the view that the facts about a 
situation cannot entail certain moral conclusions) means that such people can be condemned 
upon procedural grounds only. Although no moral judgement may be dismissed tout court, 
Hare feels that it would be an empirical improbability that someone would continue to hold 
fanatical or antisocial views if they had truly reasoned in accordance with the logic of moral 
language. To many, this might seem an unsatisfactory response. When faced with barbaric 
opinions we surely find them to be something more than poorly reasoned - we find them to 
be abhorrent. Hare's view that any ideas may form legitimate moral prescriptions as long as 
they satisfy certain formal and procedural conditions has had many dissenters. Indeed, the 
debate within English moral philosophy in the 1950s and 60s represented something of a 
contest between Hare, and his opponents who argued that by its very nature morality cannot 
be just anything. Rather, its content was held to be necessarily restricted. 
These 'naturalist'2 (or as Hare termed them, 'descriptivist') moral philosophers held that 
prescriptivism's definition of goodness in terms of commendation could not avoid a certain 
logical circularity. If something being 'good' can only be described in terms of our 
commendation of it, how is this commendation to be understood other than in terms of 
something being good? They argued that moral notions were rendered meaningless if they 
were unrestricted in terms of content - more specifically, if they did not possess some 
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definite relation to the wants, needs or function of man qua man (as opposed to those 
attributes we may merely wish to possess). The way in which the naturalists detailed this 
restriction of content were various. Philippa Foot claimed that morality (to her mind, the 
'virtues') must be intimately connected with the satisfaction of human wants. These are not 
simply reducible to the status of preferences (as Hare would hold), but are things such as 
the freedom from boredom, loneliness and injury that, for Foot, are unquestionably ultimate 
(not dependent upon human decision). To give a moral agent a reason for action he or she 
must be shown that such action will lead to the satisfaction of wants of this kind. 
Foot wished initially to argue that all virtues could be shown to be beneficial traits for each 
individual agent, and thus provide them with a reason to act in accordance with them.3 
Wisdom and temperance are directly beneficial, whilst justice, for instance, is indirectly 
beneficial in that anybody who acts in a continuously unjust manner will be so castigated by 
their community that they will suffer from loneliness. Subsequently however, she has 
disposed of her underlying assumption that moral judgements necessarily give reasons for 
action to each and every moral agent (further distancing her from prescriptivism by 
rejecting its 'internalism' about the motivational force of reasons for action), and has argued 
that virtues such as justice and charity directly satisfy the wants of others but not necessarily 
those of oneself.4 Although this means that we may not be able to supply reasons to convert 
the immoral or amoral to the way of virtue, and that it is probable that some people will 
indeed not find it attractive, Foot maintained that there are those who care enough about the 
wants of others to be charitable and just. And just because we may not necessarily be 
rationally able to persuade others to join us, there is no reason to think that we may not 
rightly morally castigate these people as selfish and quite possibly evil. Her conclusion was 
that we should " ... be less troubled than we are by the fear of defection from the moral 
cause; perhaps we should even have less reason to fear it if people thought of themselves as 
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volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and 
oppression. "5 
Foot has also challenged Hare's belief that we cannot derive evaluative conclusions from 
factual premises. She has claimed that the description of certain actions in certain situations 
makes moral conclusions unavoidable. If, for instance, someone witnesses children in 
danger of being hit by a car and immediately rushed to save them without concern for the 
danger he or she faces, this is certainly an exhibition of 'courage'. How better might we 
describe it? Peter Geach has extended this line of argument into a particular view on the 
necessary subject matter of morality.6 He argued that the word 'good' is properly 
understood in what he termed an 'attributive' rather than a 'predicative' sense. If this is so 
we could not properly understand what it is for something to be 'good' until we can 
properly specify the function of the object so called. Just as a clock may properly be seen as 
a good clock if it is neither slow nor fast but tells the time accurately, we can only 
understand the meaning of, say, a good teacher, if he/or she satisfies well the requirements 
of this social role by (amongst many things) successfully developing children's knowledge 
and understanding of their subject matter, providing a proper exemplar of mature and 
morally worthwhile behaviour, and encouraging children to think for themselves. The 
criteria for goodness are in both cases not merely a matter of personal choice - they are 
limited by the facts of the matter. 
Geach argued further that it is not simply by virtue of their social and institutional roles that 
men can be conceived of as possessing a certain function, but fundamentally in terms of 
their status as human beings. In other words, the question of what makes for a good man 
can be answered by presenting the facts of man's proper function. Geach's religiously 
inspired attempt to revive the Aristotelian notion of a distinct human function or lelos has of 
course met with much opposition. There would seem to be much more understandable 
disagreement about the true function of people per se than there is about that of a clock or 
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even a teacher (where there is certainly enough). Nevertheless, his work (together with that 
of his wife, Elizabeth Anscombe) stressed the continuing importance of a certain way of 
viewing ethics that had, until fairly recently, been long overlooked in modern moral 
philosophy. Indeed, strong traces of their work can be discerned in the ideas of Alasdair 
MacIntyre which I shall discuss in due course. 
The work of these 'naturalist' moral philosophers presented the main contemporaneous 
challenge to the ideas of Hare and others working in a similar theoretical oeuvre. More 
recent years, however, have seen a revival of forms of moral realism which, despite 
continuing remarks about the predominance of the post-Kantian orthodoxies (such as 
Hare's), seem well set to relegate such theories to an inferior position. Moral realists have 
gone further than simply to cast doubt upon the fact/value (or the associated belief/desire) 
distinction's centrality to all ethical questions and have sought to defend the idea that the 
world possesses moral properties about which moral judgements may be true or false. This 
claim thus rejects the central thesis of non-cognitivism - that moral claims, whether they be 
expressions of emotive response or prescriptions for desired action, are distinctively 
different from beliefs about descriptions of the world. For the non-cognitivist, we may all 
agree upon a certain description but differ about how we evaluate it. The moral realist takes 
this to be strongly contrary to the intuitions we have about our use of moral language. If we 
were to witness the aforementioned instance of someone saving endangered children from a 
car, would we really feel that our terming the act 'courageous' is not a cognitive belief 
capable of being true or false? Do we not really observe the courage? Our ordinary thought 
and speech seem for the moral realist to contain the idea that moral judgements are not 
commending morally neutral descriptions, but are instead somehow responding to the 
existence of some kind of moral reality present in the situation. They have, in their various 
ways, attempted to work out the consequences of this intuition and to defend it against 
sceptical attack. 
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These recent developments in moral realism (or 'moral cognitivism' as it often known) have 
proceeded along two main paths. Although united in their rejection of the common non-
cognitivist complaint (famously articulated by J.L. Mackie7) that realism involves the 
positing of 'queer' moral entities existing in the natural world, their rebuttals take different 
forms. That found largely in an American context, and represented by the work of 
philosophers such as David Brink, Richard Boyd and Peter Railton8, has sought to 
downplay the discontinuity between moral properties and scientific enquiry and claim that 
their ideas can be justified by such methodology. Alternatively, the British moral realists 
(most especially John McDowell, David Wiggins, and Jonathan Dancy9) have rejected the 
idea that moral realism is questionable from the standpoint of scientific enquiry as indicative 
of a "philistine scientism" .10 They maintain that moral properties cease to look quite so 
queer if we are freed from the narrow strictures of such thought. It is the ideas of this latter 
group that I shall consider here. 
Although the moral naturalists to whom we have previously referred defended the idea that 
moral judgements may indeed be entailed by certain factual descriptions, they 
characteristically felt that the kind of motivation necessary for an agent to act was not 
similarly entailed. Unlike Hare, they did not see moral language as inherently prescriptive 
and action-guiding. Their moral externalism stressed that one could rightfully hold certain 
moral beliefs to be true irrespective of whether or not one was so motivated as to perform 
acts in accordance with them. A moral belief will always require the addition of a 
supportive desire to be sufficient to motivate. The more recent British non-naturalist realists 
reject this kind of view. They argue that to conceive of beliefs and desires as so sharply 
split is to fail to free oneself fully from the kind of metaphysics that made the fact/value 
distinction so theoretically attractive. The faculty psychology of the eighteenth century (the 
implications of which are most strongly evident in Hume) has so separated the domains of 
affection and cognition, pathos and logos, that we are left with an understanding of the 
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world as, in McDowell's words, "motivationally inert". Against this, the realists maintain 
that we must see how to truly understand something as moral is to 'feel its pull', and that 
this 'pull' can be exerted by the cognitive features of a situation. Moral motivation can thus 
be understood best as a response to moral reality rather than as the expression of some 
desire or pro-attitude. This represents an endorsement of moral internalism. 
Some critics of course question the very idea that such moral properties can actually exist in 
the world so that people may be responsive or unresponsive to them. Where exactly might 
these properties reside? As I said earlier, the British realists rebut these charges by claiming 
that they exhibit an unjustified attachment to a world-view in which natural properties are 
all that may be said to exist. They stress that just because the moral properties they posit are 
not natural ones there is no reason to find such a suggestion troubling. These properties are 
not 'queer', but distinct. McDowell points towards an analogy with secondary properties 
such as colour as being helpful in this respect. 11 Redness, for instance, does not exist 
amongst the 'furniture' of the world in quite the same way that a rock or a refrigerator 
does, for it would not be 'there' for someone who did not share our sensory capacity to see 
it. Properties such as colours do not therefore exist independently of human sensitivity to 
them - they are necessarily perspectival. This does not however, give us cause for concern 
over whether or not colours are real and we do not accept the idea that the colour of an 
object is merely a matter of personal preference. A (first class) cricket ball simply is red, 
irrespective of how many people may mistakenly find it otherwise. People may be colour-
blind, wearing tinted spectacles, or viewing the ball under sodium lighting, but this does not 
affect the simple truth of the matter. Something can thus be objective for McDowell not 
only if it exists independently of all human experience, but also if "it is there to be 
experienced, as opposed to being a mere figment of the subjective state that purports to 
experience it." 12 
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Just as the cognition of a cricket ball's redness requires a certain kind of visual sensitivity, 
moral properties require people to possess a necessary sensitivity for them to exercise their 
'pull'. This sensitivity or capacity of moral perception allows people to discern the salient 
moral features in any particular complex situation, and react in an appropriate way to them. 
Morality is not simply a matter, as in the post-Kantian tradition, of choosing amongst 
possible courses of action, but is also to do with seeing the world in the right way. A virtue 
is thus, in McDowell's words, a "reliable sensitivity to a certain sort ofrequirement which 
situations impose on behaviour" .13 A kind person with an acquaintance in hospital would 
not, on this account, attempt to subsume the question of whether or not to visit them under 
the dictates of a universalizable principle (such as 'always seek to please the infirm') so as 
to act out of a rational duty to it. They would instead discern the need of the sick 
acquaintance as the salient moral consideration in that particular situation and act in 
response to it. The cognition of the moral reality (the need) is sufficient to motivate the kind 
act for the truly virtuous person. 14 
Of course, the identification of a kind person as someone who simply 'sees' the moral 
requirement and acts in accordance with its demands might appear to be somewhat 'cold'. 
Where in this picture is the caring desire to help that we associate with kindness? The 
realists respond that such an understanding is once again the result of a mistaken attachment 
to the idea that beliefs and desires are wholly separate domains. They maintain that seeing 
the salient moral features of a situation is often exactly what it is to feel or care. Moral 
sensitivity is certainly cognitive in that one may be correct or mistaken in discerning the 
moral reality, but it also has an intrinsic and necessary connection to one's affective 
sensibilities. "There are truths which cannot be known without the aid of an affective 
sensibility - patterns of desire and sentiment can be epistemic preconditions to seeing the 
world as it is. "15 David McNaughton offers a musical analogy: 
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If the beauty of Mozart's music is a genuine feature of the music, to which one 
can be sensitive, does this not commit the realist ... to the view that any creature, 
even one without our tastes, might come to be aware of it? For, if some property 
is genuinely in the world, then it ought to be accessible, at least in principle, to all 
observers. Yet, if the outsider did not share our tastes, he would not find it 
beautiful, which contradicts our original supposition. The realist response to this 
objection is to claim that only someone who shares our human tastes and 
sensibilities can be aware of things in the way that we are. Far from thinking of 
moral cognition as an essentially passionless matter it is quite compatible with his 
position to claim that there may be some evaluative features that can only be seen 
by someone who cares very deeply. 16 
The British moral realists do not see the notion that moral properties may be dependent 
upon the existence of particular human sensibilities for their reason giving and motivational 
force as in any way threatening their reality.17 Neither do they wish to present any 
absolutist Platonic argument to the effect that our sensibilities are static and mechanistic 
capacities to react in certain ways to unchanging moral 'forms'. Instead, they (most 
especially Wiggins) maintain that the nature of morality is in an important sense 'response-
dependent', in that moral properties cannot be understood in isolation from the ways in 
which those with the appropriate sentimental capacities l8 conceptualise the practice of 
responsiveness to such properties. To continue the musical analogy, as the appreciation of a 
musical form develops so does the richness and complexity of the ways in which we 
respond to it. Increased sensitivity to the music might result, for instance, in narrower and 
more various specifications of response, while the evolution of our concepts of 
responsiveness can aid our sensitivity to real features of the music itself. The development 
of this evaluative practice allows our richer and more complex forms of appreciation to be 
seen with some justification as judgements made appropriate (or mistaken) by real musical 
properties. Ultimately, in Margaret Little's words, "if the 'property-response' pair takes 
hold, we reach a point where the appropriateness of finding that something has the property 
and the appropriateness of having the relevant response are each held answerable to the 
other. "19 Importantly, the resources for the evolution of the groupings and classifications 
that are involved in this development of our evaluative practice are held within the practice 
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itself - "we are not simply to fire off at random in our responses to things. "20 Moral 
concepts cannot ensure their own correctness - " ... they are responses that are correct when 
and only when they are occasioned by what has the corresponding property A and are 
occasioned by it because it is A." 21 The point is that their development is in no way 
predictable or limited in the extent to which it may evolve from its base in the sentiments. 
On such an account moral concepts are local, anthropocentric and, in a very mild way, 
subjectivist (in that they are referential to the responses of subjects).22 There is no guarantee 
that such concepts can ever be immune from continual criticism and change, even if this 
means that a consensus in a true moral judgement might actually be overthrown in favour of 
an untrue one. Although we might on occasion have good reason to believe that we hold a 
certain moral belief, and that consensus upon it is justified, because it is actually true (in the 
same way, according to Wiggins, that we believe that 7 + 5 = 12 because there is nothing 
else for us to think), this may not be conclusively provable. Despite this, Wiggins assures us 
that 
... our practice can operate without any special or philosophical guarantee that 
truth and correctness will stay around in this way. Our practice can even continue 
to operate in full awareness of the flimsiness and contingency of the natural facts 
that it reposes upon, in the awareness that so often impinges upon valuation as we 
know it of our proneness to error and self-deception, even in awareness of the 
theoretical possibility that our minds and nervous systems may have been 
poisoned or perverted. What we can do about that danger is only to take ordinary 
precautions, and to have ordinary regard ... for the credentials with which and 
conditions from out of which people's judgements are made. Better, we can take 
ordinary precautions, and then, in deference to the inherent difficulty of the 
subject matter, a few more.23 
In its criticism of the non-cognitive position (as exemplified by both emotivism and 
prescriptivism), this form of moral realism provides resources for modes of moral education 
which may potentially avoid the pitfalls of the currently favoured alternatives. In this 
discussion however, I have concentrated upon its meta-ethical aspects at the expense of a 
more detailed consideration of the implications of this type of theory for our understanding 
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of moral phenomenology and moral development - two concerns which I have identified as 
being at the heart of any attempt to elucidate alternative possibilities for moral education. 
Later on, I shall explore these in more depth - focusing first of all upon the ways in which 
we might come to see the idea of morality being 'principled' action as in many senses 
inadequate, and then upon a more precise specification of what might be meant by the 
moral 'perception' or 'sensitivity' to which I have made passing mention, and the role the 
emotions may be thought to play in this. Before this, however, I should continue with the 
concerns of the current chapter. 
The Historicist Critique 
Other theorists have joined in this assault upon the perceived deficiencies of much modern 
moral philosophy, but have approached their target in a slightly different manner. Bernard 
Wiliams for example, has notably criticized the over-concentration on notions of obligation 
that pervades both the Kantian and utilitarian traditions, together with their desire for 
theoretical abstraction and 'purity'. This allies him with the arguments of Susan Hurley 
concerning the ethically distorting effects of an attachment to what she terms 'centralism'24 
(the idea that 'thin' ethical concepts such as 'right' are necessarily prior to localized 'thick' 
concepts such as 'treacherous', 'honest' and 'courageous'). Where they differ, however, is 
that Williams firmly rejects her belief that such problematic assumptions can be dismissed 
by mere analytic fiat. In criticising both Hurley and John McDowell, he maintains that; 
I do not think, as they do, that the degree of autonomy enjoyed by non-specific 
terms such as 'right' is simply something to be determined by philosophical 
enquiry; the extent to which a society uses such terms as opposed to thick 
concepts is partly a historical question, and has important social implications. In 
this I agree with Alasdair MacIntyre.25 
This reluctance to ignore the necessarily historical aspects of the study of morality has led 
me to classify WiIliams alongside both Charles Taylor and MacIntyre as a historicist critic. 
Despite differences in philosophical and political outlook, these three writers have 
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commonly looked upon the failings of modern moral philosophy as requiring some kind of 
historical narrative for their proper diagnosis.26 This narrative will enable us to understand 
the variances of moral and philosophical understanding over time, as well as the ways in 
which certain such modes of understanding may be adjudged superior to certain others, 
whilst avoiding any notion of a universal standpoint that stands over and above any 
particular concrete allegiances. 27 
A key theme in Williams' work is to distinguish ethics from what he calls the 'morality 
system'28. Central to this peculiarly modern 'institution' is the notion that unites otherwise 
differing utilitarian and Kantian approaches within it - that obligatory action exhausts all of 
the ground of morality. This he finds a particularly constricting notion, as well as one that 
importantly misunderstands the nature of our moral lives. Construing all ethical thought in 
terms of obligations is to extend both not far enough and too far. Not only does it make 
little sense of the ethical value we ordinarily find in supererogatory acts (those that go 
beyond the demands of duty) and in those admirable people who perform them, but also 
proves excessively demanding by refusing to see that obligations are merely" one kind of 
ethical consideration amongst others" 29 We should therefore reject the maxim that only 
another obligation can match the force of an obligation in an instance of deliberation, and 
present a more complex and contoured picture of the ethical life. Necessary to this picture 
will be a notion of importance, whether to an individual or 'simply, important',30 Against 
such a background we may better understand the proper place of obligations, and those 
times when they are perhaps not to be the sole or overriding consideration. 
A similar idea is also central to the work of Charles Taylor who has long criticised much of 
modern moral philosophy for its attempt to offer an "ethics without the good." 31 This 
contravenes his understanding of human agency only making sense against the background 
of what he calls 'strong evaluation' - the way in which we distinguish "between things 
which are recognised as of categoric or unconditioned or higher importance or worth, and 
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things which lack this or of lesser value. "32 Without an understanding of this, morality is 
constrained in all of the ways Williams describes, as well as in leaving no place for notions 
of either a 'good life' (what it is good to be as opposed to what it is good to do) or the 
'Good' as an object of love. Only by resurrecting these notions (which still evidently exist 
in ordinary thought) can moral philosophy cease being so constrictive and prove of 
assistance in orienting ourselves in moral space. 
Whereas Williams blames a general modern desire for theoretical purity, exemplified most 
obviously by Kant, for the ways in which our thought about morality has gone astray from 
the realities of ordinary ethical life, Taylor has attempted to trace in rather more detail the 
various intellectual and moral sources he holds to account for this decline.3) Foremost 
amongst these is what he terms the 'naturalist' temper of modern thought. This is not the 
same usage of the word as that with which I categorised the ethical naturalists such as Foot 
and Geach, but refers to the belief that human beings can be understood in the same way as 
the rest of the natural world, and are thus best studied in ways continuous with the methods 
of natural science)4 One of the main consequences of this form of naturalism is a suspicion 
of those things which cannot be fitted into a scientific view of the world. Varieties of 
'importance' or 'the good' that are not wholly reducible to the strength of our desires or 
preferences fit especially well into this category and can thus find no place in any naturalist 
or scientifically inspired moral philosophy. It attempts to rid itself of any notion of the good 
and find moral conclusions from a position disengaged from concrete local realities. The 
Kantian stress upon obedience to a rational moral law is illustrative of this approach, as are 
Hare's attempts to see the procedural operation of moral language as the sole area of 
concern. 
Our modern thinking has, for Taylor, moral as well as epistemological sources. One such is 
what he calls the 'affirmation of ordinary life', which has attempted to reject the idea that 
there are certain 'higher' goals or ways of life that are substantially different from the 
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normal course of people's lives in order to liberate them from inordinate demands. Another 
is the modem idea of freedom, which conceives of the free agent as wholly controlling his 
or her own actions, liberated from all outward influence (such as that of any 'good' thought 
to be in some sense 'higher' and constitutive of the agent's identity). As well as in Kant, 
this idea is evident in all those theories that judge the worth of some act of deliberation 
procedurally, in terms of how the agent thinks, rather than in terms of its substantive 
outcome, thus giving primacy to the creations of the agent's own will rather than to the 
identification of some actual good in the world. Because such ideas cohere so well with our 
culture's Judeo-Christian heritage, we have begun to think of them not as certain moral 
ideals amongst others, but as essential features of what it is to reason morally)5 These 
various tempers of modem thought, whether epistemological, moral, or whatever, have 
combined for Taylor to shape moral philosophy into the kind of unsatisfactory practice that 
it has so often been in contemporary times, and there are few instances where this 
unhelpfulness has been quite so apparent as in the field of moral education. Before we go 
on to consider the extent and manner in which these failings may perhaps be remedied, or 
rendered less debilitating, we should consider what has possibly been the most systematic 
attempt to account for the failings of post-Enlightenment moral philosophy (and indeed the 
entire social order within which it exists) in terms of a distinct historical narrative or 
'genealogy'. This is contained in the recent work of Alasdair Maclntyre. 
Maclntyre's criticisms of post-Kantian moral philosophy are developed within a 
distinctively socio-historical methodology (for "we have not yet fully understood the claims 
of any moral philosophy until we have spelled out what its social embodiment would be").36 
He argues that the theoretical partner of liberal modernity, sharing and developing its 
various malaises, is emotivism. Even those theories (such as prescriptivsim) that have arisen 
in criticism of it are merely further, and often more intense, symptoms of our 'emotivist 
age'. 
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The terminus of justification is thus always ... a not further to be justified choice, 
a choice unguided by criteria. Each individual implicitly or explicitly has to adopt 
his or her own first principles on the basis of such a choice. The utterance of any 
universal principle is in the end an expression of the preferences of an individual 
will and for that will its principles have and can have only such authority as it 
chooses to confer upon them by adopting them. Thus emotivism has not been left 
very far behind at all.37 
The common problem of all moral philosophy in the Kantian tradition, and therefore for 
those theories of moral education which we have considered thus far, is a failure to explain 
why we would prefer one moral principle to another (or prefer having them to not), other 
than in terms of their logical form. This would seem to run the risk of dissolving into a type 
of almost aimless voluntarism. For Maclntyre, the effects of the dominance of such theories 
are clear to see in the parlous and disordered state of contemporary moral language - its 
most striking feature being that" so much of it is used to express disagreements" .38 
This, he maintains, is not just an expression of the failure of individual discourse, but 
exposes something much more fundamental about these disagreements - their interminable 
and incommensurable nature, whereby there is no "rational way of securing moral 
agreement" ,39 Our continued desire to appeal to impersonal rational arguments or criteria 
(such as universal standards of justice or liberty) when we engage in moral debate is 
paradoxical when combined with the arbitrary and often incommensurable nature of the 
premises upon which we base such discourse. This conflict between the meaning and use of 
moral language represents, for Maclntyre, the predicament of modernity. Modern debate 
utilises assorted fragments of earlier forms (e.g. moral law from Aquinas, positive liberty 
from Green and Rousseau, universalisability from Kant etc.) but has stripped them of the 
contexts which provided them with their proper meaning. 
Unlike the arguments of the neo-naturalists therefore, Maclntyre claims that in a very 
important sense the emotivist understanding of morality is in a way actually true. This is 
because it accurately describes its modern condition - for we are truly 'emotivist selves'. 
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His socio-historical method allows him, however, to grant this much but still to deny that 
the emotivist account can (as its proponents claim) hold true universally, sub specie 
aeternitatis. Because of its inherent logical circularity (as discussed in the previous chapter) 
it does not offer a cogent account of the meaning of moral utterances, but instead accurately 
describes the use to which they are put in contemporary debate. 
This discrepancy between the meaning and use of moral terms, and its concomitant 
sociology of manipulative and Weberian social relations (represented most powerfully by 
the defining 'characters' of our emotivist culture - the aesthete, the therapist and the 
manager) was not, however, always so. The plausibility of emotivism has stemmed from its 
power in condemning the failures of the ill-fated Enlightenment project to provide rational 
foundations for the moral standards it had inherited. The embarkation of our culture upon 
such a doomed intellectual enterprise was, for MacIntyre, the root cause of contemporary 
emotivist anomie. Our moral decline is traced through three stages. The first refers to a 
(pre-Enlightenment) time when moral language embodied genuine and objective moral 
standards. This stage then gave way to a variety of unsuccessful attempts to maintain these 
standards and provide them with rational justification, before we eventually arrived at the 
third and last stage - our present culture. By means of a discussion of various 
Enlightenment figures, notably Kierkegaard, Kant, Diderot and Hume, he maintains that 
despite their differences their condemnation to failure arose from those beliefs which they 
held in common. All of these philosophers were attempting to rationally justify traditional 
moral codes without realising that such codes were necessarily tied to the" historical and 
cultural contexts within which their function was very different from that imagined by those 
who had inherited the rules but lived in a very different environment" .40 The eventual 
failure of this over-ambitious project has had immense consequences that have not, as yet, 
been fully appreciated. For 
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... henceforward the morality of our predecessor culture - and subsequently our 
own - lacked any public, shared rationale or justification. In a secular world 
religion could no longer provide such a shared background and foundation for 
moral discourse and action, and the failure of philosophy to provide what religion 
could no longer furnish was an important cause of philosophy losing its central 
cultural role and becoming a marginal academic subject.41 
Needless to say, any forms of moral education that continued to treat their subject matter as 
akin to an academic subject, solely reliant upon the proper exercise of principled reason 
would be, according to this line of thought, deeply misguided. They would not only prove 
ineffective, but would also continue to reproduce the deficiencies of our emotivist age, 
incapable of offering any hope of alternative futures. In order to avoid the consequences of 
the empty promises of the Enlightenment (and its nihilistic mirror image of Nietzchean 
genealogy), MacIntyre argues that we must ascertain what exactly has been lost from our 
predecessor culture when moral language still possessed a consistent and objective meaning. 
Taking a lead from the work of Elizabeth Anscombe42 , MacIntyre stresses that the failure of 
the Enlightenment thinkers to provide a rational justification for morality stemmed from 
their common misunderstanding of the nature of the moral rules they were seeking to 
ground. These were treated as though they could be abstracted from the particular social 
context in which they were embedded and considered in the form of pure reason. The 
extent to which they were unable to do this successfully is only now becoming wholly clear, 
when morality stands more and more in need of justification but we seem to lack any 
resources with which to complete this task. The origin of these moral rules, for MacIntyre, 
lay within the context of the trichotomous moral framework which had characterised the 
mediaeval period (influenced most strongly by Aristotelian philosophy). This framework 
consisted of; firstly, untutored human nature as it happened to be; secondly, human nature 
as it could be if it realised its tetos; and thirdly, the precepts of rational ethics as the means 
of transition from one to the other (the system of the 'virtues'). The rejection of the notion 
of a distinct human telos by the Enlightenment philosophers left them with only the first 
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element of the framework with which to derive the third - a demand that eventually proved 
impossible to satisfy . 
... for they did indeed attempt to find a rational basis for their moral beliefs in a 
particular understanding of human nature, while inheriting a set of moral 
injunctions on the one hand and a conception of human nature on the other which 
had been expressly designed to be discrepant with each other ... They inherited 
incoherent fragments of a once coherent scheme of thought and action and, since 
they did not recognise their own historical and cultural situation, they could not 
recognise the impossible and quixotic nature of their self-appointed task.43 
Williams and Taylor concur with MacIntyre in diagnosing not merely the deficiencies 
internal to these dominant theoretical strands of modern culture, but also the parlous 
position of any practice that does not recognise the sources of its historical genesis. This is 
particularly problematic for those modern currents of thought that seek to deny the 
existence of anything intrinsically higher, important or 'Good', even those values which 
supply them with their own raison d'etre. Or, as Taylor puts it, 
... they are motivated by the strongest moral ideals, like freedom, altruism, 
universalism. These are among the central moral aspirations of modern culture .... 
And yet these ideals drive the theorists towards a denial of all such goods. They 
are caught in a strange pragmatic contradiction, whereby the very goods which 
move them push them to deny or de-nature all such goods. They are 
constitutionally incapable of coming clean about the deeper sources of their own 
thinking. Their thought is inescapably cramped.44 
For him the remedy is clear. We must acknowledge the moral sources that have shaped the 
way we are, not just those dominant ones which we have discussed, but also what he feels 
is the rival and corrective paradigm of our culture - revolving around the ideals of 
'romantic expressivism' (such as imagination, creativity, and authenticity) which have been 
inherited from a number of different strands of our cultural narrative. Once these sources 
are properly 'articulated' as ideas of the Good, rather than as competing preferences, 
Taylor holds out the hope that they will eventually prove to be mutually supportive and 
realizable. The values central to modern philosophy and liberal politics, such as freedom, 
equality and autonomy, are not necessarily problematic in themselves, but require the 
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proper kind of historically informed understanding and defence to be true to our moral 
identities. The means of our regeneration are thus latent within modern liberal society, 
merely requiring a little expert 'articulation' to make their salvationary force felt. 
Williams does not, however, share Taylor's optimism, and is especially suspicious of this 
idea that the Good as an object of allegiance needs any sort of resuscitation - especially if in 
any sort of religious or spiritual form (as Taylor maintains it does).45 Rather than seeking 
to acknowledge or articulate the specifically ludeo-Christian elements of our moral sources, 
Williams in fact approves of the" departure of Christianity" that he observes in modern 
culture. We are all, for him, in some sense the children of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, 
unable anymore to believe in those practices that cannot withstand unmasking by the critical 
reflectiveness that is such a central part of who we all are. Rather than seeking to regret or 
celebrate the way in which" reflection destroys knowledge" 46, he dismisses any sort of 
grand hope for renewal (whether philosophical or cultural), and merely hopes that the 
departure of a mistaken vision of the purpose of moral philosophy will perhaps enable us to 
understand why we may have wanted it in the first place, and what we may prefer instead. 
How truthfulness to an existing self or society is to be combined with reflection, 
self-understanding and criticism is a question that philosophy, itself, cannot 
answer. It is the kind of question that has to be answered through reflective living. 
The answer has to be discovered or established, as the result of a process, 
personal and social, which essentially cannot formulate the answer in advance, 
except in an unspecific way. Philosophy can play a part in the process, as it plays 
a part in identifying the question, but it cannot be a substitute for it.47 
MacIntyre's stress upon the idea that theory cannot be viewed in isolation from the society 
in which it is embedded, has led him to be far more dismissive of the capacities for 
improvement in modern society. The moral certainties of the past have been rendered 
obsolete by the individualism of the post-Enlightenment age, and it is only by rejecting 
modernity in toto that we could ever hope to revive them and the coherent moral order 
which might ensue. As for how this might be possible for those of us 'infected' by the 
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moral characteristics of the modern world, we are left unsure. Perhaps there really is no 
way back for us from the decline he describes. Certainly, contra Taylor, this will not be 
provided for MacIntyre by an articulation of the moral sources of liberalism - these hold out 
no hope, and certainly, contra Williams, this way back is a necessity if we are to avoid the 
absurd moral arbitrariness of the contemporary liberal society which he describes. In a 
subsequent chapter I shall discuss the grounds of MacIntyre's hyper-pessimism about the 
moral promise of modernity, as well as the account he provides of an allegedly coherent 
Aristotelian alternative. For now, however, I shall discuss the third and final challenge to 
the dominant forms of contemporary moral philosophy (and education) that I have 
considered. This lies in the 'ethic of care' discussed largely in the work of Carol Gilligan 
and Nel Noddings. 
An Ethic of Care? 
Modern moral philosophy has been dominated until recently by the Kantian and utilitarian 
traditions, and by the debates that have carried on between them. As I have discussed 
earlier, these schools of thought largely share a certain conception of the form that moral 
reasoning should properly take, whatever their disagreements about the normative 
implications of such reasoning. Although it is stressed most intensely in the work of Hare, 
'doing morality' is generally taken by the representatives of these two traditions to be a 
matter of adopting an impartial stance between competing moral claims, subsuming these 
claims under the dictates of at least one universalizable moral principle, and of seeing moral 
action as obligatory duty in accordance with the requirements of principle outweighing all 
other considerations. Despite their differences, this is the conception taken by both 
Kohlberg and Wilson to be exhaustive of the moral domain, leading them to the conclusion 
that the only proper concern of moral education is to further children's capacities to reason 
in this manner. I have already referred to those theorists who have criticised either the 
controversial metaphysics underlying this conception (McDowell and Wiggins), or the way 
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in which its claims to validity rest upon a certain blindness of its own historical origins 
(Williams, Taylor and MacIntyre). In this section I would like to discuss those further 
writers who have sought to identify an alternative and distinct style of moral reasoning -
another 'moral voice'- which is not reducible to the 'orthodox' conception. In the work of 
Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings this 'ethic of care' is held to be something distinctively 
female, although much debate concerns the extent to which this additional claim is justified. 
In the last chapter I referred briefly to the way in which utilitarian modes of moral 
reasoning might be thought to deform certain values by insisting upon their comparison 
against a single metric - that of utility. Many have claimed that values such as friendship 
necessarily resist being interpreted in this way so that anybody who could so compare the 
merit of responding to their friend's need with the utility derived from, say, campaigning 
for a change in government had not properly appreciated what it was to be in possession of 
the value of friendship. Utilitarian calculation and friendship are in this sense 
incommensurable.48 It is not, however, solely the reductionism involved in comparing all 
values according to the utility they produce that may be seen to have an adverse effect upon 
our understanding of such things as friendship. The notion that morally worthwhile action is 
performed out of impartial duty to the requirement of moral principle, which utilitarianism 
shares with the tradition of post-Kantian moral theory (although the nature of their 
respectively valued principles will of course differ), is claimed to be equally damaging in 
itself. And this damage is not done just to our concept (as in the ignorance of 
incommensurability), but also to the objects of our moral concern themselves49• Michael 
Stocker has offered the following notable example about being visited by a 'friend' when 
one is ill; 
You are very bored and restless and at loose ends when Smith comes in once 
again. You are now convinced more then ever that he is a fine fellow and a real 
friend - taking so much time to cheer you up, traveling all the way across town, 
and so on. You are so effusive with your praise and thanks that he protests that he 
always tries to do what he thinks is his duty, what he thinks will be best. You at 
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first think he is engaging in a polite form of self-deprecation, relieving the moral 
burden. But the more you two speak, the more it becomes clear that he was telling 
the literal truth: that it is not essentially because of you that he came to see you, 
not because you are friends, but because he thought it his duty, perhaps as a 
fellow Christian or Communist or whatever, or simply because he knows of no 
one more in need of cheering up and easier to cheer Up.50 
This kind of obligatory moral action, exemplary in form to the utilitarian or Kantian, would 
seem to be somewhat unsatisfactory51. We are not, on this account, inclined to see Smith as 
a true friend, or at least not to see this visit as an example of his friendship. The visit does 
not seem to spring from a concern with me as me, but as a feature of a situation requiring 
dutiful action. Without necessarily having to maintain that duty to principle has no moral 
role to play, we can see that certain values or virtues (we may think of compassion, love, 
whether parental, filial or sexual, and perhaps even patriotism as other examples) would 
seem to require release from the constrictive requirements of the orthodox conception of 
moral reasoning. 52 The reasoning involved in their true expression needs therefore to make 
room for our responsiveness to particular persons within particular concrete relationships. It 
is our partial concern for a close person or group of people's need, rather than our duty to 
universal principles, that motivates us to act in a morally worthy way in such situations -
and it is this form of motivation that makes the act worthy in the way that it is.53 Even if the 
impartiality requirement is relaxed to admit of agent-relative reasons for action, the 
emphasis upon duty remains problematic. The moral concern we have for the people close 
to us should not simply outweigh that which we are expected to show for all of humanity 
(present or future), but should also be qualitatively different. Any theory of moral reasoning 
that did not allow for us fully to embody these care virtues would most likely serve to 
corrode our relationships with the people that surround us, and are most often implicated in 
our moral concern. If such relationships - whether they be with family, friends or 
colleagues - are corroded in this way, it is claimed, then so is the main foundation and 
location of our moral development and life. 
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Much of the current interest in the possible existence of an 'ethic of care' has resulted from 
the work in psychology of Carol Gilligan. This arose in reaction to her experiences as a 
researcher for Lawrence Kohlberg who, if we recall, posited the existence of distinct stages 
of moral development progressing from a pre-conventional level of egoistic avoidance of 
punishment, through a conventional level of loyalty and conformity to the people and 
institutions that one is surrounded with, to a final 'principled' level. This pinnacle of moral 
reasoning represented a person's attachment to the central virtue of justice as a means of 
solving ethical dilemmas. Kohlberg supported his ideas with numerous examples of the real-
life response of children to hypothetical situations, the most famous of which is the case of 
'Heinz and the druggist'. In this discussion two children, 'Jake' and 'Amy', are presented 
with the dilemma of a man (Heinz) whose wife is mortally ill and requires a certain drug 
for her cure, yet the druggist will only supply the drug (of which he is sole supplier) at a 
cost which is beyond Heinz's means. The children are asked whether Heinz should steal the 
drug to save the life of his wife. Jake answers that it is permissible for the drug to be stolen 
as " ... a human life is worth more than money, and if the druggist only makes money, he is 
still going to live, but if Heinz doesn't steal the drug, his wife is going to die" .54 Amy's 
response however is far less conclusive. She claims that Heinz should neither steal the drug 
nor let his wife die, but instead find some other solution such as borrowing the money or 
pleading with the druggist. 
From these responses Kohlberg concludes that whilst Amy can find no way out of the 
dilemma, lake is well on his way to personifying the 'justice perspective' which can solve 
such problems by subsuming them under the requirements of ranked universalizable 
principles. In being closer to the Kantian ideal, his moral reasoning is therefore at a higher 
stage of development than Amy's conventionalist thought. It is the tendency for Kohlberg's 
work repeatedly to find boys to be more adept and developed moral reasoners that 
provoked Gilligan's critique. She claimed that the idea of morality being solely composed of 
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the justice perspective will necessarily judge women to be inferior at thinking in a moral 
way. In this sense Amy is indeed an inferior Kantian (at least on Kohlberg's particular 
reading of Kant), but this is not all she is. GiIligan maintained that the responses of women 
and girls to such hypothetical moral dilemmas exhibit a reluctance to engage in impartialist 
principled argument, abstracted from the demands of personal relationships. Instead, they 
see the moral domain as "a network of connection, a web of relationships, that is sustained 
by a process of communication ... 55 Thus rather than merely being unable to 'solve the 
dilemma', Amy "considers neither property nor law but rather the effect that theft could 
have on the relationship between Heinz and his wife ... she ties the wife's survival to the 
preservation of relationships. "56 The way in which Amy (and women generally so it is 
claimed) engage in moral reasoning exhibits, for Gilligan, the existence of another 'moral 
voice' centring around the idea of care rather than justice, and a picture of the self as 
connected to particular others rather than as individualised and autonomous. 
This threat to the supposed universality of the impartialist and principled conception of 
moral reasoning (a wider version of what Gilligan, following Kohlberg, has termed the 
perspective of justice) has met with much critical resistance. While some have resisted the 
notion that the supposed care virtues have any place within morality proper (unless when 
exemplified by impartialist reasoning), other defenders of the impartialist tradition have 
maintained in a variety of ways that the care virtues can find a home within their 
understanding of morality. Modern interpreters of Kant for instance, such as Barbara 
Herman and Onora O'Neill, have stressed the extent to which impartial reasoning acts as a 
testing mechanism for our moral views and practices, rather than as a source of them. This 
allows for the idea that the care virtues can take an important and distinctive (although still 
inferior) place within morality as long as they do not violate the side-constraints set by 
universalizable principles. A number of feminist writers have also wished to deny the 
existence of any alternative moral voice especially if it is claimed to be distinctively female. 
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They claim that it is only the domination of women by men that has produced a deficit in 
their manner of moral reasoning (by, for instance, confining them to the private realm), and 
that to proclaim the equality of 'care' is merely to cement this subservience. When the 
dominant tradition of philosophy has generally regarded women to be incapable of moral 
thought, the role of feminism on this interpretation is not to celebrate this inequality in the 
name of 'difference', but to protest against the conditions that have produced it. 
If we were, however, to accept the idea that there are varieties of authentic moral 
understanding that cannot be accommodated within the dominant impartialist tradition we 
are left with the question of how far these are tied to gender. In other words, is care a 
solely female 'moral voice'? Although many have taken this impression from GiIligan's 
work, it never seems to have been her intention to make such a claim. Although 'care' may 
unsurprisingly be exhibited most often by women and undervalued most often by men (for 
reasons to do with their typical social roles), there is no reason to think that men are in 
some way incapable of appreciating the special values of love, friendship and the like. 
Some writers have seen this as allowing us to conceive of a broader understanding of 
morality able to encompass both impartiality and care in situations where they are properly 
called for.57 In her more recent work however, GilIigan has maintained that care and justice 
are not ordinarily synthesised into a wider form of moral thought, but instead present 
distinct but equal ways of approaching any given moral problem. Referring to 
Wittgenstein's famous duck/rabbit figure (a picture which can be seen as representing either 
of these two creatures, but not both simultaneously) she suggests that we all possess the 
ability to approach moral problems according to either the care or justice perspective, and 
to switch perspective if required. Utilizing a musical metaphor, she describes them as 
'counterpoints' to each other, and as together comprising a 'double fugue' .58 This has raised 
the further possibility that there may be more than merely two of these moral voices, and 
that racial, cultural or class differentials may be equally as important as gender for their 
58 
analysis. 59 Once this thought is combined with the idea that the voices are not tied in any 
way to the identity with which they are most associated, and that we may actually be able to 
create our own moral 'bricolage' from the multitude of moral voices available, it shows 
signs of departing along radically relativist or postmodern trajectories. 60 
So far we have considered two broadly defined ways in which the idea of care may be 
understood. Firstly, there are those who have sought to either downplay its moral 
importance altogether, or to present it as important but inferior to impartialism. Secondly, 
there are those such as Gilligan herself who have stressed the equality of the care 
perspective with other ways of approaching moral problems, or at least (in a more 
relativistic style) denied that any moral voice can be proven superior or inferior to any 
other. This leaves us with a third way of approaching the issue - that the challenge of 'care' 
may demonstrate either the inferiority or the unimportance of impartial ism. There may 
therefore be a way in which Gilligan's work is rather too kind on the impartialist tradition. 
We may wish to see the justice perspective as problematic in itself rather than simply to 
deny its sole occupancy of the moral domain, thus leaving it intact in all other respects. 
Indeed, it has been argued that Gilligan's stress upon the centrality of actual articulated 
responses to abstract moral dilemmas as the key to understanding moral perspectives leave 
her in the shadow of Kohlberg's work despite her critical intent.61 
The idea that 'caring' may be the primary and central model, at the expense of an 
impartialist morality of principles, is found most especially in the work of Nel Noddings. 
For her, morality is based upon the core experience of the mother-child relationship.62 This 
embodies what she calls 'natural caring' - a situation in which the attention of the carer is 
focused solely upon the 'cared-for', and our motivation is comprised of their needs. The 
intensity and ease of our caring gradually declines as we move away from family 
relationships and towards mere acquaintances or strangers - the domain of what she calls 
'ethical caring', which comes to us unwillingly as an obligation. Although Noddings would 
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seem right to assert against the impartialist that it is impossible to think that we could care 
for all people equally, she does seem to underestimate the extent to which we value care for 
strangers as an ethical ideal. This is especially so if, for example, the stranger is unable or 
unwilling to reciprocate our care, or if they exist outside of all our circles of close care -
when they are thus a stranger to us all (we could perhaps think of a refugee). In such 
instances, Nodding's idea of care does not appear to reach out far enough. 
In another way, however, such care would seem to encompass too much of our moral 
thought. The care we have for those people close to us (most especially our children) is 
most certainly deeply felt, but does not always push out of the way reflection concerning its 
appropriateness. Although the affective, emotional dimension of our moral experience has 
been unduly denied by impartialist thought, this does not mean that it should be emphasised 
at the expense of denying our ability to subject it, and the social norms our emotions 
express, to rational criticism. 10nathan Dancy provides an example; 
... these notions [of care] are very important indeed, for those who fail to see 
their centrality are people who will be blind to the real nature of the moral choices 
they have to face. But ... care itself can be abused, and acting out of care, or 
making the caring choice, need not always be the right choice. An instance that 
occurs to me here is that of a husband whose care for his wife is so great that it 
effectively suffocates her, preventing her from making something of herself for 
herself. We might think in such a case that it would have been better if he had 
acted more out of respect and less out of care.63 
It would seem that this possibility of care being the wrong response to certain moral 
situations (rather than being exactly what a moral response is, in the way that Noddings 
presents it) is of particular interest in those relationships where adults have responsibility 
for children - the most obvious examples being parenting and schooling. It may pain a child 
to have to do things for themselves, or to have to attend their mathematics lessons, but we 
know that this is in their long-term interest. Teachers and parents are continually faced with 
the problem of judging when children should be protected from harmful influences, and 
when they need to gain experience of the 'ways of the world' in order for them to make 
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their way in it at a later date. 64 Of course, the proponent of care may maintain that it can 
encompass such prudential considerations, but that would seem to allow questions about 
when exactly the child for whom we are responsible will feel the benefit of our caring. 
Should we allow a child to play instead of study because of the present satisfaction they 
receive, or encourage them to study so that they might lead a more fulfilling life in the 
future? It would seem natural here to claim that we should be temporally impartial about 
when such benefits as there are will be cashed out (or at least that there is nothing wrong 
with this being one consideration amongst others) but of course caring on Noddings' view 
can allow impartiality no place at all. To allow it even such a benign role as this is simply 
not an option. 
But surely, the idea that there are times when it is a more sober response than full blown 
care which is required by the situation does not need to concede anything to impartialist 
theories of the sort I have been criticising. They represent merely one idea (and a 
particularly extreme one at that) of what it is to stand back from the intensity and tumult of 
a situation and reflect upon it. We may adjust our moral gaze to take in wider features of 
the situation without having to agree to the irrelevance of the concrete and particular. We 
may sometimes even be impartial without having to become 'impartialists'. This view is 
supported by Bernard Williams who insists that " ... it is quite wrong to think that the only 
alternative to ethical theory [a problem solving morality of impartial principles] is to refuse 
reflection and to remain in unreflective prejudice. Theory and prejudice are not the only 
possibilities for a reflective agent, or for philosophy ... 65 This holds out the promise of a 
description of proper moral reasoning which, while rejecting central aspects of the 
dominant impartialist tradition, does neither over-identify it with gender difference nor 
over-emphasise the place of the care virtues at the expense of fairness. Despite the extent to 
which the different theorists I have been considering in this chapter disagree greatly with 
one another, their views have provided resources for the more positive articulation of an 
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alternative conception of morality, a central feature of which is a certain antipathy to the 
way in which ethics has been so often presented as a matter of adherence to principles of 
conduct. 
Principles and Particularity 
Our everyday thinking about morality would seem to preserve a central place for principles. 
A paradigmatically 'moral' individual is most often characterised as a man or woman who 
is principled. Whatever inducements to the contrary there may be, nothing will deflect them 
from acting in accordance with their moral duty. The most obvious example of a set of 
moral principles in our culture is of course the ten commandments. A life lived in 
accordance with these is thus both principled and, some might claim, fully moral. We may 
of course disagree with this assessment, and maintain that this particular moral code is not 
entirely correct. We might want to add some other principles to the list to cover up possible 
loopholes that would make immorality seemingly permissible. Equally, we may think it 
preferable to reduce the list of principles to one general aim - say the promotion of utility. 
Yet, whatever way we alter the list, such a conception of what it is to live morally is still 
phrased in terms of adherence to a principle or list of principles. 
It may seem strange, therefore, that I should seek to investigate an idea (that of 
particularism) that is best understood in terms of its hostility towards this way of 
understanding moral commitment. Such hostility might seem to be a product of some kind 
of amoralism. If one attacks the very notion of moral principles, surely that is to attack 
morality itself? It would thus be hard to see how such an idea could be useful in the 
formulation of an approach to moral education. In this section I seek to show how such 
fears are unwarranted. Particularism, in its various guises, is not hostile to moral principles 
in the more plain and ordinary sense, but only to the place they occupy within certain 
modern ways of thinking about morality and moral thinking. It can therefore acknowledge 
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the importance of principles in, say, the training of the young or as rough and ready rules 
of thumb without weakening its case against the idea that principles provide the primary and 
exhaustive means of understanding morality. 
As I have already said, moral action is often articulated in terms of its fit with certain 
general principles. A shopkeeper who tells the truth about the condition of some of his 
'damaged goods' even though it could have been concealed is seen to prize the principle 'do 
not lie' over possible financial benefits of doing otherwise. Similarly, a person who 
promises to help a friend move house, and still does so despite the subsequent appearance 
of a more attractive proposition elsewhere, is thought of as someone who prizes the 
principle that 'promises are to be kept'. We might thus consider the proper role of moral 
education to be one of encouraging adherence to such admirable principles, and to those 
rules which allow us to subsume the features of new and perhaps more complex situations 
under their requirements. Even if we were wary of promoting adherence to any particular 
principle and so, in a concern for the moral autonomy of children, sought to provide them 
with the ability to make moral decisions for themselves, the decision procedure could stilI 
be characterised in the same way. As exemplified by the work of Kohlberg and Wilson, 
moral thought could be conceived as being an intellectual process of seeing which of the 
principles we have encountered in the past apply best to the novel situation in which we 
now find ourselves. An action is right only if it is derivative from the requirements of a 
moral principle statable in universal terms (so that the relevant features of the situation 
count the same every time they are present). Therefore, if the facts of a situation reveal that 
a child is being attacked in the street, we will be able to see that their sUbsumption under 
the requirements of the two principles I have discussed will tell us little, and that there may 
therefore be another principle that will guide action here. This might perhaps be an 
injunction that we should 'always seek to protect the innocent from injury'. 
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So far, so good. Difficulties arise, though, when principles come into conflict. We may not 
want to break the injunction concerning lying when a friend asks for information about the 
whereabouts of her husband, but feel duty bound not to break the promise of secrecy you 
gave to him on this very matter. In such a situation we would seem to be at a loss 
concerning the right course of action, and no longer possess recourse to proper reasons for 
our chosen course of action. This might seem to allow irrationalism too far into our ethical 
lives. The provision of reasons to guide us in such situations (and so to combat moral 
irrationalism) is the ambition of what has come to be known (at least by its adversaries) as 
moral or ethical theory. This ambition is clearly articulated by R.B. Brandt at the beginning 
of his Ethical Theory: 'What is ethical theory about? Someone might propose as an answer: 
"Everyone knows what an ethical problem is; ethical theory must be about the solutions to 
such problems" 66 
Moral theory holds out the promise that in instances of moral conflict the force of certain 
principles can be conclusively shown to outweigh that of others and thus provide a guide for 
action. The simplest way to attain this is of course to claim that all the various principles to 
which we claim allegiance are actually instantiations of one more general aim. This 
monistic solution is most prominently represented by utilitarianism. On these grounds the 
apparent problem of whether to lie or break one's promise is solved by appeal to the 
amount of utility that would ensue from each course of action (however this is calculated). 
If honesty might lead to the break up of a marriage and the unhappiness of children, then 
honesty may not be the best policy. Utilitarianism thus subsumes all moral problems under 
the requirements of a single universalizable moral principle. Alternatively, moral theory in 
the Kantian tradition stresses the way in which moral principles are ordered in a systematic 
hierarchy, whereby one's reasoning in times of apparent conflict should refer to the 
successively more general principles which outweigh those under consideration, and can 
recommend the correct action. This is the form of reasoning that Kohlberg (following Hare) 
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has advocated as the basis for understanding moral development, and is exhibited in the 
lauded response of the male child (Jake) to the 'Heinz and the druggist example' we 
encountered earlier. 
As I have suggested already, there are a number of reasons why we may not be fully 
satisfied with this answer to the problem of moral conflict. We may instead wish to 
preserve some of the importance that instances of moral conflict have for us in our ordinary 
thought and experience - that conflicts are not mirages, but real and potentially tragic. One 
of the ways in which this importance is most clearly felt has been discussed by Bernard 
Williams as the issue of 'rational regret'. For Williams, the attachment of moral theory to 
the idea that such conflicts are always fully resolvable can make little sense of the way in 
which we ordinarily feel regret for the course of action we have not chosen, even if we 
have made the right choice by not acting in that way. For utilitarians, we must simply 
ascertain which choice would maximise utility, while for Kantians, we must act out of 
obligation to the more general principle which our reasoning identifies. On neither of these 
accounts, is it rational to feel regret for not honouring a particular obligation, if it turns out 
that there was a greater obligation to act otherwise, and in a way that makes the first course 
of action impossible. Williams maintains that such types of moral theory are at fault for not 
leaving space for the notion that the first obligation can in some sense continue to apply, 
and that our non-compliance can be a legitimate reason for regret. This point is made even 
more acute if we think of the most extreme forms of moral conflict when there would seem 
to be no reason to think why it would be better to act in one way rather than another (a 
dilemma), or where the values on either side of the dilemma are so incommensurable that 
the compensation we may have from choosing one course of action (however large) could 
never match the value of the action we passed over (a tragic dilemma). The force of the 
latter kind of instance derives from the sense that whichever decision we come to, we will 
always have to commit some wrong. 
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Critics of ethical theory thus charge that its desire for systemisation and simplicity 
misrepresents our ethical experience. The presence of tragic dilemmas, it is argued, is no 
mere chimera to be resolved by recourse to superior methods of moral reasoning (such as 
that of Hare's archangel), but is in actual fact something central to our ordinary moral lives. 
Indeed, as Martha Nussbaum has argued, we would be rightfully distrustful of a politician 
who, when faced with a necessary decision between two appalling courses of action, did not 
feel any sorrow or regret for the wrong that will inevitably result.67 We may appreciate the 
politician's admirable resolve in the face of such a difficult choice - for we surely do not 
want to be led by those who would recoil in such situations. We may also come to the 
conclusion that he or she made the right decision, and deserves praise for this, or at least 
should not be blamed for the wrong that results. Yet despite this, "we also want them to 
preserve and publicly display enough of the Aristotelian intuitions of the ordinary private 
person that they will say, here is a situation in which we are violating an important human 
value." 68 
Although these reflections cast some doubt upon the ambition of the moral theorist to find a 
systematic and foolproof decision procedure for the resolution of ethical quandaries, it has 
not yet been claimed that the place of principles is problematic in itself. There is in fact no 
reason why an ethic of principles could not jettison the loftier ambitions of the 'theorist' and 
yet still claim to be an appropriate method of moral reasoning. McNaughton and Dancy 
have both discussed the 1930s work of WD Ross as an example of just this approach. 69 
Ross claimed that reference to general moral principles informed us as to what our prima 
jacie duty was in any given situation. Thus if we are asked to keep a promise, we are duty-
bound to act in accordance with the principle which states that one should 'always keep 
promises'. When two moral principles apply to a situation however, and we cannot possibly 
act out of duty to both, there is no systematic and foolproof decision procedure which can 
guide us in choosing the right course of action. All we have recourse to in situations such as 
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these is to pay close attention to the precise characteristics of the particular context in which 
the decision is called for. When our primajacie duties conflict then, according to Ross, this 
is precisely what good ethical judgement consists in. Little more can be said. 
This understanding of the complexity of moral thought preserves the importance that tragic 
dilemmas and the rational regret that results from them have for us. For the particularist, 
therefore, it represents a considerable advance over the utilitarian and Kantian theories that 
have dominated modern thinking about morality (and moral education). Their central 
complaint, however, is that Ross has still preserved too important a role for the appeal to 
general principles. In a number of ways, particularists have sought to downplay their 
importance yet further. 
The view that moral thought should proceed according to a deductive model, whereby a 
moral action is justified by reference to a principle which has general application (such as 
'do not lie' or 'always keep promises'), is held to be importantly deficient. This model 
holds that whenever the features of a situation are such as to bring one of our moral 
principles 'into play', the same non-moral facts will have the same result in every other 
situation. This should make certain that our principled action is not unfairly partial towards 
ourselves or those close to us, and that we are not swayed by the presence of morally 
irrelevant factors. Thus, if we condemn the fact that we were deceived about the state of 
some damaged goods we have purchased, we must concede that this type of lie is wrong 
irrespective of who it harms and in what circumstances the lie is told. The problem for the 
particularist lies in the way that this model discourages attention being paid to the particular 
concrete specificities of each moral situation (which Ross thought was only required in 
situations of moral conflict). The same objection also arises if principles are not part of a 
deductivist schema, but provide an element within a coherentist methodology of 'reflective 
equilibrium'.70 This model rejects the strict one-way flow of deduction in favour of a 
dialectical means of moral justification in which principles provide reasons for action in 
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particular instances and these particular judgements contribute to the specification of that 
principle. Despite this, however, nothing has been said to disabuse us conclusively of the 
notion that moral principles are indeed legitimate providers of reasons for action. 
In addition to the problems involved in maintaining complete impartial ism that were 
discussed in the last section, we may feel that the antecedent formulation of these moral 
principles ill-equips the moral agent to deal with the new and unexpected features of the 
successive circumstances in which their application is called for. Moral situations would 
often seem to possess a potential to outrun the possibility of their being translated into the 
language of principles. Agents may very well understand that a certain moral principle is 
relevant, but the situation may differ so sharply from all previous cases in which it was 
called for that the capacity to apply it correctly is severely hindered. In response to such 
situations, it is likely that knowledge of a set of general principles is less helpful than (or is 
at least partly dependent upon) a ruleless ability or skill to respond in the way that is called 
for by this particular situation. This is the virtue identified by Aristotle as phronesis or 
'practical wisdom'. In this sense, recourse to general principles can leave our moral action 
heavily underdetermined. 71 
Another problem with the generality of principles is the possibility that the non-moral facts 
about a situation which lead to it being thought of as wrong, or lead to a certain type of 
action being obligatory, may mean something quite different on another occasion. If this is 
right, it would seriously undermine the idea that principles can be constructed which affect 
themselves whenever certain facts are present - that the alteration of other facts cannot stop 
us thinking that, for instance, a lie is still a lie because if a fact matters morally it must, ipso 
facto, matter everywhere. Jonathan Dancy suggests that although the creation of pleasure 
for people is normally taken as a reasonfor doing something, if people took pleasure in 
watching public executions this would quite possibly be a reason against having them.72 The 
presence of the pleasure in each of these instances, therefore, means something different 
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depending upon the character of the surrounding situation. The claim that the behaviour of 
a reason in a certain situation cannot be adequately predicted by reference to its behaviour 
in other and previous situations, leads to a stress upon the importance of a holistic 
conception in which the behaviour can only be understood in terms of its relationship with 
all the particular and concrete features of the context of moral agency. Once again, the 
place of principles within such an account of moral thought would appear redundant, but 
rather than being due to the possible underdetermination of jUdgement, the problem here 
would tend to be that a reliance upon moral principles would result in action being 
overdetermined, uniform and unyielding. 73 
Nonetheless, these considerations still do not prove the case against the advocate of an ethic 
of principles. For they may, as RM Hare notably has, draw a distinction between the 
generality and the universality of principles. So far we have discussed the problems 
involved with the use of moral principles that guide action over a large amount of cases and 
tend therefore to overlook the concrete specificities of each situation to which they are 
applied. Such principles are general in scope. It is not necessary, however, for principles to 
have these characteristics in order to have universal form - for all this requires is that the 
principle will apply to all cases that are relevantly similar. Although the principles we most 
readily think of as universal ('do not lie', 'do not kill' etc.) also exhibit generality, there is 
no reason why universal principles may not be highly concrete and detailed. So detailed in 
fact, that it may be unlikely that they would ever come into use again (although it must of 
course be a possibility that they could). These latter kinds of principles are indeed the ones 
that Hare considers to be most exemplary in form.74 Although constructions of this kind 
would seem to finesse criticisms concerning the over-abstraction or over-generality of 
principles, they would seem to run into further difficulty. Most obviously, it is hard to see 
how a morality composed of a multitude of such concrete universal principles could avoid 
being inordinately unwieldy. As Martha Nussbaum has put this - "An ethical science with 
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'principles' this context-specific would have to have a vast and infinitely extensible series of 
principles; and this is not a science that will satisfy those who are looking for science." 75 
We might therefore conclude that there is little reason to salvage the primary place of 
principles within moral reasoning. When they have the virtues of simple rules of thumb (of 
which the educational advantage is clear) and offer the promise of direct guidance, their 
abstract generality seems to make them both (almost paradoxically) insufficient aids to our 
moral choices and strict unsympathetic masters. Yet when the problems involved in the 
quest for simplicity and generality are eased, there would seem be little necessary attraction 
to them at all. With sets of principles of either type, the scope required for the non-rule-
governed faculty of judgement would seem to be so extensive in bridging the gap between 
principle and right action that we may sense that this kind of uncodified ability is a more 
appropriate locus of ethical thought than deductive reference to the principles themselves. 76 
When such criticisms are allied with a meta-ethical rejection of non-cognitivism (the idea 
that moral statements cannot be true or false), the case against moral principles becomes 
even more pointed and radical. Although the case for or against principles is in no way tied 
to any particular view on this issue, so that writers such as Ross could be firmly cognitivist 
concerning ethical principles, it is notable that recent moral philosophy and (to an even 
greater extent) thought about moral education has entwined the principled approach with a 
meta-ethical non-cognitivism. This serves to increase yet further its vulnerability to 
particularist challenge. 
The formal and procedural account of moral reasoning propounded by non-cognitivists in 
recent times has established consistency as its master virtue. If there is no truth of the 
matter about an ethical judgement, then the fact that someone makes the same judgement 
whenever a certain natural fact is present in the situation (say the breaking of a promise) 
gives us at least a certain amount of confidence that they are reasoning in a rational manner 
- that their judgements track those features of the situation to which they claim to pertain. 
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We therefore come to understand the moral stance of a person by seeing what facts these 
are that consistently attract their moral approbation or disapprobation. Even moral 
cognitivists such as Ross saw the advantage that an ethic of principles had in promoting the 
intuitive sense we have that features which matter morally in one situation must matter 
similarly in all others. We have already seen how some have challenged the idea that such 
features must matter in the same way in every situation (however different) and have sought 
to stress the way in which context may alter a feature's moral importance. If, though, we 
include moral as well as non-moral facts within the possible description of the situation, our 
attachment to the sense of consistency described above might become yet more tenuous. 
This line of criticism is developed by John McDowell as the thesis of 'uncodifiability'. He 
argues that the problem with models of moral reasoning which centre around the appeal to 
principles is not that they over-determine our actions in particular concrete instances, but 
that they are, in fact, incapable of guiding us at all. This is because moral choice is a not a 
matter of subsuming particular cases under more general principles, but is, on McDowell's 
view, a process of discerning the salient and overriding moral features of a situation which 
count in favour of a certain judgement. 77 And this is a process which resists linguistic 
codification as "any attempt to capture it in words will recapitulate the character of the 
teaching whereby it might be instilled: generalisations will be approximate at best, and 
examples will need to be taken with the sort of 'and so on' which appeals to the co-
operation of the hearer who has cottoned on." 78 In allowing that agents may be guided by 
moral as well as non-moral facts about a situation, this subverts the idea that a consistent 
evaluative response to the same set of non-moral facts produces a guarantee of consistency 
in moral judgement. The consistent appeal to stable moral principles would therefore no 
longer be necessarily indicative of integrity. And, as McNaughton has concluded, 
... if there is nothing that all wrong actions have in common except that they are 
all wrong, then this account of the utility of moral principles [that they guarantee 
consistency] must be mistaken. The only method of arriving at correct moral 
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conclusions in new cases will be to develop a sensitivity in moral matters which 
enables one to see each particular case aright. Moral principles appear to drop out 
as, at best, redundant and, at worst, as a hindrance to moral vision. 79 
We are left to wonder whether moral principles can be of any use at all. Has being 
'principled' ceased to be a virtue and become a vice? This would seem to be a very odd 
suggestion, and one to which it is not impossible to respond. For what I have been engaged 
in questioning here is the idea that correct moral reasoning proceeds deductively from 
general or universal principles8o , via a process of situational judgement, to particular 
actions. I have maintained that principles, thought of in this sense, do not prove efficacious 
in enabling the moral agent to decide correctly, and that thinking that they do may even 
prove to be harmful to such decisions. This is to apply equally to any notion that principles 
possess a priority in decision even if the strictly deductive method is relaxed.81 There 
should be nothing contained within such criticisms, however, to threaten the commonplace 
idea that good ethical thought and practice may usefully be thought of as, in part, 
conforming to certain general rules and principles. This would allow us to see the virtue of 
'being principled' consisting not in the sUbsumption of all ethical choice under the dictates 
of moral rules, but as a sign that the principled person's moral choices are of such a 
consistency and reliability that they can conveniently be seen as examples of a certain 
rule.B2 As such, it is a commendation that expresses part of what we would want to mean by 
the virtue of integrity - the possession of a firm and steady commitment to the morally 
good. We might even think of correct moral judgement as instantiating such rules and 
principles, as long as we do not think of this instantiation as being the best or fullest account 
of our aim. Our aim should simply be to make the correct choice - a task for which appeal 
to principles is of little or no assistance. Martha Nussbaum takes a similar view: 
We must notice first that rules could play an important role in practical reason 
without being prior to particular perceptions. For they might be used not as 
normative for perception, the ultimate authorities against which the correctness of 
particular choices is assessed, but more as summaries or rules of thumb, highly 
useful for a variety of purposes, but valid only to the extent to which they 
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correctly describe good concrete judgements, and to be assessed, ultimately, 
against these. 83 
Surely one of the more obvious of purposes for which these 'rules of thumb' may possess a 
certain usefulness is moral education. For this represents the process by means of which 
children come to acquire those various kinds of knowledge and ability (cohered into 
dispositions or states of character) which enable them to make reliably good practical 
judgements. Although I shall elaborate upon the more precise features of this developmental 
process at a later point, it is understandable that children who have not yet acquired these 
aspects of character will have to be provided with some fairly reliable means of simulating 
the choices which they would have made were they to have possessed such aspects. For it is 
only by having experience of performing ethically virtuous actions (the habituation that 
constructs our ethical 'second nature') that we become able to see for ourselves when and 
where they are truly appropriate, and act reliably in such a way out of pleasure taken in 
intrinsic goods for which the actions are performed. Within this (as we shall see) largely 
Aristotelian conception of a good moral upbringing, the following of rules may provide just 
such a reliable method of simulation. They are by no means the ideal guide for ethical 
jUdgement, but they are better than nothing at all. 
Adults may, for example, have been taught the rule 'never touch the hot stove' as children, 
but no longer feel the need to refer to it in achieving the same end. It is not that the rule is 
no longer necessary for us adults (as 'don't talk to strangers' would be), and nor is it 
merely that the rule has been internalised (as we are also now capable of acting in a 
contrary manner when the situation demands it without endangering our commitment to the 
end the rule is designed to serve). Although it may seem strange for children to witness an 
adult who has taught them a rule acting in a way that transgresses it, we are able to think of 
no better way to enable the child to think and feel in the more mature way we adults do 
than to inculcate these simple rules. We consequently teach a child to prize a principle such 
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as 'do not lie', not just in the hope that it will continue to follow it, but that it will provide a 
basis for the child to experience the pleasure acting in such a way involves (where this is 
assisted by encouragement, and perhaps by appropriate punishment meted out upon those 
occasions when the principle is willfully ignored) and become more and more able to act in 
an honest way without needing to refer to the rule at all. 84 It is not the principle we want to 
be cherished forever, but the honesty (or, rather, the truth). Once we have 'ethical lift-off 
as it were, the rule may (and should) be cast aside as something we have outgrown. ss 
This conception of what is involved in the development of a child's moral thought and 
feeling allows us to diffuse the common contemporary understanding of the conflict 
between indoctrinatory approaches and those which centre around a concern for a child's 
autonomy. This is a conflict most often thought to concern the question of whether we 
should rest content with inculcating a certain set of moral rules in the minds of children, or 
whether we should instead prefer to provide them with the skills necessary to create rules 
for themselves in response to rapidly changing circumstances. What we are now able to see 
is that the appeal to rules is a mere stage (albeit a necessary one) within a long and perhaps 
unending process of character development. Of course, the efficacy of rules within this 
process will to a large degree depend upon the kind of behaviour being encouraged or 
discouraged. In the case of a rule such as 'do not lie', it is unlikely that there will be too 
much of a problem in knowing what kind of deed (or abstinence from such) is appropriate 
to its demands, given that it is known that this is the sort of case when such a rule applies. 
But this does not seem to be the case with other rules, such as 'always be fair and just' or 
'never disrespect your elders'. The kinds of behaviour which we would wish to promote via 
the teaching of such rules would seem to resist such easy codification - for what actually 
represents fair or respectful behaviour upon this or that particular occasion? The extra 
demands which such virtues make of our judgemental ability to interpret what the principle 
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requires in particular concrete situations requires that their educational treatment is 
appropriately differentiated from virtues such as honesty. 
Consideration of the principle 'always be fair and just' may also, however, indicate a sense 
in which rules have a place even when they appear to represent inappropriate codifications 
of complex particular judgements. This derives from the fact that 'justice' is a virtue 
particularly central to political rationality, and thus to that part of moral education which 
deals (as it must) with the education of moral citizens. Bernard Williams draws attention to 
this as follows: 
In particular, modern complex society functions which are ethically significant are 
performed by public agencies and, if the society is relatively open, this requires 
that they be governed by an explicable order which allows those agencies to be 
answerable. In a public, large and impersonal forum 'intuition' will not serve, 
though it will serve (and nothing else could serve) in personal life and in a more 
closely shared existence. 86 
We encounter a similar thought in the work of Joseph Raz who argues that: 
In mass, highly mobile societies, public authorities are particularly ill-adapted to 
judge matters in which having the right feelings, the proper moral sensibilities, is 
of particular importance. They are more suited to dealing with abstract principles, 
with general rights and duties, than with matters of moral character, personal 
relations, etc. 87 
Although we may not wish to characterise forms of moral judgement ungoverned by rules 
as 'intuition', the point is well taken that becoming aufait with politics (as one must if one 
is to act morally in that part of life) is, to a great extent, a process of becoming aUfait with 
the public rules and principles around which political life is organised, justified and 
understood. This is not, of course, to claim that political judgement is best approached as a 
rule governed enterprise, or that the content of such rules and the extent to which they are 
embodied in action is the only relevant consideration in the evaluation of political morality. 
Instead, what I am trying to maintain here is that we should not attempt to advocate a model 
of moral education which, for all its advantages, may produce a situation in which politics 
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becomes more and more an arena that is separated from our ordinary moral experiences 
and the wisdom we build upon these. In an age when politics seems to centre increasingly 
around technocratic reasoning at the expense of moral claims, we should be wary of 
compounding this process. It is perhaps true that the only way to avoid this is to retain the 
reference to rules and principles as part of moral education. There is obviously very much 
more to say on this topic of the relationship of moral education and politics. For example, it 
is not entirely clear why the condition of politics in modern society should mean that we 
need to reformulate our ideas about virtue and its acquisition. We must surely retain the 
possibility that it is a criticism of contemporary society that is required so that it is fitting to 
our best understanding of what morality and moral education should be. And in the light of 
the close relationship which holds between education and the society in which it operates, it 
is likely that moral education will be one of the main vehicles of any attempts at reforming 
social development in the wake of such criticism. I shall subsequently deal with some of 
these political concerns in the greater detail they evidently require. 
An elaboration of the alternative moral standpoint which I have been alluding to throughout 
this chapter will evidently need to be more explicit concerning certain central issues. For 
instance, if there is no central position retained for moral principles, how precisely do we 
work out the morally correct course of action, or when the action of others is 
reprehensible? Is an emphasis upon dispositions of character rather than upon action alone 
necessary? How, if at all, can the ethical role of the emotions be of help? Dealing with 
these and other issues is part of the portrayal of a broadly neo-Aristotelian view of the 
moral life and moral reasoning. Also, to ensure that I do not stray too far from the main 
point of these reflections, I should draw attention to the ways in which these themes might 
impinge upon issues of moral development and education. All of this shall be the concern of 
the next two chapters of this thesis. 
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Chapter Three 
An Aristotelian Alternative I: Practical Judgement and Moral Perception 
I should have by now achieved certain of my aims. I began by discussing in some detail the 
various theories that have been intended to guide our contemporary practice in the field of 
moral education. From this discussion I have concluded that despite their professed 
differences they are all, in the end, inadequate for notably similar reasons. To investigate 
the source of these deficiencies, and in the hope of being able to discover some more 
adequate approach to moral education, I have 'situated' these theories within the context of 
contemporary moral philosophy of the neo-Kantian tradition, drawing attention to some of 
the critical challenges which this tradition has faced. In this and the next chapter I shall 
return to the focus of my initial concerns by offering a broad account of a potentially more 
promising approach to moral education, based upon a very different manner of conceiving 
moral thought and practice. This approach will derive to a large degree from a reading of 
Aristotle's ethical work, together with more recent writing in the neo-Aristotelian tradition. 
Although I do not intend to be overly programmatic in this task, I shall discuss in turn some 
of the most notable themes which demarcate this alternative account from those which still 
form the main foundations for contemporary understanding of moral education. 
In beginning to search for ways of theorising a more adequate approach to moral education, 
we must of course begin with a clear understanding of our aims. What, therefore, is our 
conception of a morally educated person, or to put it another way, what are the moral 
failings or inadequacies we would wish to see children avoid possessing, or which we 
would want to educate children out of? For many of those remarking upon a perceived 
moral decline of our society, the answer to such question is that large numbers of today's 
children "do not know the difference between right and wrong" , and that it is the task of 
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moral education to make clear the nature of this important distinction. The approaches I 
have discussed up to this point, together with the alternative I shall adumbrate here, have all 
attempted to rectify this problem in their own distinctive ways. We may therefore be able to 
discern some of the important differences between competing approaches by reference to 
those kinds of moral failure which they take to be paradigmatic, and those which their 
pedagogic methods are chiefly designed to counteract. 
Values Clarificationism, as we have seen, considered itself to be an attractive means of 
engaging in moral education whilst avoiding the dangers of either indoctrinating some 
particular moral content, or giving in to the socially prevalent dangers of amoral ism and 
nihilism. It deemed success to consist in enabling children to decide freely upon their own 
values, whatever these values turned out to be. Its paradigmatic forms of moral failure were 
consequently those in which judgements of right and wrong were unknown, thought to be 
irrelevant or unimportant, or were 'unclarified'. The notion that "not knowing the 
difference between right and wrong" might be consistent with an ability to make fully 
clarified value judgements where these judgements are mistaken is excluded entirely. 
Teachers have value only in assisting the efficient development of a child's chosen values, 
not in interfering with their content. For this latter practice would involve judging the 
merits or demerits of particular valuations - a matter with which teachers cannot or should 
not involve themselves. 
As judged against this understanding of the nature of moral failure, Kohlberg's theory came 
closer to a more intuitively acceptable account in stressing the development of those 
mechanisms which govern the correct use of moral language. On this view, it is perfectly 
possible that a child's lack of knowledge concerning the 'difference between right and 
wrong' may be exemplified by a value judgement that could be deemed faulty according to 
the rules which govern the logic of such utterances. They might, for instance, not fully 
understand the need to avoid self-contradiction in one's value judgements, either by issuing 
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wildly varying judgements on the same moral issue, or by failing to appreciate the intimate 
connection between one's moral prescriptions and one's actions. On such occasions, 
teaching the rules of moral language use would seem to be exactly what we expect from 
moral education. Yet against other forms of moral failure, the 'intellectualism' of 
Kohlberg's theory (and John Wilson's for that matter) would seem to lack such bite. 
Against the proto-amoralist, who thinks moral concerns are irrelevant to their choices of 
action, it does not explain quite why we should care to engage in what they call genuine 
moral reasoning. For this, as for the problem of accidie (in which a moral sense is not 
missing, but dulled by depression or the like) it would appear to have no more chance of 
success than VC (although the 'therapeutic' style of the latter may place it in a potentially 
superior position). Equally, Kohlberg's theory does not satisfactorily explain why we 
should subsequently care to act on our moral reasonings at all - thus threatening its success 
at countering weakness of will (when a person fails to act according to their honestly 
avowed intentions). In adhering to a strict bifurcation of belief and desire, and in 
considering education to be solely a matter of development in the former domain, such 
approaches encounter severe difficulties in answering questions of this sort. 
In countering the challenge provided by the wicked or immoral, both Hare and Kohlberg 
have held out the hope that a developed commitment to the logical procedures of moral 
thinking will make it unlikely that people would remain committed to antisocial viewpoints 
on pain of inconsistency. This was, of course, the only hope available for them, as they 
both took the view that morality was not a domain in which judgements could be deemed 
true or false as if they were natural facts. There was consequently no logical limit to the 
range of evaluations to which I may choose to be committed. Hare maintained that the 
amount of 'fanatics', as he described those who would allow that their antisocial views 
should apply to them in the same way they apply them to everyone else, would be trivially 
small. This has been a point of concern for many critics who have not been reassured by 
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Hare's reply, and remain convinced that we require a stronger bulwark between what are, 
and what are not, acceptable moral views. This would connect to the intuitive view I offer 
here that teaching the difference between right and wrong should extend somewhat beyond 
the limits of the Hare/Kohlberg approach to this issue. 
In these two chapters I hope to show how a moral education that rejects some of the main 
features of both of these approaches will be better able to deal with the kinds of moral 
failure (actual or potential) which we wish to counteract in an educational context. 
Crucially, I would wish to challenge the intellectualist idea that moral failure most often 
results from the possession of wrong beliefs concerning moral questions - that the child we 
would wish to reform is the one who would respond: "If I were faced with a choice 
between being cruel and being kind, I would choose cruelty". This is where the idea that 
moral education is precisely a matter of teaching the difference between right and wrong 
can be misleading if taken, in the way the approaches I have discussed do, at face value. 
For the gap between cruel behaviour (or being a 'cruel' person) and this sort of belief tends 
to be far larger than those wedded to an intellectualist approach imagine it to be, so that it is 
highly unlikely that educating children out of such beliefs and the reasoning that produces 
them will do all the work we require from moral education. l 
As I shall claim subsequently, the difference between the virtuous and the non-virtuous 
person cannot always be explained in terms of corresponding differences in the 
propositional content of their beliefs. For it is quite possible for these propositional contents 
to be identical, but for their moral responses to differ greatly. Moral education, therefore, 
is not just a matter of encouraging children to 'know' such moral distinctions, but to 
appreciate them fully in a manner which is evident in the very way they live out their lives. 
We might say that we wish for them to know these distinctions in a way which pervades not 
only their intellect, but their whole character. As such they form part of Aristotle's key 
virtue of practical wisdom. 
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Once we reject the questionable philosophical assumption that thin moral descriptions (such 
as 'good' or 'right') have a necessary priority over thick descriptions (culturally embedded 
terms with an unavoidable empirical element such as 'honest' or 'courageous')2, we may 
find it easier to conceive of moral education as being less about the development of formal 
procedures, and more about the promotion of children's ability to recognise when and 
where these thick descriptions are made appropriate by the concrete features of particular 
situations. So rather than asking whether or not we can properly classify a refusal to protect 
a friend from attack as the 'right' or 'wrong' thing to do, we should ask whether or not 
such an act is actually an example of 'cowardice', and how our recognition of this may 
further enhance our specification of what sort of vice cowardice in fact is. It is this process 
of learning to recognise, prize, further specify, and act upon a whole array of these 'thick' 
moral terms (virtues and vices) that, on my alternative account, properly constitutes 'moral 
development'. For it would make little difference if a child was able to reclassify cowardice 
as 'right' rather than 'wrong', if he or she remained unable to recognise cowardice for him 
or herself when it was present, and see it as involving them in the task of moral judgement. 
The moral terrain which we hope to enable children to negotiate is constituted by the whole 
battery of such concepts we have available to us, and it is essential that they are brought to 
recognise their shape before their journeys can begin in earnest. 
It is one of the more serious deficiencies of both Values Clarificationism and the 
intellectualist approaches of Kohlberg and Wilson that they claim to develop children's 
moral reasoning without attending to the development of their character as moral persons. 
Moral education must properly concern not only how we think, or what we do, but also 
who we are. As Joel Kupperman has pointed out: 
The mistake of such theories results from the separation of the growing person from the 
process of skill acquisition. To treat a student's preferences at a certain stage as basic, 
incorrigible data is, in effect, to regard the student as incapable of growth. Such an 
assumption may well promote the result it assumes.3 
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This disavowal of character development underlies the view that Kohlberg formed from his 
reading of studies by Hartshorne and May. He maintained that because teaching children a 
'bag of virtues' was shown to have little of the intended influence upon their behaviour it 
must therefore be a pointless exercise. This of course ignores the fact that we are in the 
process of developing children into virtuous adults, and that it is at this time of maturity that 
the benefits of an education of character would be expected to be cashed out. It is as though 
the difficulty of the question concerning what type of person we would wish children to 
become has led us to prefer them staying as they are. This surely represents a mere 
abdication from the responsibility of the moral educator. 
As we have seen in the last chapter, central to this reconception of the nature of moral 
education is the thought that the rational construction of universal principles which are then 
used to guide moral decisions perhaps represents an inappropriate and ineffective model of 
reasoning to act as its basis. A contrary model which stresses attention to particulars will be 
advocated as a means of more adequately coping with the variety of moral failures ill-
addressed by orthodox approaches. A key addition derives from a rejection of the non-
cognitivism basic to Kohlberg's and Wilson's view of morality. The thought that the world 
may contain moral properties to which we may be responsive or unresponsive adds a 
further and prior form of possible moral failure to those encompassed by the practice of 
judgement conceived as the bridging of principle and particularity. This concerns the 
possible failure of moral perception, attention or vision - the faculty or faculties which 
allow us reliably to pick out the salient features of a situation which make appropriate 
judgement possible. 
Crucial for the articulation and educational development of this perceptual ability will be an 
understanding of the nature and role of the emotions beyond the logos/pathos or 
belief/desire dichotomy evident within mainstream post-Kantian moral philosophy. They 
will be conceived as aspects of character which assist, and are often partly constitutive of, 
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the achievement of certain moral goods, so that their possession (or absence) can provide 
legitimate reasons for moral evaluation of that person, irrespective of whether or not they 
contribute to the performance of a moral action. This represents part of a more general shift 
in focus from the evaluation of moral action to that of the character of moral agents. It is 
hoped that this will assist in a better understanding of, and response to, the problems of 
moral motivation I have discussed. For it has been a central problem of the intellectualist 
approaches to moral education that they have provided no satisfactory explanation of why 
the promotion of moral reasoning should have any necessary effect on the standards of 
moral behaviour at all. 4 With all of these matters in mind, it may be right for us to reject as 
an aim of moral education that children should 'know the difference between right and 
wrong', and instead see our intended enterprise rather as Edmund Pincoffs has - as a matter 
of "becoming the right sort".5 
An Aristotelian Approach to Ethics 
The discussions of the last chapter have led us towards the general conclusion that the 
centrality of moral principles to moral education has too often been exaggerated. 
Approaches which grant them an exalted position, such as those advocated by Kohlberg and 
Wilson, risk overlooking what is most important and basic to morality (the practices, values 
and virtues, expressed in concrete and particular situations, which underlie appeals to 
principles), and failing to explain adequately why their preferred educational methods 
should have any necessary effect upon the moral conduct of young people. Other than in 
brief references to the necessary place of perceptual and judgmental faculties in moral 
reasoning, however, I have not yet provided a full account of how we should alternatively 
conceive such reasoning, as well as the proper role and content of moral education. It is 
therefore incumbent upon me in this chapter to go some way towards the provision of just 
such an account. As I have already stated, this will emphasise a particular interpretation of 
the nature and role of judgement and moral perception. It will also stress the role to be 
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played by the affective or emotional dimension of life. These are ideas which play either an 
insufficient or non-existent part within the approaches advocated by Values-Clarification, 
Lawrence Kohlberg and John WiIson, but are central to the account of ethics provided by 
Aristotle, and developed today by numerous philosophers (including David Wiggins and 
John McDowell).6 Before I begin to discuss these concepts in more detail, it may be useful 
at this point to provide a general introduction to the Aristotelian manner of approaching 
both moral philosophy and education, for it is this which will form a basis for the account I 
will present here. 
Aristotle's work on this subject matter, contained for the most part in his Nicomachean 
Ethics, was importantly teleological, in that discovering what was good about something 
was to discover the nature of its end. Just as 'good' for a knife consisted of its excellence 
for cutting, and a 'good' farmer was one who excelled in the cultivation of crops and herds, 
Aristotle held that human beings as such could similarly be said to possess a distinctive end 
or telos. The task of ethics for Aristotle, as with all Greek thinkers, was to investigate the 
nature of this end, and the range of excellences ('virtues' or arete) that served to bring it 
about. This view departs strongly, therefore, from the dominant understanding underlying 
much of the twentieth century's thought on ethics (as well as the approaches to moral 
education which I have considered up to now). Found in Hume's aphorism (probably 
derived from Pierre Bayle) that reason is merely 'the slave of the passions', and famously 
expressed by Moore as the so-called 'naturalistic fallacy', this understanding held that 
evaluative questions were so different in kind from factual or descriptive questions that it 
would represent an error to attempt to infer a value from a fact or description. In denying 
such a bifurcation, Aristotelian ethics thus presents strong affinities with the contemporary 
forms of moral realism to which I have referred previously. 
The telos for which men characteristically aim was thought by Aristotle to be that of 
eudaimonia. This is the ultimate good which we desire for its own sake and for the sake of 
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which we desire other things. Although it is often translated as 'happiness', this may 
misleadingly suggest that it is to be identified with subjective feelings of pleasure or joy. 
Terms such as 'the good life' or 'well being' are thus perhaps rather better attempts to 
grasp Aristotle's meaning. Aristotle held the nature of man's eudaimonia to therefore be 
"an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence of virtue, and if there are several 
virtues, in conformity with the best and most complete" .7 It is not a static condition, but a 
practical way of engaging in the activities of life - exemplified by the reasoned and 
character revealing responses given at times of ethical deliberation (bouluesis) and choice 
(prohairesis). The role of the virtues is to effect the transition of man from his ordinary 
untutored state, to the condition of well-being - a state neither innate nor unnatural, but 
requiring the efficacious development of man's natural, primitive capacities. The purpose of 
moral education understood in this Aristotelian manner will be to assist this very 
development of those capacities which allow for man to attain those virtues pertaining to the 
moral life. Indeed, the explicit intention of the Nicomachean Ethics was for it to serve as a 
guide for prospective statesman in the carrying out of this political task of citizen education. 
Despite this focus upon the 'production' of virtue, we must nevertheless be careful not to 
think of the virtues and their acquisition as a means to the end of well-being as though they 
could each be specified independently. Moral education does not have manipulation as its 
aim, and should not be organised as if it were a simple matter of furthering the most 
productive and efficient means of achieving a certain end. This would create a false affinity 
with modern examples of teleology such as utilitarianism, where the end (utility) can be 
specified independently of the means that are chosen to pursue it. For it is an important 
part of Aristotle's view that an internal relationship holds between the virtues and well-
being whereby the former are constitutive of the latter. Eudaimonia cannot be specified 
other than through the engagement in those practices which form its component parts. In 
this sense, the good life simply is the virtuous life of displaying excellence in those very 
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practices. It is the internality of this relationship between means and ends that marks the 
chief distinction between Aristotle's two kinds of practical (as opposed to theoretical) 
knowledge: the technical knowledge (techne) involved in production (poiesis), and the kind 
which is implicated in action proper (praxis), excellence in which Aristotle terms phronesis 
or 'practical wisdom'. 
Just as the mind was, for Aristotle, separated into rational and non-rational elements, the 
virtues were correspondingly classified as either intellectual (acquired through teaching) or 
moral (acquired through habituation and training). Through such habituation (ethismos), the 
moral virtues become settled dispositions of character as opposed to the mere abilities or 
skills that comprise techne (although both skills and virtues develop through practice). One 
of the ways in which these two categories are best distinguished is through the observation 
that the possession of a skill seems no different to performing those actions characteristic of 
a skilful man. If one were to simulate a champion archer by scoring just as many points as 
he did, it would make little sense to maintain that one was not similarly skilful. This, for 
Aristotle, was because "works of art (techne) have their merit in themselves; so it is enough 
for them to be turned out with a certain quality of their own. "8 In other words, the 
possession of a skill is not endangered by the state of the person who performs the skilful 
acts (unless, of course, the act was a mere accident). Importantly, however, a distinction 
does seem to exist in the case of moral virtue. If one were to act in the same way as an 
authentically courageous person, this would be no guarantee that one was in possession of 
the virtue of courage. This is at least partly due to the importance of the motivational aspect 
- that one must choose virtuous actions for their own sakes (prohairoumenos di' auta).9 One 
may, for instance, be acting for the sake of a financial reward or from fear of punishment 
or even to display one's athleticism. All of these motivations would serve to make the 
apparently courageous action merely calculative rather than fully virtuous. It is essential to 
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virtuous action, that it arises from a correctly patterned set of motivations - the development 
of which is the basis of good character. 10 
It was also important, for Aristotle, that virtuous action is performed in full knowledge of 
the facts of the situation. Ignorance of the thinness of the ice may be a reason why an action 
performed to save a dog stranded in the middle of a frozen lake is perhaps best 
characterised as one exhibiting the character trait of recklessness as opposed to courage. A 
truly virtuous person will act not only for the right reason (to kalofl or 'for the sake of the 
noble'), but also in a way that consistently and unchangingly exhibits a mean between the 
vices of deficiency and excess (in the case of courage, these would comprise of cowardice 
and recklessness). Rather than a plea for moderation in all cases, as many have taken this to 
be, the doctrine of the mean instead stresses that although there is only ever one way of 
making the virtuous choice in a particular situation, there are a multitude of ways to make 
the wrong one. Another important distinction between virtues and skills arises from the 
differing extents to which they are grounded in the habitual qualities which comprise a 
person's character (or, as Aristotle put it, "a fixed and permanent disposition" 11). For 
instance, we might have little problem in saying that someone is a truly skilful archer even 
though they no longer engage in this pursuit (assuming, of course, that their skillfulness had 
not diminished in that period), whereas we would not say that the same person is a kind 
man even though his behaviour no longer exhibits kindness. Moral education aims at the 
production of kind people, not people who have the skill of being kind at their disposal as 
long as they choose to exercise it. In this sense, virtues are not detachable from the 
composition of a person's character in the way that skills can be.12 One of the upshots of 
this is that a person may be held responsible for the presence of many of those factors 
which may prevent him or her from choosing and acting virtuously - a responsibility that 
does not occur in cases of failure to act in accordance with a skill. As Sarah Broadie 
interprets this point: 
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It is not in general the proper business of the builder as such to have made sure 
that he is not so upset that he cannot operate, any more than it is his business qua 
builder to make sure that his body is healthy. But it is, Aristotle thinks, the proper 
business of the prohairetic agent to be in whatever emotional condition is 
necessary for him to function well. 13 
Because of these motivational and situational aspects of virtue, the focus of Aristotelian 
ethics is not upon rules or principles which govern right conduct, but upon the 'man of 
good character' (the spoudaios). It is therefore an approach which fits well with the 
particularist ideas I discussed in the last chapter. One may gauge the virtuous course of 
action in a particular circumstance by attempting to understand the way in which a virtuous 
person would have chosen to act in just such a situation. The man of good character will act 
consistently in the right way, for the right reason, and will have his passions tempered so 
harmoniously that a disposition towards virtuous action becomes an unchanging part of his 
character - his 'second nature'. Virtue comes easily to him. In some ways, however, we 
have conflicting thoughts about this latter aspect of virtuous character. Phillippa Foot, for 
instance, has drawn attention to the way in which we often think that the struggle to act 
courageously that is ongoing within someone who is sorely tempted by cowardice or 
external temptation to act otherwise, serves to make their courageous action rather more 
heroic and praiseworthy than that performed by someone to whom it comes easily because 
of their lack of fear. This would indeed seem to fit with the idea that being a human 
'excellence', virtue must in some sense be difficult. Foot seeks to resolve this difficulty by 
attempting to differentiate virtues in order to see that" some kinds of difficulty do indeed 
provide an occasion for much virtue, but that others rather show that virtue is 
incomplete." 14 She claims, for instance, that there is an important difference when honest 
action involves a struggle against temptation to steal whether such a temptation arises from 
a defect of character, or from features of the situation such as one's poverty. In the latter 
case she concludes, "difficulties of this kind make honest action all the more virtuous." 15 
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Despite the intuitive appeal of her view, I fear that Foot may be mistaken here. For there 
would seem to be little difficulty with characterising the ideally virtuous agent as one whose 
passions are harmoniously tempered to such a degree that contrary temptations to virtuous 
action do not happen to arise (in McDoweIrs terminology, they are silenced), whilst 
continuing to regard the heroic struggle of the poverty-stricken with the temptation to steal 
as importantly praiseworthy. This is especially so if one is mindful of the way in which 
Aristotle's ethics focuses upon the development of virtue as much as anything else - a 
process in which praise, as well as similar responses such as exhortation, admonishment or 
scolding have an important role to play. It would seem that Foot too easily conflates this 
praiseworthiness with virtue itself. We may even preserve the idea that the choices of the 
virtuous agent (as examples of excellence) must be difficult, just as it is difficult to hit a 
'bull's eye' in archery, as long as we do not insist that they must necessarily be difficult for 
the agent themselves. Even though we may characterise temptations towards vice as 
understandable, and the overcoming of them as deserving of praise, there should be little 
obstacle in the way of understanding moral education as the production of virtuous agents in 
whom these contrary desires just cease to arise. 
Later on, I shall make more reference to the way in which an Aristotelian conception of the 
place of the passions or emotions within the moral life departs greatly from the view 
underlying much of recent philosophy and educational theory. We shall come to see that 
the 'tempering' of which I have made passing mention should not be understood as though 
it meant 'mastered by the intellect'. For Aristotle the expression of the right emotional 
response on the right occasion and to the right degree (in accordance with the mean 
exhibited by the man of good character) was an importantly constitutive part of what it is to 
be virtuous. Before turning to such matters, however. I should discuss the aspect of the 
'rational part' (the [ogistikon) which is most apposite to our present concerns - the virtue of 
phronesis or 'practical wisdom' which represents excellence in the form of knowledge that 
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pertains to praxis. This intellectual virtue occupies a pivotal position in Aristotle's 
understanding of morality, in that its acquisition allows a person with a certain moral aim to 
deliberate most profitably concerning the course of action it would be best to follow in 
order to achieve that aim. Since the exercise of phronesis results in morally right action, the 
phronimos (the practically wise man) must also possess all of the moral virtues in order that 
his deliberative excellence is not reduced to the status of mere cleverness (in the particular 
sense that a murderous stalker may be 'clever'). In their relation to phronesis therefore, the 
virtues are a unity. 16 
The Perception and Deliberation of the Practically Wise 
Given its importance for any attempt to articulate a model of moral education, I need to say 
rather more about quite what it is that properly constitutes the virtue of practical wisdom. 
This is a topic about which there has been much academic controversy in the recent past, 
with a number of philosophers quite self-consciously attempting to 'rescue' Aristotle from 
the grasps of his neo-Kantian interpreters. This controversy has revolved around a 
particular difficulty of exegesis of the Nicomachean Ethics concerning his account of proper 
deliberation (bouleusis) and choice (prohairesis) that are the essential character-revealing 
marks of phronesis. 17 In the third book of his Ethics Aristotle attempted to describe the sort 
of practical reasoning appropriate to moral questions by utilising an analogy with technical 
reasoning. It is characteristic of this sort of thinking that an end is pre-determined (whether 
by prior deliberation or not) and held steady, while practical deliberation concerns only the 
choice of those courses of action which would be most causally efficacious in bringing it 
about. In the analogous moral case: 
We deliberate not about ends but about means. A doctor does not deliberate 
whether to cure his patient, nor a speaker whether to persuade his audience, nor a 
statesman whether to produce law and order; nor does anyone else deliberate 
about the end at which he is aiming. They first set some end before themselves, 
and then proceed to consider how and by what means it can be attained.18 
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His conclusion that "the object of deliberation, then, cannot be the end but must be the 
means to ends" 19 has been the cause of much confusion. In a certain way it is rather 
uncontroversial. Just as a teacher would not seem to deliberate whether to educate the 
children in her class but, rather, deliberates upon the question of what means to employ to 
ensure that they are best educated, one would not seem to deliberate properly upon whether 
or not to seek the good but upon the question of how best it is sought. As the Ethics is 
explicitly presenting an account of deliberative excellence concerned with the end of action 
(praxis) rather than with theoretical knowledge (theoria), these observations seem to be 
sound enough. Difficulties arise when one considers quite how moral deliberation would 
proceed in such a manner. It would seem that the question of how to achieve well-being in 
general, or how best to be courageous, patient, or just is not always simply a matter of 
selecting appropriate means for the achievement of an independently specified end, but also 
a question of what that end is, or of what course of action best constitutes that end.20 The 
question of 'how should I be courageous here?' thus often seems to be the same as 'what 
makes for courage in this situation?' Indeed, the very nature of many of the practices within 
which ethical deliberation is called for would seem to make it impossible for an end to be 
specified prior to the deliberation concerning how to achieve it in that specific case. The 
internal and constitutive relationship between means and ends in the case of moral virtue (to 
which I referred earlier), would seem to make the technical deliberative model redundant in 
the moral case. 
Recent commentators have, however, drawn attention to the way in which such difficulties 
are diffused if we reject the "means to an end" translation that is found in WD Ross' 
version of the Ethics21 , and derives largely from the 191h century scholarship of Julius 
Walter.22 For this would seem to import an untoward Humeanism into Aristotle's ethical 
outlook, whereby reason simply considers the ways of best achieving the ends antecedently 
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set by desire. David Wiggins, for instance, has suggested that Aristotle's words here are 
rather better translated as "what is towards an end". Together with the idea that his 
technical analogy was intended merely to utilise an example of deliberation familiar to his 
audience (rather than to function as his model), this would seem to allow us to read 
Aristotle as maintaining that we do not reason whether or not to achieve our end, but about 
what our ends are in the particular circumstance in which we have to make our choice. Yet 
there are a further set of problems here again, concerning how this less instrumental form 
of deliberation properly proceeds. Conflict arises between those favouring a neo-Kantian 
model, based upon deduction from general principles to the particular case, and its critics, 
concerning Aristotle's more complex discussion of bouleusis and prohairesis in his sixth 
book (concerning virtues of the intellect). The issues here mirror those I have discussed in 
the last section concerning particularity. 
The neo-Kantian interpretation here is referred to by John McDowell as the 'blueprint 
picture', and by Sarah Broadie as the 'Grand End' view23 - one which is once again 
furthered by a distinctive translation by Ross. Aristotle describes the reasoning of the man 
of practical wisdom endeavouring to 'hit the mean' in a deliberative situation as being in 
accordance with orthos logos. This is rendered by Ross as 'right rule', and by other 
translators as 'right principle'24, thus implying that the orthos logos represents a 
deliberative procedure whereby the features of particular cases are subsumed under the 
requirements of more general principleS,25 If this was Aristotle's intended model, it would 
appear to fit well with his claim that practical wisdom involves having grasped a universal 
end (eu prattein or 'doing well'), and having the deliberative excellence (euboulia) 
necessary to bring that end to bear upon particular cases (what the aspiration to well-being 
demands here) throughprohairesis. There is on this picture, therefore, a 'blueprint' of the 
universal that is available to reason independently of our attempts to instantiate it in 
practice,26 Yet this view seems to be quite contrary to some of the other things Aristotle has 
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to say about the nature of the deliberation excellence in which forms an essential part of 
practical wisdom. In the second book of the Ethics, for instance, he states that: 
Now questions of conduct and experience have as little fixity about them as 
questions of what is healthful; and if this is true of the general rule, it is still more 
true that its application to particular problems admits of no precision. For they do 
not fall under any art or professional tradition, but the agents are compelled at 
every step to think out for themselves what the circumstances demand, just as 
happens in the arts of medicine and navigation.27 
And later in the same book; 
... it is not easy to define by rule for how long, and how much, a man may go 
wrong before he incurs blame; no easier than it is to define any other object of 
perception. Such questions of degree occur in particular cases, and the decision 
lies with our perception.28 
Contrary to the case of techne, where the craftsman operates with a particular image of his 
end (his product) when he chooses his tools and methods, it would not seem to be possible 
for Aristotle (according to these statements) to have countenanced the idea that the virtuous 
person similarly possesses a grasp of their end independently of the choices they make in its 
service. This would appear to lend support to the particularist thesis that ethical reasoning is 
improperly characterised in terms of deduction from general or universalizable principles. 
There is just something about the subject matter of ethics that cannot be captured in this 
way. This being so, orthos logos is perhaps better rendered as 'right reason', thus losing its 
associations with deductive accounts of moral reasoning. It is certainly not that phronesis 
represents a kind of everyday moral thought, as though there existed a superior level to 
which we may have recourse if the situation is such as to demand it. Rather, this 
particularist model of practical wisdom represents precisely what ethical excellence is. This, 
incidentally, would serve to make Hare's recent claim that his classification of 'two levels 
of moral thinking' derives from Aristotle amongst others appear a somewhat fanciful 
suggestion.29 
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If this deductive model is not ideally fitted to be a guide to Aristotle's intended account of 
good deliberation, how should we characterise what it is to bring the universal end to bear 
upon particular circumstances of choice? One possibility that has been advocated by 
Wiggins and McDowell amongst others30 , is that the decisions made by a person who 
possesses the perceptual and motivational propensities characteristic of the phronimos, are 
themselves incidences of this 'bringing to bear', even when that which is brought to bear is 
not appealed to in any deductive sense. The universal conception of well-being is therefore 
not something that can be grasped or attained independently of the possession of just these 
aspects of character. To grasp the universal simply is to see aright in particular 
circumstances. Or, as McDowell puts it, " ... there is nothing else for a grasp of the content 
of the universal end [a correct conception of doing well] to be except a capacity to read the 
details of situations in the light of a way of valuing actions into which proper upbringing 
has habituated one." 31 The content of the universal is thus embodied in the ways of 
perceiving, deliberating and acting - a "conception of how to live" 32 - that comes to light 
throughout the lifetime of the virtuous person. 
If we take the exercise of virtue characteristic of the phronimos to rest upon this capacity of 
perception (or 'situational appreciation', as Wiggins has rendered Aristotle's aisthesis) 
regarding the salient ethical considerations of particular circumstances in which one finds 
oneself faced with ethical choice, the place of habituation within Aristotle's account 
becomes very important. If we were to rest content with the deductive 'rule-case' model, 
we would have been able to understand habituation as the process by which ethical agents 
acquire the motivational propensities needed to translate the independently grasped 
blueprint of 'what well-being is' into habitual virtuous action. But this view would no 
longer seem to be available. For we can now only grant that those who have been properly 
habituated into correctly perceiving the 'fine and noble', and are motivated to act for the 
sake of it, can be thought to have access to the universal end. This would seem to make 
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sense of the statements we find in book ten of the Ethics, where Aristotle insists that only 
the well brought up are able properly to understand the sort of ethical reflection that his 
work represents.33 
There is, admittedly, a certain circularity involved here, with phronesis being the kind of 
knowledge that can only be acquired by experience and habituation of character, and the 
good actions that comprise this experience requiring the possession of phronesis for their 
performance. In light of this, it is important to understand that phronesis is not something 
that is merely added on top of a well-formed character, but is a kind of knowledge that 
forms part of what it is to be of good character. Ethical virtue and practical wisdom 
therefore develop in an inextricably linked fashion. An account which emphasises the place 
of moral upbringing in Aristotle's theory would also serve to undermine those views 
claiming that his conception of the virtues that comprise eudaimonia is derived from extra-
ethical commitments - something Alasdair MacIntyre refers to as his 'metaphysical 
biology'.34 Instead of this, we must rest content (on this account) with the idea that Aristotle 
did not seek to provide any sort of external foundation or justification of his view, but 
actually took it for granted that his audience had already been brought to share his general 
ethical perspective.35 As he states in the towards the end of his Eudemian Ethics, 
... argument and teaching, we may suspect, are not powerful with all men, but the 
soul of the student must first have been cultivated by means of habits for noble joy 
and noble hatred, like earth which is to nourish the seed. For he who lives as 
passion directs will not hear argument that dissuades him, nor understand it if he 
does ... The character, then, must somehow be there already with a kinship to 
excellence, loving what is noble and hating what is base.36 
There is evidently much of interest in this notion of habituation, especially as regards the 
conceptual reordering of moral education, about which I have not yet made mention. In 
fact, one may argue that Aristotle's understanding of virtue was very largely an 
understanding of its acquisition. Not only do the details of what sort of developmental 
model Aristotle envisaged need to be fleshed out, but I should also refer to understandable 
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concerns regarding the apparently 'mechanical' nature of this process. I intend, however, to 
defer this discussion for the moment and look instead to investigate in some further depth 
this notion of 'moral perception' to which I have alluded. 
In my previous discussions of the deficiencies of a principle-based ethical system, I have 
laid particular emphasis upon the way in which such a system underestimates the important 
role played by judgement - the capacity to fit a moral aim to particular circumstances. One 
of the advantages of a broadly Aristotelian way of conceiving of moral excellence is that 
this situational capacity is allowed to play a much fuller role than it is in those accounts of 
morality influenced by theorising in the Kantian tradition. Moreover, in this last section I 
have tried to show how Aristotle's ethical outlook (augmented by some recent 
interpretations) is of help to us in broadening our view of what moral excellence requires 
beyond the exercise of good deliberative judgement (euboulia) to include a capacity for 
something like 'moral perception' - an 'eye' for what he called 'ultimate particulars' 
(eschata) in ethics. This is to be understood as the faculty 37 which allows us to discern the 
features of particular concrete situations that are of most importance for any subsequent 
deliberative judgement.38 The deductivist paradigm of moral thought, as we have seen, 
suggests that once one is aware of the 'major premises' of practical syllogisms (such as 'one 
should not punish the innocent'), the corresponding 'minor premises' (such as 'this accused 
man is innocent') require no epistemologically particular means for their discovery. The 
central ethical virtue for this approach is therefore the strength of the will which protects 
the properly judged result of the practical syllogism. For Aristotle, however, this protection 
of boulesis does not exhaust all that he means by phronesis. Equally important is the 
operation of phronesis-nous - that which allows for the fullest aisthetic perception of the 
particulars constituting the minor premises. Without this, our ethical understanding would 
be importantly incomplete. This is a point well emphasised by Nancy Sherman; 
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... most procedures for generating or testing via principles leave out of the 
account the process by which we formulate the intentions to be tested. And this 
process depends upon what we perceive as relevant in the case, how we 
individuate or describe the situation. If we misdescribe circumstances or fail to 
notice relevant features then the test will be testing intentions, but intentions that 
are inadequately responsive to what may in fact be the demands of the situation ... 
And reflection which begins with the decision or intention rather than with the 
construal of the situation to which the intention is a response begins too far down 
the line,39 
Good character is thus revealed not only in acting consistently for good ends, or judging 
accurately what course of action a commitment to such an end requires, but also in the way 
one 'reads' the situation in which deliberation and action will be necessary. The phronimos 
is, to use Nussbaum's paraphrase of Henry James, 'finely aware and richly responsible' -
cognizant of the multifarious moral considerations that pertain to various particular 
situations and accepting of the responsibilities such an awareness brings with it. It is of little 
use having the conscientiousness and willpower such that one is committed to fighting, say, 
the evils of racism, if one is ill-equipped to appreciate when instances of this kind of 
discrimination actually occur in concreto. These instances are often subtle without reducing 
their unjust impact, and complex without being imperceptible. What is required of ajust 
person is consequently at least partly comprised of the perceptual power produced by the 
developed nature of those faculties (both cognitive and affective as we shall see) which 
assist the recognition of racism and the suffering it produces when it is occurrent. Only if 
the perception is true to the situation can an action performed out of opposition to racism be 
characteristic of a virtuous person, rather than merely being the action that a virtuous 
person would have performed. This represents the acquisition of a kind of knowledge for 
which there is no available formula or set of formulae, no 'way of perceiving' other than 
that embodied in the character of practically wise men - those for whom "experience has 
given them an eye, they see aright. "40 Joseph Dunne has offered some further examples of 
moral perceptions that may be of a kind characteristic of the operation of phronesis: 
I am taking out my frustrations with the boss on the children. 
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I am making distractions for myself in order to avoid making this decision. 
Mary is embarrassed because alcoholism has been mentioned. 
An inordinate fear of failure is preventing John from revealing his full potential in 
class. 
James is causing trouble in class because he's bored with work that's too 
undemanding for him.41 
It is important to note that these perceptions cannot be characterised as distinctively 'moral' 
from any external or neutral perspective, abstracted from the moral point of view 
represented by the agent or perceiver in question. As I have suggested before, all that 
correct moral perceptions, choices or actions can be said to have in common is that they are 
correct - and this is not a feature which can be appreciated by someone who does not have 
the capacity to perceive in this way. This represents a departure from those neo-Kantian 
views (such as Kohlberg's) which have hoped to discover some intrinsic aspect to thejorm 
of proper moral judgements which marks them out as distinct. As is well known, Kant drew 
this distinction by separating categorical from hypothetical imperatives, where the first 
involves a degree of rationally compelled duty (as opposed to action performed out of 
inclination) that is particular to moral reasons. Aristotle's thought differs from both that of 
Kant and that of the Stoics (the most prominent Greek thought after Aristotle), in that it 
does not lay emphasis upon any formal distinction (or indeed any distinction at all) between 
moral and non-moral reasoning. Rather, all right choices (whether they reveal virtues such 
as courage, or those such as magnificence, which no longer strike us as especially moral 
dispositions) are united under the single end of eudaimonia and are performed for the sake 
of the noble (to kalon). 
Perhaps this discussion remains a little too abstract, lacking a more precise elaboration of 
the operations of this 'moral perception'. This is true, but is also in some ways appropriate 
to the matter of concern itself. Indeed, Aristotle himself refrained from providing any 
examples of quite what it is that is perceived. For it is one of the implications of a focus 
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upon moral perception and situational judgement, that the centrality of illustrative or 
schematic examples to philosophical discussion appears to be somewhat unwarranted. The 
use of such examples too often seems attached to the idea that one can draw moral 
conclusions (or the matters for deliberation) from a comparatively short discussion of a 
particular case. Its precise features are taken to be 'symptomatic' of general features that 
pertain to like cases (which become the main focus of concern), rather than aspects of the 
situation which demand close consideration in their own terms. This would represent a way 
of approaching ethical reflection far removed from the one which I have been outlining in 
this chapter - one whose natural imaginative vehicle would seem to be the more finely 
grained narrative accounts of ethical choice contained in the novel and biographies. 
One should not, however, make too much of the possible aesthetic resonances supplied by 
the use of terms such as 'perception', 'discernment', and 'the reading of situations' .42 It is 
true that in many ways these analogies can be of help. To return to an example from the last 
chapter, the process of developing artistic judgement concerning music consists in the 
gradual refininement of responses to that particular medium. To an uneducated ear, one 
piece of music may sound pretty much the same as another - maybe we are able to say little 
more than that we just 'like music'. As we listen attentively to further pieces, and particular 
features of them are pointed out to us by someone with more experience of music43 , we 
begin to appreciate more and more complexities of which we were previously unaware. Our 
increased discernment may lead us to better understand quite why we like the music we do, 
or to prefer alternative pieces to those which we initially favoured. Through a process of 
education, therefore, we have gained the capacity to discern finer and more complex 
aspects of music, and to judge them in a superior manner - a capacity which importantly 
outstrips any attempts we may make to Codify it in terms of principles or rules. In his 
Politics, Aristotle himself refers to the analogy between the processes of musical and moral 
habituation, 
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... since music happens to be a kind of pleasure, and virtue is concerned with 
proper enjoyment and loving and hating rightly, it is clear that there is nothing 
more necessary to learn and to become habituated in than jUdging rightly and 
delighting in good characters and fine actions. Rhythm and melody provide keen 
likenesses of anger and gentleness, and also of courage and temperance and of all 
the opposites of these and of all the other states of character ... And becoming 
habituated to feeling pain and delight in likenesses is close to feeling the same way 
towards the things that are their models.44 
This serves to illustrate the important place that aesthetic forms generally, and music in 
particular, occupies in Aristotle's thoughts concerning moral development and education, 
and there is much here that evidently confirms some of the things I have been trying to 
suggest about these matters. It also reflects the way in which the ancient Greeks tended to 
see the good of the beautiful, and of the moral sense of the noble as inseparable - in fact 
both are referred to by the same Greek word (kalos). In modern times, however, we are 
more used to the idea that there may be some opposition between the values of art and 
morality - that art may exist 'for art's sake' rather than for any (especially moral) end 
external to it. Indeed, in MacIntyre's condemnation of modern 'emotivist culture' in his 
After Virtue, he refers to one of the defining 'characters' of modernity as being the aesthete 
- one whose appreciate excellences as turned to manipulative rather then moral ends.45 I do 
not intend to explore these complex and interesting issues of the relationship of morality and 
aesthetics here, but I would stress that one should never overestimate the intimacy of this 
relationship to the degree that one might begin to understand the development of a finer and 
more complex sensibility as the sole aim of moral education. We intend to produce agents 
of good character not moral dilettantes. Good character often requires fine perceptions, but 
we should not want their desirability to result in a situation where an agent is so 
overwhelmed by complex and competing moral considerations that she is unable to move 
herself even when action is urgently demanded. 
If we do not want to have to defend the difficult view that all moral goods are aesthetically 
good, we must allow that moral perception includes the ability to know when its task is 
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complete, or when further perceptual strivings would be fruitless or in danger of fostering 
inertia, and that it is now the time for action. It may be true to say that fine perception is 
something praiseworthy irrespective of whether or not any action results from it, but we 
should not allow the activities of perception, judgement, and action to float too far apart. 46 
If, to adapt an example of Justin Oakley's, we were to imagine a woman hearing of a 
misfortune that had occurred for an ex-husband of whom she has a dislike, it might be that 
even though her perceptions of his likely hurt and anger could be finer than those of anyone 
else, they merely enable her to all the more enjoy schaden/reude from his fate and act in 
ways to maximise its ill consequences.47 In recognition of such possibilities, we must 
remember that it is the task of phronesis not merely singularly to develop these various 
aspects of our moral characters, but also to assist their integration into a virtuous whole. A 
state in which they exist disharmoniously cannot by definition be one of virtue. A similar 
warning about the dangers involved in overstressing the connections between art and 
morality is offered by Joseph Dunne who insists that "there are emotions which we should 
certainly not regard as good were we to meet them in a friend (or in ourselves) but which 
we might nonetheless find powerfully expressed in what we should be compelled to regard 
as a good work of art. " 48 
Another way in which our understanding of the picture of phronesis I have developed here 
may go astray is if it is too closely assimilated to the model of ethical intuitionism. This 
view, which became popular in the first few decades of this century (especially through the 
work of Moore, Pritchard and Ross), accepted the cognitivist thesis that moral values are 
not created by us but discovered - that truth and falsity properly pertain to notions such as 
good and wrong. In addition to this they characteristically held either one or both of the 
following further theses: the ontological claim that 'good' (and other such valuational 
predicates) made propositional reference to distinct, non-natural and unanalyzable 
'properties' in the world, and/or the epistemological claim that there was a particular mode 
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of cognition or 'intuition' by means of which we could acquire ethical knowledge (whether 
that meant becoming aware of such 'ethical properties' or not).49 The neo-Aristotelian 
perceptual model I have been outlining here accepts the idea that our beliefs are judged in 
accordance with their accuracy as a response to ethical reality (the first thesis), and that we 
can be morally praised for our success in discerning such reality. It is for this reason that 
some may be tempted to claim that such a model can represent little but a contemporary 
revival of discredited intuitionist ideas. 
However, this would be to ignore the importance of the way in which the perceptual model 
firmly rejects the other two claims of intuitionism I have stated above. Firstly, it does not 
seek to posit the existence of any such properties as 'goodness' or 'rightness' (whether 
defined in Moorean terms or not), existing independently of the make-up of one's 
sensibility, which one may succeed or fail in identifying. 50 The ethical 'reality' to which it 
makes reference does not, therefore, have quite the same degree of metaphysical ambition 
as was evident in certain intuitionist ideas. Although moral perception is most definitely a 
matter of cognition (amongst other things), it need not follow that what is involved can be 
captured by the idea of coming to believe a certain proposition (such as 'that action 
possesses the simple, unanalyzable property of goodness'). The 'way of perceiving' 
embodied in the character and conduct of the virtuous person is not easily reducible in 
terms of the propositional content of his or her beliefs. For what is perceived is essentially 
practical - the salience or non-salience of a variety of reasons for action present in the 
situation. And it is precisely such practical reasonings (the content of phronesis) which, for 
an Aristotelian, cannot properly be captured in propositional terms.51 
What are identified by the virtuous person's correct moral perception are not any 'queer' or 
unusual properties but ordinary reasons and considerations (such as those offered by Dunne 
above) that bear upon our choice of action in specific situations. Furthermore, in denial of 
the second claim of the intuitionists, such perception does not involve the possession or 
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cultivation of any unusual or distinct modes of cognition (over and above sense perception, 
emotion and reason) suited to matters of ethical importance. Perception of ethical reality is 
nothing stranger than what is involved in, for instance, taking the presence of a child on a 
dangerous edge of a cliff as a most salient reason for action. As Dancy has written, 
... moral reasons are just ordinary considerations such as his distress or the loss to 
her self-respect. The wrongness of the action is not a reason for not doing it; 
reasons for not doing it are more mundane features. This is in keeping with the 
claim that telling someone, even with authority, that the action is wrong does not 
give her a reason to hold back. The reason to hold back is the same as the reason 
why the action is wrong, namely the damage you will do to your friend's 
prospects (or whatever).52 
Of course, correctly judging the respective practical salience of various features of a 
situation is often a rather more complex affair than that involved in instances such as the 
dangerous presence of a child upon a precipice. As David Wiggins has stressed, «few 
situations come already inscribed with the names of all the concerns which they touch or 
impinge upon. "53 This being so, the phronetic agent will possess an attentiveness and 
sensitivity (both cognitive and affective) that marks him or her out as being excellent in this 
sphere. Such moral capacities are not esoteric in any sense, but are such that any ordinary 
human being may reasonably aspire to excellence in terms of them. They cannot be taught 
or learnt from any rule-book, but are developed through a lifetime's experience of active 
involvement in social practices54 (although there is equally no reason why such experience 
might not prove similarly efficacious in fostering vice). 
One of the main features which sets apart the approach I am describing from earlier 
theories such as intuitionism is its rejection of a Humean bifurcation of beliefs and desires. 
Only if we reject the view that the recognition of ethical truth cannot be sufficient to 
motivate action, but requires the independent addition of a distinct desire element, do we 
become able to see some internal relationship holding between moral judgement and action 
whilst preserving the idea that such attitudes can be true or false. Intuitionists, accepting the 
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Humean thesis, conceded that the moral facts of which we could become aware represented 
mere reports of reality and, as such, were insufficient to motivate action. Many critics have 
subsequently felt that the way in which this external ism misses something of the essential 
action-guiding nature of moral judgements (the strangeness we would find exhibited in 
someone who said that they knew their actions were wrong but did not care to cease 
performing them), is one of the main explanations for why intuitionism was historically 
superseded by those non-cognitivist accounts which were thought better able to encompass 
our ordinary thoughts on this question. 55 
The cognitivist account I am defending here does not posit the existence of neutrally 
characterisable inert features of the moral world (whether or not this is conceived in 
naturalistic terms), but claims that those in possession of a suitably developed sensibility are 
able to judge which of the irreducibly practical reasons for action are most salient within a 
situation, and furthermore, that 'seeing' such features can involve being motivated by them. 
As an example, we might say that somebody who saw the aforementioned child upon a 
dangerous cliff but did not judge that this situation presented a reason for action sufficient to 
motivate him or her, did not merely lack a benevolent desire to match their accurate 
cognition of the danger involved, but actually failed to 'see' something present in the 
situation - namely the needfulness produced by the danger. 56 And the recognition of this is 
not possible for someone whose sensibility is not so attuned as to be motivated to act in 
response to it. This failure represents a cognitive lack - a failure of the developed moral 
perception (or attention, insight, vision, or whatever) that is required in a fully virtuous 
character, as well as an affective deficiency. 57 An awareness of this needfulness and the 
accompanying motivation to intervene that is united in a person with the appropriately 
shaped sensibility is not something that, as I have said before, can be explicated in terms of 
propositions concerning the situation in which it is operational. It is the development of all 
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aspects of this sensibility in young people, the kind of character preconditional for access to 
the moral world, that is the task of moral education. 
How might we understand the way in which a virtuous person is properly attentive to a 
situation if their reasoning, as a practical matter, is not to be fully articulated in terms of the 
propositional content of their beliefs? Equally, what is it that occurs when one's sensibility 
develops to the extent that one arrives at a correct view of a situation if it is not a change in 
such beliefs? We might think about these questions with regard to the issue of akrasia 
(incontinence or weakness of will), which Aristotle discussed in the seventh book of his 
Ethics. The akrates is a person who has a knowledge of the right course of action which 
would appear to be the same as that possessed by the virtuous person, yet fails to act in a 
virtuous manner. If the propositional content of their beliefs is the same, what can explain 
this failure? As is well known, Socrates thought that the notion of akrasia was 
unintelligible. Believing that virtue represented a theoretical knowledge of the good, he 
maintained that it was impossible for someone truly to know what action it is good to 
perform but still not perform it - wrongdoing must always be the result of ignorance. 
Alternatively, one who takes the problem to be a real one might maintain that an akratic 
person has their knowledge of the good overridden by appetites or emotions which knock 
reason off its true course. The essential characteristic of the virtuous person, therefore, is 
the suppression of these aspects of character. 
Aristotle's view differed from both of these alternatives. He suggested, against Socrates, 
that it is certainly possible to act wrongly despite possessing knowledge of what action 
would be right, and suggests that the answer to the problem of akrasia has to do with the 
role in moral deliberation of appetites and emotions. He did not, however, go so far as to 
claim that it is the failure to eliminate the affective sphere in general that supplies this 
answer. For Aristotle, appetitive and emotional desires were not things which necessarily 
need to be suppressed in this way, but were in fact essential ingredients of virtuous 
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perception, deliberation and conduct. One fails to be continent, not because one has 
feelings, but because these feelings are not in their proper order or shape - they do not 
'speak with the same voice' as their rational prescription. With regard to temperance 
(sophrosune), which Aristotle regarded as the only unqualified domain of akrasia, the 
incontinent man (as opposed to the self-indulgent akolastos) actually chooses not to have 
that one extra drink. The fact that his action does not follow in accordance with his choice 
(prohairesis) has to do with his being overtaken by the impulses of appetite. He possesses 
the required knowledge, but fails to use it. In the case of the continent person (the self-
controlled enkrates), these competing impulses are overridden by the motivational force of 
the 'reasoned wanting' expressed in choice, whilst for the truly temperate no improper or 
excessive feelings are present at all. Similarly, for that other noted virtue of self-control, 
courage, excellence consists in fearlessness when one engages in dangerous action for the 
sake of noble ends. The consequence of the proper upbringing of the virtuous person is 
that the rational and non-rational parts of their souls (as Aristotle phrased his moral 
psychology) operate in tandem to the extent that immature competing desires exist for them 
no longer. Their desiderative capacities (orektikon), whether they concern appetites, 
emotions or 'reasoned wantings', are able to and have listened to reason in the manner that 
marks out their chief distinction from the merely physiological aspects of their non-rational 
parts, and which represents a successful moral education. 
Why, one might ask, does the moral belief that is shared by the virtuous and the incontinent 
motivate only in the case of the former? To avoid the Humean conclusion that there must be 
an extra non-cognitive desiderative element missing in the case of the latter person to 
explain their failure, McDowell has claimed that we may interpret Aristotle's account as 
meaning that that the akrates has their accurate perception somehow "clouded, or 
unfocused, by a desire to do otherwise" .58 He sees the same features of the situation (those 
potentially constituting the minor premise which, if joined with the major premise he 
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already possesses in a practical syllogism, would result in virtuous action), but does not see 
them in a way that motivates. It is not that virtuous reasons lose out during deliberation to 
contrary desires, for deliberation is already complete and a choice has been made. Yet this 
choice does not result in appropriate action. This means that we remain able to identify 
virtue with, as McDowell puts it, the 'deliverances of sensitivity' - a sensitivity which is 
sufficient to present us with the most virtuous reasons (and only those reasons) for action in 
any particular situation, and to ensure that the very presence of those reasons is enough to 
motivate us to act in accordance with them. We might understand this 'clouding' of 
perception by desire as the kind of thing that happens when we have a specific intention to 
refuse the extra drink, but find ourselves slowly falling for its temptations - that extra drink 
becomes 'just' that extra drink. We do not alter our temperate choice, but the extent to 
which it is integrated with our impulses begins to subside. Eventually, our relation to our 
original choice becomes like that of an actor to the lines he is reciting, and our action 
comes to reflect an earlier stage of moral development when we were unable sufficiently to 
control our appetites. 59 
In comparing the akratic to the drunk or the madman, Aristotle suggests that in extreme 
cases we possess knowledge of the good in the way they do - at the 'back of the mind', 
unobtainable for practical purposes because of their submission to appetite. Moral 
education acts against this possibility by encouraging the pleasure that is taken in acting for 
the sake of the noble, and thus counteracting the competing desires for the pleasures 
resulting from the sating of the appetites. In other cases, we might understand the 
problematic relation of perception to motivation in a slightly different way - this time 
concerning deficiencies of feeling. Here, the clouding results from a failure to see a moral 
situation in its fullest sense - a perspective that may well involve some more intense 
affective response to an object more distant to us than our immediate and immature 
appetites and impulses. To return to a previous example, we may choose a course of action 
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on the basis of a perceived needfulness, but do we really see it in its fullest, unclouded 
sense if we feel no accompanying sympathy? As Nancy Sherman has concluded: "The 
source of the problem may not be an overly strong rival desire, but simply a phlegmatic 
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response to the situation ... the solution is not to quiet the passions ... but to appeal to them, 
to be aroused by their sensitivity, to see with the heart." 60 Once again, the cognitive 
differences between a person who was motivated to act and another who was not should not 
be considered entirely in terms of their propositional content. Rather, they are to be thought 
of as differences in appreciative sensibility - that which accounts for the received 'shape' or 
'pattern' of propositionally identical cognitive states. 61 
Whilst these examples of the ways in which incontinence exhibits itself are unproblematic, 
some have felt that McDowell's interpretation carries with it certain difficulties. If, as he 
suggests, there is a kind of knowledge which can always ensure it is acted upon due to its 
'silencing' of non-virtuous reasons for action, and which is the preserve of the virtuous 
person, it becomes hard to understand quite what is involved in the case of continence. If 
akrasia results from the clouding of the accurate perception enjoyed by the virtuous person, 
how is it that the continent person (who, it would seem, has neither accurate nor clouded 
perception) manages to act upon his choice? Can it be that their cognition is just as 
inadequate as the incontinent, but that they enjoy a more intense desire to do what is good 
(or conversely, less intense opposing desires? This would seem to mean that the possibility 
of cognitive motivation (which grounds his internalism), applies only for the perfectly 
virtuous. For the rest of us on McDowell's account, the motivation will only be Humean.62 
As well as severely narrowing the field of cognitive motivation, his account also seems, 
according to Sarah Broadie, to misrepresent Aristotle. For not only does he never equate 
continence with ignorance (only incontinence is so identified), but he also explicitly defends 
the idea that akrasia can occur at times of clearheadedness. 63 She concludes from this that 
Aristotle nowhere suggests that there is a kind of practical knowledge of this sort that 
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necessarily gives rise to proper action. His usage of 'ignorance' is therefore meant merely 
as a label for incontinent behaviour, rather than as a postulate to explain it. 64 It refers not to 
the character of the knowledge, but to the sense in which the knowledge shared by the 
virtuous, the continent, and the incontinent, remains unfulfilled if it does not achieve its 
actualisation in a course of action. This caveat that the sensibility of a person with 
developed moral perception cannot guarantee virtuous action does not, however, threaten 
the notion (which I have canvassed throughout this chapter) that cognitions can entail 
motivation. It merely casts doubt upon the idea that if a cognitive state is sufficient to 
motivate in one instance, it must also motivate whenever else it occurs.65 
Although the extra complexity of these interpretative questions need not detain us here, the 
issue of incontinence gives us some insight into the distinctively Aristotelian manner of 
conceiving the place of feelings and emotions in moral thought. Whichever way we 
understand Aristotle's intentions regarding this issue, it is of no doubt that he sees the 
proper relative standing of the cognitive, affective and conative aspects of moral character 
as the key to avoiding incontinence (and indeed achieving full virtue). In addition to 
excellence of the rational part of the soul (this being practical wisdom in the domain of 
praxis) which I have considered in some depth, Aristotle understood the basis of virtue as 
being the proper habituation of the non-rational part - the acquisition of states of the sort in 
"which we are well or ill disposed in respect of the feelings concerned" .66 This, in more 
modern parlance, we may like to term the 'education of the emotions' .67 Although I have 
made some preliminary reference to the role taken by affect in virtuous perception and 
judgement, I shall in the next chapter give some more sustained consideration to the way in 
which a neo-Aristotelian account of moral education will understand the nature of these 
emotions. For without the correct development of the affective part of character, the 
achievement of practical wisdom will remain an impossibility - we would remain unable to 
'see with the heart'. 
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I 1 am writing of 'belief here in the propositional and non-emotional sense in which it appears in the work of 
most neo-Kantian writers on moral education. As we shall see later in this chapter, if our understanding of 
cognition were to be stripped of these kinds of limitations, the claims of this paragraph may seem less 
appropriate. 
2 This is the assumption termed 'centralism' by Susan Hurley in her Natllral Reasons op. cit. The terminology of 
'thick' and 'thin' moral concepts is used in Bernard Williams' Ethics alld the Limits olPhilosophy op. cit. pp. 
143-5. 
3 Kupperman J Character (1991, Oxford, Oxford University Press) p. 173. 
4 In articulating the claim that action-based ethical thought lacks a motivational component, Louis Pojman writes 
that: 'Ethics becomes a sort of mental plumbing, moral casuistry, a set of hair-splitting distinctions that 
somehow loses track of the purpose of morality altogether. But what good are such rules without the dynamo of 
character that propels the rules to action?' Pojman, L Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong (1995, Belmont 
CA, Wadsworth) p. 162. 
5 Pincoffs, E op. cit. p. 150. 
6 The aforementioned work of these two writers has formed only a part of the revival of interest in Aristotle and 
'virtue ethics' that has emerged in the last couple of decades. One might also draw attention to the work of 
Edmund Pincoffs, Alasdair MacJntyre (also aforementioned) and Philippa Foot (esp. her collection Virtues and 
Vices (1978, Oxford, Oxford University Press). Other important works include: Geach, P The Virtues (1977, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press); Wall ace, J Virtues alld Vices (1978, Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press); Dent, N The Moral Psychology olthe Virtues (19R4, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press); 
Nussbaum, M Love's Knowledge op. cif. and The Fragility olGoodness (19R6, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press); and Sherman, N The Fabric olCharacter (1989, Oxford, Clarendon Press). 
7 Nichomachean Ethics trans. By Thomson, lA.K. (1952, London, Penguin) I 097b37-1 09Ra2. 
8lbid. 1105a27-28. 
9 Ibid. 1 105a30-4. 
10 The possession of a virtuous set of motivational propensities represents a correct rational shaping of the 
desiderative capacities (orektikon) with which a person is naturally imbued. These are various in type. They 
range from sensory appetites (control of which is the virtue of temperance), emotional feelings such as fear (the 
overcoming of which in pursuit of the noble represents courage) to bOlllesis or 'reasoned wantings' - where 
motivation simply derives from one's practically wise judgement of value. 
11 Ibid. 1105a35. 
12 Expanding a point of Aristotle's, Gilbert Ryle has amplified this distinction by pointing out how we would not 
accept as an excuse for immoral behaviour the claim that the agent had simply 'forgotten the ditference between 
right and wrong'. Forgetfulness would, however, appear to be a valid excuse in the case of theoretical 
knowledge or skills. Ryle, G 'On Forgetting the Ditference Between Right and Wrong' in Melden A.I. (cd.) 
Essays in Moral Philosophy (1958, Washington, University of Washington Press) pp. 147-159. Cp. Arisotle op. 
cif. 1140 b27-30. 
\3 Broadie, S Ethics with Aristotle (1991, Oxford, Oxford University Press) p. 81. 
14 Foot, P 'Virtues and Vices' in Crisp, Rand Slote, M (eds.) Virtue Ethics (1997, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press) p. 171. 
151bid. p. 172. 
16 The unity of the virtues thesis has been one of the more famously controversial aspects of Aristotelian doctrine. 
In a way, it would seem to be a necessary corrollary of any virtue theory, as we can easily understand the need 
for virtues to be 'bounded' by other virtues. This is to say that an activity which we would, ceteris parabis, 
regard as virtuous, may not be if it issues in a vice related to a different virtue. It appears, however, that many, 
ifnot most, modem commentators are concerned to reject the thesis in its full-blown form, finding the idea that 
a wicked person (a Nazi for instance) could properly possess the virtue of courage to be rather less than bizarre. 
This idea is certainly present in the views of, amongst others, Stuart Hampshire and Alasdair Maclntyre. I am 
tempted to say that this reluctance results from an untoward stress upon Aristotle's account of the various 
virtues, as opposed to his general understanding of eudaimonia within which they are situated. In the reading of 
Aristotle I propose, following Wiggins and McDowell, the importance of ethical upbringing or habituation 
serves to make such a stress upon a foundational list of the components of well-being less appropriate. 
116 
17 We should note that Aristotle is concerned to stress that the possession of good judgement is not sufficient for 
phronesis. This virtue has the additional requirement that good judgements are properly translated into practice. 
18 Nicomachean Ethics op. cif. 1112bll-16. 
191bid. 1112b37-8. 
20 This is particularly so when deliberation is aimed at the achievement of general rather than particular ends - 'the 
good for man' rather than honesty, courage etc. Cf. ibid. 1140a25-29, 1142b27-3. 
21 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics trans. by Ross, WO (1915, Oxford, Oxford University Press). 
22 Jaeger's influential work makes a different use of this understanding. He claimed that it is the function of 
phronesis is 'to discover the right means of attaining the end determined by the moral will' Jacger, W Aristotle: 
Fundamentals of his Development trans. by Robinson, R (1934, Oxford, Clarendon Prcss) p. 242. 
23 Broadie, Sop. cit. pp. 179-265. McDowell, J 'Deliberation and Moral Development' in Engstrom, Sand 
Whiting, J (eds.) Aristotle. Kant and the Stoics (1996, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) pp. 19-35. 
24 lA.K. Thompson is among those translators favouring this latter version. op. cit. 
25 This interpretation is perhaps most famously offered by DJ. Allan in his 'Aristotlc's Account of the Origin of 
Moral Principles' in Proceedings of the Xlth International Congress of Philosophy vo!. 12 (1953, Amsterdam, 
North Holland) pp. 120-7. He similarly maintains elsewhere that: 'In some contexts actions are subsumed under 
general rules, and performed or avoided accordingly ... in other contexts it is said to be a distinctive fcature of 
practical syllogisms that they start from the announcement of an end ... A particular action is thcn performcd 
because it is a means or the first link in a chain of means linking to the end' 'The Practical Syllogism' in AlItollr 
d 'Aristotle: Recellil ofJert a Mgr. Mansion (\ 955, Louvain) pp. 336-7 as quoted in Wiggins, 0 'Deliberation 
and Practical Reason' in his Needs. Values. Tntth op. cif. p. 226. 
26 Given its neo-Kantian 'shape', it is perhaps surprising that one of the most prominent presentations of such a 
picture is provided by that arch anti-Kantian Alasdair Maclntyre, in his Whose Justice? Which Rationality? op. 
cit. pp. 129-142. Terence Irwin's Aristotle's First Principles (1988, Oxford, Clarendon) and John Cooper's 
Reason and the Human Good in Aristotle (1975, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press) also lend support 
to this interpretation. 
27 Nicomachean Ethics op. cit. I 104a3-1 O. 
28/bid. 11 09b 15-23. Martha Nussbaum has notably rendered krisis here (in the final clause) as 'discernment' 
rather than the commonly found 'decision'. This would seem to allow that such an operation can be a character 
revealing matter for which one is morally responsible, independently of its consequences for action. This 
translation is emphasised in her 'The Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of Public and 
Private Rationality' in Love's Knowledge op. cif. 
29 He makes this claim in 'Universal Prescriptivism' in Singer, P (ed.) A Companion to Ethics (1991, Oxford, 
Blackwell) p. 461. 
30 Wiggins, 0 'Deliberation and Practical Reason' op. cif., McDowell 'Deliberation and Moral Development' op. 
cif. See also Vasiliou, I 'The Role of Good Upbringing in Aristotle's Ethics' MetClphilosophy 1998 pp. 771-797 
for an account heavily influenced by these works. 
31 McDowell ibid. p. 23. 
32 McDowell 'Virtue and Reason' op. cit. p. 346. 
33 Nicomachean Ethics op. cif. I 094b28-1 095a6, 1095b3-8. 
34 MacIntyre, A After Virtlle op. cit. p. 162, Williams, B Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy op. cif. p. 44. 
35 McDowell claims that: 'It is undeniable that, to many modern readers, there seems to be a question of 
correctness that such an approach cannot address, precisely because the approach does not seek a foundation for 
the outlook as a whole. But I think the very idea of such a question reflects a kind of anxiety that is distinctively 
modem.' 'Deliberation and Moral Development' op. cif. p. 30. The motivating thought behind this anxiety, 
furthered by an attachment to the superiority of the methods characteristic of the natural sciences, is that ..... 
objective correctness would require breaking out of a sphere of specific cultural inheritance into an undistorted 
contact with the real" McDowell, J 'Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle's Ethics' in Aristotle and Moral 
Realism Heinaman, R (ed.)(1995, London, UCL Press) p. 216. 
3bAristotle 'The Eudemian Ethics' trans. by Barnes, J 1179a35-1179b31 in The Complete Works of Aristotle 
(1984. Princeton NJ., University of Princeton Press). 
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37 Lawrence Blum stresses that we may be better thinking of a collcction of abilitics (both cognitive and affective) 
here, rather than referring to a unitary 'faculty', although this claim does not arise from a reading of Aristotle. 
op. cit. p. 46 n. 25. 
38 There is a need to be careful here, as it would be wrong to exaggeratc both the scparatcness and the practical 
chronology of these components of moral thought. Some recent works sympathctic to the idca of 'moral 
perception' (notably Lawrence Blum's Moral Perception and Particularity op. cit.) give the impression that it 
is a kind of pre-ethical faculty, that enables the entry of moral concepts at a subsequent stage of judgement. In 
his analytical breakdown of the 'steps of moral agency'(lbid. pp. 57-60), for instance, Blum claims that a stage 
of perception precedes a stage of judgement. Although we may grant that such stagcs arc conccptually scparablc 
and logically ordcred, it wrong to overlook the extent to wbich they enjoy a dynamic and oftcn coincidental 
relationship. Any perception may of course be proved inadequate by the experience of deliberative retlection or 
of attempts to act. In such situations, it is clear that some kind of 'to and fro' mutual correction will occur to 
disrupt any conception of the relationship as necessarily uni-linear. The further possibility of coincidence 
occurs when motivation derives merely from perception, and there is no need for subsequent judgements. In 
Aristotle's words, 'the action proceeds more directly from thc moral state' (Nicomacheall Ethics op. cit. 
1117(20). Perhaps more problcmatic is Blum's suggestion that moral perception can be analyzcd as bcing 
composed of two distinct steps. These are; a) the accurate recognition of an inchoate situation's fcatures; and 
then, b) recognizing 'the features of an already characterised situation as morally signiticant' (Ihid. p. 58). This 
would seem to give the impression that perception is engaged be/ore one's judgement becomes coloured by 
ethical concerns. But surely certain so-called 'thick' concepts conjoin evaluative and empirical content to the 
extent that confining one's judgement to already characterised situations is to risk missing some of the picture. 
Our perceptions possess an ethical quality from their very beginnings, and we are responsible for those parts of 
the picture we miss. 
39 Nicomachean Ethics op. cit. 1147a25-26; Sherman, N The Fabric O/Clwracter (1989, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press) pp. 25-26. 
40 This is David Wiggins' paraphrase of Nichomachean Ethics 1143b15, otTered in his Needs. Values. Tmth op. 
cit. p. 236. Barbara Herman's claim that the discernment of moral saliences can be encompassed by Kant's 
theory of judgement at least acknowledges this important phenomenon, but still understands it as an ability that 
is acquired and exercised via reference to rules. Cf. her 'The Practice of Moral Judgement' in JOllmal 0/ 
Philosophy 82 1985 pp. 414-436. 
41 Dunne, J Back to the Rough Ground: Phronesis and Teclme in Modem Philosophy and in Aristotle (1993, 
Notre Dame IN, University of Notre Dame Press) p. 302. 
42 Nussbaum has perhaps been most guilty of over-emphasising this particular manner of understanding ethical 
excellence. 
43At the risk of sullying Aristotle's intentions, one might say that experience has given them an 'ear'. Cp. 
Nicomachean Ethics op. cit. 1143b 14. Indeed, as Wittgenstein referred to a similar ability to appreciate what is 
saliant in concrete situations as a 'nose' (cited in Dunne, J op. cit. p. 368), this perhaps serves to complete the 
set of sensory analogies. 
44Aristotle The Politics 1340a15-28 trans. by Sherman, N in The Fabric o/Character op. cit. pp. 182-3. 
45MacIntyre, A After Virtue op. cit. pp. 24-25,40-41. 
46Lawrence Blum criticises McDowell's account of moral perception in 'Virtue and Reason', for defining this 
solely in terms of its generation of right actions. This perhaps unfairly overlooks the fact that McDowell's 
article is specifically addressed to the task of reversing the non-cognitivist approach to the understanding of 
right conduct Cfrom the outside in') with one that approaches from the 'inside out'. The issue of conduct is thus 
the guiding thread of the piece, and this is perhaps why moral sensitivity or pcrception is undcrstood only in 
terms of its relations to it. Blum, L Moral Perception and Particularity op. cit. p. 43-44 n.21. 
47 Oakley, J Morality and the Emotions (1992, London, Routledge) p. 208 n. 83. 
48 Dunne, J op. cit. p. 73. 
49 Both views were held by Moore, whilst Ross and Pritchard accepted only the second. 
50 And in not so doing, they are immune to Mackie's central criticism of moral cognitivism - that it rests upon the 
existence of what he termed 'queer' entities. Whilst maintaining that appeals to such entities are a central part of 
moral language, he insisted that they make refercnce to things that cannot exist. His is thereby an 'error theory' 
concerning the nature of moral language. Mackie, J Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong op. cit. 
118 
51 It is this latter claim that marks out the view I am defending here from those Kantian theories which also 
maintain (contra intuitionism) that ethical truths are found in the sphere of practical as opposed to theoretical 
reason. Thomas Nagel is perhaps the most prominent contemporary representative of these theorists. 
52 Dancy, J Moral Reasons op. cit. p. 115. 
53 Wiggins, D op. cit. p. 231. 
54 Thus allowing 'expertise' to revert to its original meaning as a dcrivative of the Latin tcrm expert liS - to have 
experience of. 
55 Maclntyre, A A Short History of Ethics (1966, London, MacMillan) pp. 254-8 and After Virtue op. cit. pp. 13-8; 
Darwall, S Gibbard A and Railton, P 'Toward Fin de Siecle Ethics: Some Trends' in Philosophical Review 
1997 p. 119; Dancy, J 'Intuitionism' in Singer, P A Companion to Ethics op. cit. p.415. 
56 Darwall S, Gibbard A and Railton P ibid. p. 156. In combining empirical con1ent and motivational force, 
'need' is representative of what have been termed 'thick' ethical concepts (most especiully by Bernard Williams 
in his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy op. cit. pp. 143-5, and in various writings by John McDowell). They 
are used in contradistinction to 'thin' concepts such as 'good' and 'right' which do not scem to have this 
feature. 
5711 is thus a failure of what Michael Luntley likes to term 'sensible thinking' (in 'Renovating the Political and 
Autonomous University' in The University in a Liberal State Brecher, B et al (eds.) (1996, Basingstoke, 
Avebury Press). This idea draws inspiration from Annette Baier's reinterpretation of Hume, which argues that 
he had not intended his mature writing to relegate reason to a subsidiary position to that of bare desire (as many 
have assumed), but was actually attempting to propose a 'more enlarged species of reason' that encompassed 
the sentiments. She writes that 'The Treatise used reflection first to destroy one version of reason, then to 
establish the sort of customs, habits, abilities and passions that can bear their own moral survey. It thereby 
reestablished a transformed, active, socialized reason to a 'likeness of rank, not to say equality' with sovereign 
moral sentiment' A Progress o/Sentiments op. cit. 
58 McDowell, J 'Virtue and Reason' op. cit. p. 336. 
59 The idea that moral weakness represents (at least in part) a reversion to earlier stages of one's moral 
development is stressed by Miles Burnyeat in his 'Aristotle on Learning to be Good' in Rorty, AO (cd.) Essays 
on Aristotle's Ethics (1980, Berkeley CA, University of California Press) pp. 69-92. 
60 Sherman, N The Fabric a/Character op. cit. p. 48. 
61 This suggestion is offered by Jonathan Dancy op. cif. pp. 53-4 and by Margaret Little who writes that the 
"notion of "taking as morally salient" is not reducible to believing or knowing the proposition that a given 
feature or set of features has such-and-such moral significance. Rather ... "taking as salient" is akin to having a 
kind of experience". 'Virtue as Knowledge: Objections from the Philosophy of Mind' in NailS vo\. 31 no. I 
1997 p. 66. 
62 Dancy, J Moral Reasons fbid. 
63 Nicomachean Ethics op. cif. 1149b 14-18. 
64 Broadie, Sop. cif. p. 299. 
65 Dancy Moral Reasons op. cif. pp. 53-54. 
66 Nicomachean Ethics. op. cit. 1105b26. 
67 Although this would not be to suggest, contra Aristotle, that virtuous character can be derived simply from 
teaching. I do not intend 'education' to have these narrow connotations. 
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Chapter Four 
An Aristotelian Alternative 11: The Education of the Emotions 
In the previous chapter I introduced an Aristotelian approach to ethics as a promising 
alternative to the philosophical positions we have seen to underpin much of the moral 
education theory in the second half of the twentieth century. I also began to indicate the 
main points of divergence between these ancient and modem forms of thought by means of 
a discussion of the nature of moral judgement and moral perception. In this discussion it 
became clear that a further aspect of this divergence concerned the role of the affective 
dimension within the operation of these practical faculties. This chapter will investigate this 
topic in the greater depth it deserves, and will move on from this to outline the account of 
childhood moral development and pedagogy which we may feel able to glean from 
Aristotle's work. This, it is hoped, will possess distinct advantages over the accounts we 
have encountered thus far. 
The philosophical analysis of human emotions, and feelings more generally, has long been a 
notoriously difficult and divergent enterprise. This is due in no small part to the very wide 
range of application which these terms cover in ordinary usage, and the number of 
component features which are thought to be involved as a matter of conceptual necessity. 
Perhaps one of the simplest manners of analysing common emotional phenomena such as 
anger or fear is to focus upon their affects. This would be to follow the ordinary sense we 
have that being in an emotional state involves feeling something whereas being in a state of, 
say, belief need not have these affects on us. Affectivity may of course be understood in 
terms of either bodily or psychic feelings. Both Descartes and Hume seem to have held the 
view that emotions are properly understood in terms of feelings of the latter sort, like the 
anger or joy we may understand ourselves to be experiencing despite the absence of bodily 
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alteration. Indeed, even if bodily affects were to accompany our psychic feelings, these 
would simply be associated with, or caused by our emotions rather than actually being part 
of them. 
A difficulty with this view is that it would seem to suggest that emotions are only accessible 
to introspection, and it therefore precludes the fairly unproblematic idea that we can know 
the emotional state somebody is in rather better than they can themselves. Indeed, the very 
psychic feelings with which we may want to identify emotions can be such as to disrupt the 
ordinary processes of introspection by means of which we identify ourselves as being in this 
or that emotional state. Problems of this sort led both William James and Carl Lange, 
writing towards the end of the nineteenth century, independently to propose theories 
identifying emotions with the bodily disturbances accompanying our perceptions of the 
external world. Anger is therefore not to be thought of as any sort of feeling 'inside our 
minds' but as the composite of physical symptoms such as muscular tightening, redness of 
face, and heavy breathing that result from the perception of an insulting gesture (or some 
other anger-inducing occurrence). Despite establishing a sense in which emotions could be 
said to be publicly observable, further difficulties arise from this sole concentration upon 
feelings (things which we actually notice about ourselves) which this physicalist 
understanding shares with Descartes and Hume. 
One such difficulty regards the little sense affective explanations can make of the lasting 
quality of certain emotions, especially where the experience of them is not continuously tied 
to certain feelings at all. A good example may be the case of grief, which often seems to 
affect people without them actually feeling it as such (bodily or psychically). Only at some 
later stage of their life may the grieving person come to realise the way in which their grief 
was impacting upon them, but it would be difficult to maintain that it was only at this time 
that the person really had that emotion. This would suggest that we should not tie the 
affective quality of emotions too closely to feelings.) Indeed, given that many emotions 
122 
(consider grief, remorse and regret) seem almost impossible to differentiate purely by 
means of reference to their affects, even when this is not solely construed in terms of 
feelings, we may consider the possibility that there may be some additional element central 
to the analysis of emotion. For many theorists, this missing element is cognition. This 
would mean that beliefs would not be understood as merely relating to or causing emotions, 
but as being part of what the emotions are. Although some such as Sartre2, and more 
latterly Robert Solomon), have argued that emotions are simply certain types of cognition 
not essentially related to affectivity, this need not mean that affect is removed from the 
picture entirely. It will instead mean that the perception of the world with which any affects 
are associated is a key element within the complex whole of the emotion. Different 
emotions will therefore most often be differentiated in terms of the beliefs about the world 
with which similar affects are associated. It is only in this way that we may be able to claim 
that identical feelings of psychic depression and bodily sluggishness are more properly seen 
as symptomatic of grief rather than remorse or regret because they relate to the knowledge 
that a loved one has died. At least one result of extending our understanding of emotions in 
this manner into the cognitive domain, is that we become able to conceive of ways in which 
our emotions may be educable states, rather than irrational brute forces. 
This is certainly the view of the philosopher of education Richard Peters, who gave some 
sustained attention to the nature and development of the emotions throughout his work and, 
despite sharing many of his neo-Kantian views, has criticised Kohlberg's model of moral 
development for the lack of proper attention he thought it granted to its affective aspects. 4 
Peters wrote that" the central feature of states of mind which we call 'emotions' ... is a type 
of cognition that can be called an appraisal" .5 Emotions therefore reveal the world to us in 
non-neutral evaluatively coloured ways, and despite having a 'conceptual connection' with 
affects, are identified with "reference to the understanding of the situations which evokes 
them".6 Importantly for Peters, cognitive appraisal could be of two kinds, active or passive, 
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depending upon the kind of phenomena they are connected with. Appraisals which are 
properly deemed 'active' serve to connect our cognitions with action - they motivate us to 
do things in accordance with the way we see the world. We may, for instance, see an act of 
punishment descending into cruelty (an evaluative appraisal), and be motivated to intervene 
(an active state). Peters stressed that in functioning as a motive, such an appraisal cannot 
form part of what we would want to call an emotion. Instead, emotions exist when 
appraisals of the world are connected with bodily or psychic phenomena which 'come over 
us'. In other words, they connect cognitions with passivity. 
This strict separation between activity and passivity is indicative of Peters' intellectual debt 
to Kant. As we have seen before, a Kantian view of morality understands it to be primarily 
a matter of acting out of duty to moral principles available to us via the use of reason. As 
such, its domain lies on the active side of Peters' distinction. Unlike the passive states 
which 'come over us', action can truly be said to be under the control of our will, and thus 
represent something for which we can be held morally responsible. Although he did not 
dismiss emotions as mere blind forces, he understood the kind of cognition available to us 
in emotional states to be of a distinctly inferior order. This is because of the tendency 
emotions have to "warp and cloud perception and judgement and aid and abet self-
deception and insincerity" .7 As a rational enterprise, education must, for Peters, attempt to 
correct these damaging tendencies and ensure that children are brought up with clear rather 
than clouded perception. 
Emotions are to be educationally disciplined by reason in two main ways. Firstly, the 
cognitive appraisals upon which emotions are based are to be made subject to the rational 
criteria which necessarily apply to all beliefs. Children should therefore become able to 
recognise when the emotions which they or others are experiencing are connected to 
irrational appraisals, so that they can be suitably revised. This process will involve a 
developed ability to recognise different kinds of emotion by reference to their distinctive 
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cognitive and affective features. Rational control is thus exerted by increasing children's 
knowledge and reflective understanding of the ways in which people such as themselves can 
characteristically be affected by certain kinds of appraisal. s Yet even those people who have 
this kind of knowledge and understanding of emotions may not actually be able to control 
them by force of will. Some emotions are just too 'primitive' and intractable. For this 
reason, Peters felt, educators must also attempt the" control and canalisation of passivity" 9, 
whereby these kinds of state are stabilised into less chaotic sentiments and dispositions, and 
channeled into positive expressive outlets (such as art) which exist midway between 
passivity and action. 
Problems with Peters' view arise both from his denial of the common sense idea that 
emotions can function as motives, and from his connected denigration of their ethical 
importance. Firstly, are emotions really so distinct from motivations and desires? Certainly 
in ordinary usage, we do not seem to have any particular problem in pointing to an 
emotional state as being a motive for an action. We strike out at someone because we are 
angry with them. We resist cheerful public occasions because we are grieving for a loved 
one. 10 These do not strike us as being unusual kinds of explanation. Equally, one might 
have difficulty referring to someone as experiencing certain emotions if they do not 
experience a desire to go along with their bodily and psychic affects. Can it be true that my 
cognition of an insult together with tense and agitated feelings can fully represent anger, 
when I cannot really be bothered to act in any way even when the opportunity presents 
itself? Although I would not want to claim that having a certain sort of desire is a necessary 
feature of all emotional states, the strict distinction between emotions and motivations that 
Peters insists upon does seem rather difficult to uphold. Indeed Kant does not appear to 
have denied that we can be motivated to act by an emotion. He did, however, like Peters, 
claim that our emotions are partial and unreliable, and thus present unsatisfactory sources of 
moral motivation compared with affectless operations of practical reason (discernments of 
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where duties lie), and that being outside of the autonomous control of the will, they cannot 
possess non-instrumental moral worth.11 Although Kant allowed that certain kinds of 
emotion may be derivatively useful in promoting our adherence to moral duty (we may 
think primarily of sympathy), and may therefore be justifiably strengthened in education, 
they "must not precede a metaphysic of morals or be mixed with it" .12 There is no 
additional element required for us to act morally over and above the operations of 
dispassionate reason. Indeed Kant doubted whether emotional motivation, even when it 
produces the same actions as a purely rational adherence to duty, could be considered as a 
form of moral motivation at all. 
From the brief mention I have made throughout this chapter concerning the place of feeling 
and emotion within an Aristotelian (or neo-Aristotelian) account of the moral life, it will be 
clear that this diverges in a number of important ways from the ideas so far considered in 
this section. Moral virtue, for Aristotle, was a state in which reason and desire are in 
harmony - the rational and non-rational parts of the soul 'speaking with the same voice'. 
Most virtues characteristically exist within some particular area of life and operate with 
regard to its associated emotions (courage with danger and fear, temperance with bodily 
pleasures and appetite, and so on), representing an intermediate state (the famous 'mean') 
between experiencing too much and too little of that emotion. To use the example of 
courage therefore, a person is brave when avoiding the twin vices of recklessness (not 
acknowledging the presence of actual danger) and cowardice (inability to act for the sake of 
a noble end due to being overcome by fear) in their choice of action. Similarly, one exhibits 
modesty in avoiding both vulgarity or shamelessness at one extreme and over-sensitivity or 
touchiness at the other. 13 It is not that fear or feelings of self-esteem (or indeed, for 
Aristotle, any emotion) are in themselves bad, but that they become problematic if one's 
moral character or practical wisdom is deficient in a way which leads to an emotion being 
exhibited inappropriately to the situation. 
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Of course there is nothing in this view which necessarily departs from the views held by 
Socrates and the early Plato, according to whom feelings and emotions were necessarily 
corruptive of the life of reason which resulted in virtue, nor from the essentially similar 
ideas of Kant or Richard Peters. On all such accounts, 'harmony' would be little different 
from 'mastery', with intellect firmly in the driving seat. Although Aristotle seems close to 
this view in stressing that it is the role of the rational part to prescribe to the receptive, non-
rational part, one need not understand this in any overly 'intellectualist' manner. For the 
term 'rational part' was used by Aristotle in different senses. Sometimes it referred 
narrowly to the pure intellect, which is counterposed to the non-rational collection of 
functions which are not reason themselves, including both those of mere 'growth and 
nutrition' and the appetites, impulses and desires which issue in action. However, as these 
latter, specifically human desiderative faculties (orektikon) are "in a sense receptive of 
reason" 14, Aristotle often included them in a broader and more inclusive understanding of 
'the rational' which is sensitive and emotional as well as calculative and theoretical. It is the 
proper condition and function of these different 'strictly rational' and 'reason responsive' 
capacities which represents both the subject matter of ethics, and the concern of moral 
education. The 'harmony' involved in virtue is not, therefore, a triumph of reason over 
suppressed irrational feeling, but is the unified operation of two broadly rational sources of 
virtue - intellectual and moral. 
What is particular about Aristotle's view, therefore, is that moral virtue is understood as a 
dynamic and integrated complex of cognition, affect and desire. It reveals itself in the ways 
we think, feel and are motivated to act. This is shown, for instance, by the account of anger 
in his Rhetoric where he argued that" anger (orge) may be defined as a desire accompanied 
by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have 
no call to slight oneself or one's friends." 15 Here we can see that the emotion in question is 
not just a blind affective feeling, but is directed cognitively and intentionally at a selected 
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feature of the environment (the conspicuous slight). This cognition does not 'give rise' to 
the emotion, but forms part of what the emotion is. As much can be said with regard to the 
desire for revenge which accompanies the belief and painful feeling (this being constitutive 
rather then consequent). Aristotle's understanding evinced here thus departs from the 
theories of both James/Lange and Kant/Peters, in that he does not attempt to separate out 
the cognitive, affective and desiderative components of emotional responses with the 
intention of identifying one of these components as the core essence which accounts for the 
others. 
On this view, moral responses cannot be evaluated without reference to the emotional state 
of the agent, as this is a central feature of the character for which they bear responsibility. 
Emotions are morally significant. The virtuous person is one who has the right emotions, of 
the right intensity, towards the right objects. Such significance, however, does not yet show 
that emotions can be of any particular worth, or that any worth they may have is not merely 
instrumental to the operation of reason, or that an education of the emotions should 
properly aim at least as much at their cultivation as at their suppression or 'canalisation'. In 
other words, I have not yet shown that an Aristotelian view of the emotions regards them 
any more positively than other competing views which might similarly allow that they can 
be 'responsive to reason'. Indeed, some philosophers have interpreted Aristotle in way 
which undermines any hopes we may have of deriving such a view from his account of 
ethics. Von Wright, for instance, has written that "action in accordance with virtue may be 
said to be the outcome of a contest between 'reason' and 'passion' ... In the case of every 
specific virtue there is some specific passion which the man of virtue has learned to master" 
(emphases my own).16 In the light of this, how might the proper state of emotion ever be 
anything other than one of suppression? 
A more positive account of the ethical worth of emotions might begin by stressing the 
contribution they can make in assisting correct moral choice and action. Rather than 
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thinking of them as necessarily destructive influences upon clear moral thought and action, 
we might instead see how these difficult tasks are made easier and more consistent when 
affective responses support the use of reason. How much easier it is to courageously defend 
a loved one from attack when we are angry with their attacker, or to perform charitable 
duties when we are filled with pity for the plight of the poor. As I have already said, this is 
the kind of instrumental value that was granted to the emotions by Kant, and would prove 
similarly amenable to utilitarians (although Kant would insist that it was the duty that was 
actually responsible for the motivation) .17 Yet there is still no particular necessity for the 
fully moral person to also be an emotionally sensitive person. Indeed, there is a tendency in 
Kant's thought in this area to see actions performed with the help of emotional 'crutches' as 
distinctively inferior to those motivated purely by the recognition of duty. It is only the duty 
motive which can be summoned by and relied upon by all moral agents, and for which they 
may be held responsible. Emotions may fortuitously aid action of the kind which duty 
demands, but it has none of these features and thus cannot be deemed a moral form of 
motivation. An Aristotelian view differs from this in seeing the possession of certain kinds 
of emotion as doing rather more than assisting the performance of duties discerned by 
reason. Emotions are instead regarded as epistemologically necessary for certain kinds of 
evaluative knowledge, and as also representing a constitutive (and thus non-instrumental) 
part of what certain virtues actually are. In this way, it is not so much that the emotional 
dimension of moral character is promoted in relation to the intellectual part, but that the two 
are not to be considered as separable. Together they form a distinct way of seeing. 
The virtuous person's ability to perceive ethical salience is something that often requires 
emotional engagement in those concrete situations where choices are to be made. The 
wholly dispassionate person will consequently have a distinctly inferior kind of moral vision 
however refined their powers of reason may be. Like the akratic, they may register the 
same things as the virtuous person, but not in the same way, or with the same resonances. 
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They do not merely fail to have an affective or desiring element to go along with accurate 
cognition, but do not have the kind of perception that is made up of all these features. 
Properly cultivated emotions enable a kind of vision to which they can have no access. We 
may doubt, therefore, whether a person who is epistemologically disadvantaged in this 
sense, like the person whose lack of sympathy prevents them from seeing the existence of 
needfulness when a child is in danger, will prove able to respond in the way which certain 
virtues require. Yet despite this, a Kantian may still respond that if a person's actions are 
willed in accordance with duty it cannot matter whether or not their emotions had been 
engaged in their conception of the moral situation. We may, for instance, be able to 
compensate for our lack of emotional advantage by performing actions of the kind we 
imagine an emotionally engaged person would perform. Possessing an emotion, they would 
say, even if it is often of epistemological assistance, remains an instrumental good that 
cannot by itself add any extra worth to the performance of a morally right action. 
But as we know, it is not action but character that is the focus of the Aristotel ian ethical 
viewpoint. This being so, we are able to claim that there is a real moral difference between 
two people who act to help a friend if one acts out of sympathy but the other is 
dispassionately dutiful. For writers such as Michael Stocker, this suggests that it is only 
those with emotional involvement in the welfare of their friends who are able to enjoy the 
goods of friendship and similar virtues of attachment .18 This is the case just as it is that we 
would not consider someone to be patient if they fought to remain silent in the face of 
considerable feelings of irritation. Emotions are not merely required epistemologically for 
virtuous action but are constitutive of the virtues themselves. Right emotion can make right 
action even better in that it shows that the action is performed in the context of deeply felt 
ongoing commitments. A lack of emotion will indicate that the actions are being performed 
from a character which is not fully suffused and integrated in this way. The focus upon 
character will also mean that emotions can be of moral worth even when they do not 
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connect with the performance of an action. Instead, they show that a person has, or has not, 
perceived a moral situation with the degree of emotional intensity characteristic of full 
virtue. We will differentiate accordingly between the sort of person who reacts with anger 
at a great injustice and the sort who could not care less, even if there is no course of action 
which could have been taken to rectify the situation. Similarly, to refer back to an earlier 
topic of discussion, there is a sense in which we would expect a fully moral person to 
experience regret for the course of action that they could not choose when faced with a 
tragic dilemma. Although such feelings cannot alter the consequences of one's choice 
(which is why some have thought them to be irrational), to lack them would seem to 
indicate that the moral importance of the alternatives forming the dilemma was in some way 
ill-perceived. 19 
We should of course see that virtues, being diverse qualities, will differ with regard to the 
kind of role emotions occupy. Justice, for instance, does not seem to centre around the 
control or cultivation of any particular emotion, but around an evaluative judgement 
concerning the relative fairness of certain states of affairs. Executive virtues such as 
courage, where acknowledged danger is faced for the sake of good, are of the kind for 
which the virtuous person's emotions are the area of concern, but would seem to count for 
little in any positive sense. We would only be concerned that their practical reasoning was 
not hampered or overwhelmed by fear. For those like Von Wright, virtues of this kind 
would appear to be paradigmatic. Yet for other kinds of virtue, such as friendship, 
tenderness or charity, we can imagine how appropriate feelings of love or sympathy 
towards the object of our intended actions might in fact be too weak for the achievement of 
virtue to be possible. It would seem hard to imagine how someone who does not affectively 
care for the feelings of anyone other than himself would be able to be a tender person (as 
distinct from being able, on occasion, to act in a tender manner). The possession of virtues 
such as these would seem to centre around the positive character of certain interpersonal 
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emotions, to the extent that it becomes hard to see how one could ever be satisfied with any 
account of morality which was unable to afford them this place. 
It should be clear that an approach to moral education influenced by the sort of Aristotelian 
account of the emotional dimension of life developed here will depart in important ways 
from those based upon what I have called an 'intellectualist' account. Emotional states will 
not be seen as essentially destabilising conditions which cannot enjoy moral worth without 
the independent sanction of sovereign reason, but as aspects of life which may be both 
necessary for correct moral response and form an irreducible part of that response itself. 
None of this should suggest that emotions cannot often be guilty of exactly those crimes for 
which 'intellectualists' accuse them. If we are so overcome by fear that we cannot save a 
child from drowning in a shallow pond, it is clear that we need to learn to differentiate the 
kinds of things which are truly fearsome (waterfalls and rapids) from those which are not 
(ponds), and that we should attempt to adjust our emotional characters in response. In cases 
such as these, it is the way in which the morally mature person no longer feels the pull of 
youthful impulses (such as a fear of pondwater) that marks them out as having undergone 
the kind of emotional transition involved in becoming courageous. Even when emotions are 
more constitutively required for certain virtues such as love and sympathy, it is equally 
possible that they might require some degree of suppression. It is perfectly likely that one's 
feelings of affection or pity for another person may be so intense that they can serve to 
overwhelm good judgement by perhaps increasing the possibility that an expressive action 
will be performed instead of a more restrained but more loving or pitiful alternative, or that 
feelings prove so intense that any choice of action appears unworthy of them. Emotions are 
not valuable merely as themselves, but as essential components of the complex states of 
character we term virtues. And as they are so often essential components, they require not 
only suppression or canalisation but cultivation also. 
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The cultivation of the emotions would take its place within a moral education that 
concentrates not only upon cognitive development, but upon the broader subject of the 
whole person's growing character. Whilst admitting that the emotional dimension of 
character retains a certain unavailability to intentional attempts at its shaping, control and 
cultivation that is not the case with the strictly rational dimension, it is most certainly not to 
be ignored. It is a vital part of such moral education that attempts are made to encourage 
the development of emotions in directions which allow them to form essential parts of 
virtuous characters. As such, its associated pedagogic techniques would go beyond the 
schematic 'problem-solving' of intellectualist approaches, to encompass a consideration of 
how moral themes and choices pervade the complex lives of concrete individuals. As I have 
suggested earlier, it is within the narrative structures presented by biography, personalised 
accounts and fiction that moral choices are most clearly seen in relation to the emotionally-
imbued character of the chooser, rather than as impersonal, quasi-scientific problems. As 
with the connected use of art and music, as well as participation in those activities with 
which certain emotions are characteristically associated, these educational techniques can 
serve to draw out the often primitive emotional responses of children in ways that 
impersonal and intellectualised examples cannot. Simply providing children with the stimuli 
to arouse emotions which they may not have otherwise experienced can serve to make such 
feelings more a part of their 'second nature'. Only in this way can such feelings later 
become the foundation for developed virtues. It is therefore essential that children are used 
to feeling a certain way when listening, for instance, to accounts of the weal and woe of 
other people. This kind of learning through experience would here aid the development of 
sympathy. As well as experiencing the particular feelings associated with that virtue itself, it 
is equally important that children are brought to feel pleasure resulting from successful 
virtuous activity, and pain resulting from its frustration. As Aristotle states, "we need to be 
brought up, right from early youth, as Plato says, to find enjoyment and pain in the right 
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things. "20 This fusing of pleasure and pain to the cause of the 'noble' provides the 
motivational 'engine' for moral development that we have found to be lacking from 
alternative educational approaches. 21 
Once elicited in this way, the emotions of children can subsequently be subject to 
cultivation into the more complex and subtle forms that will assist and comprise superior 
moral responses - a development which will be the source of pleasure,22 This will involve 
engagement in activities which require a certain base level of emotional maturity to begin 
with, but which can help greatly in the enrichment of those emotions (one might think 
especially of community work with the disabled), together with the development of a 
critical understanding of when and where different emotional responses are appropriate, and 
when and where they may be ill-directed, sentimentalist or patronising. As Aristotle's 
theory of emotion describes them as cognitive and intentional phenomena, emotional 
education can proceed through this kind of progressive refinement of their constitutive 
cognitions. Nancy Sherman's Aristotelian account of the role of parents in habituation 
describes this well: 
The parent helps the child compose the scene in the right way. This will involve 
persuading the child that the situation at hand is to be construed in this way rather 
than that, that what the child took to be a deliberate assault and cause for anger 
was really only an accident, that the laughter and smiles which annoy were 
intended as signs of delight rather than of teasing, that a particular distribution, 
though painful to endure, is in fact fair - that if one looked at the situation from 
the point of view of the others involved, one would come to that conclusion. 23 
Especially important to this process will be encouraging children to look beyond the 
temporally and spatially immediate ways of satisfying their emotional desires, and consider 
the ways in which a longer or wider view may prove to be the better one even though it 
involves the difficult task of delaying the pleasure derived from virtuous choice. Once used 
to choosing the latter option, it would be hoped that the attractions held by the more 
immediate sources of pleasure begin to subside as they begin to be classified as 'ignoble' 
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and ill-befitting of the sort of person the child has now become. This is how the temperate 
person is able to ignore the impulses of appetite and act for the sake of the 'proper 
enjoyment of bodily pleasures' of which they have learned to partake. As we know, the 
akratic does not have his or her emotions ordered correctly with regard to such pleasure 
and, in spite of their better judgement, falls prey to the remaining temptations of impulse 
and appetite. The extension of emotions which have 'listened to reason' thereby supports 
the simultaneously developing virtue of practical wisdom, by means of which a desire for 
virtuous ends finds its fruition in action performed at the appropriate time and place, and in 
the appropriate way. 
The manner in which I have begun to describe how a neo-Aristotelian form of moral 
education would approach the cultivation of the emotions has relied upon a developmental 
account of upbringing or habituation - what Aristotle terms ethismos. It has also shown that 
habituation is not to be thought of as mindless process of emotional manipulation in the 
service of a subsequent acquisition of practical wisdom, but as encompassing the integrated 
and mutually corrective development of all (cognitive, affective and conative) aspects of a 
virtuous character. I shall attempt in the next section of this chapter to describe the most 
important features of this developmental process in a way that encompasses all of these 
aspects, and with regard to the forms of moral education which this account best supports. 
The Development of Virtue 
The aim of moral upbringing within an Aristotelian schema is to effect the transition of a 
child's character from its untutored state (albeit one which is 'ready for virtue'), to a state 
in which virtue becomes 'second nature'. This is not something which occurs naturally as 
though it were a kind of irreversible ripening, but a precarious process reliant upon the 
continual pedagogic interference of others who are in the best position to guide the child 
towards his or her24 goal - full ethical humanity. With assistance from those who know 
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better, the child can eventually become able to make virtuous judgements and perform 
virtuous actions on their own account. Once they reach this experienced standard of 
excellence in emotion, perception and deliberation, they are then in a position to hand on 
their understanding of virtue to the less mature. How, though, does this development take 
place? 
The child is understood by Aristotle as beginning in an initial state when his or her 
desiderative capacities (the orektikon, which as we know differ from both the growth and 
decay of physiology and the activities of the 'strictly rational' part as being the subject of 
ethismos) are largely taken up by urges of appetite (epithumai) and the kinds of emotional 
inclination which go little beyond the fear, anger, joy and such like which accompany the 
thwarting or meeting of these kinds of need. These motivational propensities will centre 
around the enjoyment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, and it is to this end that the 
child aims in its primitive cognitive activities. Although the third aspect of the orektikon, 
the rational wish or boulesis which is the kind of deliberative motivation resulting from an 
assessment of value, is just as fundamental to human nature, it remains in the background 
during childhood as it "depends on cultivation and adventitious knowledge" .25 This being 
so, he or she is at this stage incapable of the reasoned, prohairetic choices of virtuous 
adults. Although capable of more simple kinds of rational activity such as the deliberation 
involved in choosing a toy or a sweet, the child does not as yet have the ability to choose in 
the light of deliberation which takes all things into consideration (including a ranking of the 
various goods aimed for). He or she has yet to embark upon the process which shall result 
in them ceasing to be at the 'beck and call' of their basic desires, and begin to exert some 
degree of rational control upon them. 
Aristotle's famous (though none too detailed when one considers its centrality to his ethics) 
account of how moral development takes place rests upon the notion of habituation - that we 
learn to be virtuous by doing virtuous things. In his own words, 
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... the things we have to learn before we can do we learn by doing, e.g. men 
become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre, so too we 
become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing 
brave acts ... The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger, some men 
become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible, by 
behaving in one way or another in the appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one 
word, dispositions arise out of like activities. 26 
As I have mentioned before, this might initially seem to involve a problematic circularity. 
How can a means of acquiring virtue rest upon the performance of acts that require virtue 
themselves? Aristotle's answer, of course, is that the acts performed by the learner are 
virtuous only in the sense that they are of the kind which would be performed by a virtuous 
person - they do not as yet express the full virtue which is the aim of the exercise. Thus if 
the learner and the virtuous person both decline to over-indulge their appetites during a 
meal, it will be in the character of the latter, who chooses (with full knowledge) for the 
sake of moderation and experiences no conflicting motivations, that temperance is truly 
exhibited. The learner may choose to act in a like way only in order to gain the praise of 
others, but in experiencing what it is to choose temperately it is hoped that such choices will 
become easier and more a part of his own character in the future - they will become 
habitual, and the learner will have developed a "kinship to virtue" )7 At the initial stage of 
development, when children act largely for the immediate attractions of pleasure, the 
educator (in this case, most often the parent), will attempt to make virtuous conduct 
attractive to the child in these terms. Moderation of immature appetites and emotions (such 
as fits of anger) will be greeted with praise, reward and encouragement, while contrary 
conduct will attract admonishment and perhaps punishment.2s The aim of this is not merely 
to get the child to perform the desired acts (although there is an attraction in this), as it 
would be if one were training an animal, but is to enable and support his or her progress to 
the stage when they will choose to perform such acts in full knowledge, for their own sake, 
and out of a settled and enduring character, as would a virtuous person. It is therefore 
important that the child is encouraged to see the actions they perform as being, in this 
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sense, their own, and that habituation is not a merely non-cognitive enterprise but engages 
with the child's incipient attempts at moral deliberation,29 
To this end, the role of the parent or educator is to aid the child's acquisition of what 
Aristotle terms 'the that' (holi) - the practical knowledge of what is the right thing to do in 
particular circumstances, as well as the states of character which allow this practical know-
how to function correctly. The advice and instructions which are given therefore serve a 
number of concurrent purposes. First of all, they introduce the child to the idea that actions 
differ in quality from one another in terms that do not merely reduce to degree to which 
they satisfy his or her appetites or emotions as they are presently constituted. Faced with a 
table full of food, they will learn that there are reasons why they should not eat more than a 
certain amount even if they would get pleasure from doing so. At such an early stage, the 
child will perhaps not be able to understand these reasons fully or at all (let alone act 
consistently on them), but they will learn that such reasons exist. And not only this, they 
will also learn that such reasons will count for others to such a degree that they will have to 
act in accordance with them or face unattractive consequences. Equally, continued 
experience and assistance will involve a developing knowledge of how such reasons are 
differentiated amongst themselves (in other words, the variety of virtues), and of the kinds 
of conduct that are appropriate in all kind of concrete situations. As MacIntyre has put it, 
" ... one has to learn ... how to conceptualise and to classify, so that in practical reasoning 
one's descriptions of the situations and issues upon which universal moral truths concerning 
the virtues have to be brought to bear are in the appropriate form." 30 The repetition 
involved in learning by doing will not be like that involved in body-building, where the 
mechanical repetition of an identical action over and over again produces the desired result. 
Instead, the virtuous actions which are repeated will never be identical in this way, varying, 
as they always will, according to the specificities of the concrete circumstances in which the 
performances takes place. It is therefore essential that the learner becomes able to see why 
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it is that externally dissimilar actions are united in being examples of one and the same 
virtue. This is what is being learnt when a child is encouraged to see the importance of 
acting in a fair or honest way with strangers, even though they have only previously 
encountered these standards of behaviour when amongst friends. At the other extreme, the 
child must also learn that there are times when apparently identical actions are not similarly virtuous. 
We might imagine an example being the difference between generously giving something of one's 
own to a friend, and doing the same thing when the gift has already been promised to another. In 
being brought to see this, the child is making an advance in the ability I have referred to as 
'moral perception', and further refining this aspect of their emotional life. 
This is how the motivations of pleasure and pain can allow a way in to the development of 
an active sense of 'the noble', even if this does not as yet hold any attractions for the child 
themselves. They will now know that justice, temperance, friendship and the like are 
virtues and valuable just for being so, but they will not be sure quite why this is so. The 
degree of moral development which means that the learner becomes able to provide 
answers to questions of this second sort involves an acquisition of what Aristotle terms 'the 
because' (dioti).3 1 It will be hoped that the sense of achievement and satisfaction which a 
child has from their growing capacity for virtuous conduct performed under guidance, will 
lead to them becoming able to distance themselves from their emotionally and appetitively 
driven pursuit of goods desired as pleasant to a degree which allows room for a bouletic 
pursuit of goods desired as noble. In doing so, he or she begins to focus upon objectives 
which are less immediate than those which they sought previously, and thus starts to 
deliberate in the manner which can form part of true prohairesis, and of the virtue of 
practical wisdom. Initially, they will be taught that the delaying of gratification is both 
possible and worthwhile by being shown how it can aid the attainment of the appetitive 
pleasures for which they are already aiming - that by resisting certain impulses they can 
better satisfy others. Once this knowledge is attained, it is possible that the more distant 
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gratifications of virtuous conduct will no longer appear to be either impossible or pointless. 
In being able to choose like this, the learner will become able to experience the kinds of 
'noble joy' that the virtuous person has in satisfying their desire for noble ends (although 
the pleasure of this joy will not, of course, be the aim of virtuous action). The result should 
be that those appetitive and emotional pleasures which he or she had previously desired will 
either be legitimated by their newly acquired desire for the noble, or else come to be seen 
as disgraceful (aischron) and unworthy of the type of person he or she has become,32 The 
attractions they once held gradually slip away. 
Yet despite this development, the virtuous choices of which he or she is now capable 
remain a precarious achievement. For although they can now be made from an independent 
understanding of the noble value inherent in them, they may not, as yet, flow from a 
character that is fully and stably integrated. There may be occasions, therefore, when the 
learner who has gained the capacity for fully virtuous choice will nevertheless suffer a 
conflict between the motivations he or she has recently come to possess, and those which 
reflect an earlier and inferior stage of their moral development. The result of such conflict 
will be choices anticipating either the mere continence, or the akrasia of the mature moral 
agent. The aim of the advanced stages of moral education will be to ensure that the 
development of full virtue, which will often be a hesitant and irregular process (some kinds 
of virtue proving easier to 'master' than others), comes eventually to pervade the learner's 
entire life. Once this is so, they will possess a character which is firm, unchangeable and 
self-endorsed in the cause of virtue, and which provides them with settled patterns of proper 
satisfaction in the choices they have now become able to make. 
It is people of this sort who Aristotle has in mind as the right sort of audience for his 
lectures on ethics, and for ethical teaching (didaskalia - teaching in the formal sense, to be 
contrasted with habituation) more generally.33 Only once they have been brought into the 
fold of the truly virtuous can they appreciate the lessons which this kind of study holds for 
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them (these are not lessons for the moral sceptic). Teaching about ethics in this sense will 
provide students with the means to arrive at a more general defence of the manner of life 
into which they have been habituated. It is not that such lessons will add any further moral 
worth to the ability to reliably pick out, and act correctly upon, the salient moral features of 
concrete situation. As Aristotle says, at " ... the starting point is the fact ['the that']; and if 
this is sufficiently clear there will be no reason to ascertain the reason why." 34 This ability 
is, in a sense, all that virtue is. Instead, the more general and theoretical account provided 
by the more formalised teaching of ethics will allow the student to become familiar with 
how argumentative procedures of philosophy apply to the ethical field. From this 
understanding, the student should gain both a confidence in the defensibility of their chosen 
life of virtue, and a means of rejecting the pseudo-philosophical arguments of the charlatan. 
They acquire the ability to differentiate" ... between those arguments which are appropriate 
to it [ethics] and those which are foreign" )5 
This understanding of the nature of moral development, and of the educational strategies 
which assist it, is clearly very different from that which underlies the orthodox approaches I 
have discussed critically thus far. Perhaps the most important difference lies in the attitude 
taken to the avowal of any concrete moral position by the moral educator. For those 
approaches which we have termed 'rationalist' or 'intellectualist', this would, as we know, 
be to go beyond the proper remit of education - this being to provide children with the 
knowledge and skills to make autonomous choices of their own. Educators should, on this 
account, employ only those kinds of pedagogic strategy which can co-exist happily with the 
maintenance of a neutral position between the multifarious moral positions on any particular 
issue. Only in this way will they be able to avoid imposing their own views upon children, 
or prejudicing their future moral choices. The neo-Aristotelian educator, however, will 
have severe disagreements with this stricture on his or her practice. They will stress that 
noble efforts aimed at encouraging children to be reflective and autonomous in their moral 
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lives must be based upon the solid ground of properly habituated character. As one 
proponent of character-based education has stated: 
To suppose that there can be effective moral reflection without a first stage in 
which categories are learned and habits and attitudes are formed is as naive in its 
way as to suppose that secondary-school mathematics can be taught effectively to 
girls and boys who have never learned number concepts or (perhaps a better 
analogy) to suppose that we can explore the limits of our obligations to other 
people with a student who never heard that anyone else has rights)6 
The earliest stages of moral education will therefore consist of a more or less dogmatic 
introduction of children to those central moral norms which will form the basis of their 
subsequent moral education and reflection. Although the educator should make every effort 
to promote children's independent rational support for these norms, this is, at this time, less 
important than them actually coming to believe in them, and acting in ways which express 
these beliefs. The worry that such dogmatism will unjustifiably prejudice children's future 
moral choices will not concern the neo-Aristotelian who insists that without an initial 
prejudicing towards virtue and away from vice a child cannot ever become a moral 
chooser. For choice (prohairesis) is not a simple matter of just picking one option whilst 
aware of alternatives, but requires a full perception and understanding of the moral value 
inherent in each alternative - abilities which require the 'eye' which only experience of 
virtue can provide. And in attempting to develop this ability, the teacher must show that the 
values at stake in choice are not mere options to be picked as though little rested upon 
them, but are crucially important and thus deserving of serious deliberation. For the teacher 
to refrain from expressing their own moral opinions may indicate to children that he or she 
did not consider them to merit this sort of importance in his or her own life. So that they 
are able to teach children that moral values are to become central attachments in their lives, 
the teacher, as Mary Warnock has argued, " ... must have views, principles, attitudes, even 
passions; and it is only if he is seen to be a moral agent that he can teach his children to be 
moral agents too." 37 
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At later stages of moral education, the teacher may well find that stepping back from 
dogmatic instruction in favour of a more open and exploratory approach may be a more 
effective pedagogic strategy if it promotes the phronetic ability of children to better apply in 
practice those virtues which have become central parts of their character, or to rationally 
endorse these from a more reflective position. It should be stressed that this can only be a 
subsidiary aim to the shaping of character in the cause of virtue. There is no question 
whether it is more important for a child to become the sort of person who acts virtuously 
yet does so in an unreflective manner, or the sort who has an reflective attachment to non-
virtuous causes,38 Yet there will, nonetheless, exist moral issues for which answers are not 
readily supplied by those core values which have formed the basis of the earlier stages of 
moral habituation. It will not be enough here that children are brought up to be honest, 
kind, and courageous, if there are levels of reasonable disagreement, not so much about 
whether these are virtues, but about whether or not certain kinds of conduct count as 
representatives of them. 39 For children to progress beyond the moral impasses which can 
result from encounters with such difficult situations of choice, they will require kinds of 
imaginative deliberation which are better learnt from less dogmatic advice and instruction, 
and from more complex forms of direct moral experience (including, importantly, 
experience of the failures as well as the successes that life can bring).40 
Where it is the school that is responsible for assisting moral development, the neo-
Aristotelian will be wary of the 'special lessons in morality' that are central to the 
approaches advocated by both Lawrence Kohlberg and John Wilson. 41 These writers had 
maintained that moral thinking, as a rational pursuit with its own logical procedures, should 
aspire to be considered as a school subject on an equal footing with others in the academic 
curriculum. Only then would it be taken seriously enough by educators and children alike. 
For those educators interested more in the development of moral character, the notion that 
morality could be dealt with in this way would produce a somewhat different reaction. 
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Rather than supplying moral thinking with the respect it deserves, its bracketing as a 
curriculum subject in itself could, they might suggest, produce the negative effect of its 
trivialisation. For children may begin to think that once they had closed their 'morality 
textbooks' and listened to the week's last moral dilemma they had now left behind this kind 
of obtuse and arcane study until their next lesson. In doing so, they are as Aristotle 
remarks, " ... behaving rather like invalids who listen carefully to their doctor, but carry out 
none of his instructions". 42 And just as "the bodies of the latter will get no benefit from 
such treatment, so the souls of the former will get none from such philosophy" .43 Lessons 
in moral thinking may be enjoyable, or have other benefits for children, but they cannot 
provide for us all that we require from moral education. No doubt, schools by themselves 
cannot alone do all of this, but they can certainly do rather more than rest content with the 
provision of special lessons in morality. 
Instead of being encouraged (albeit indirectly) to see morality as an intellectual matter 
confined to the academic curriculum, children should ideally be brought to see how it is not 
a subject which can be pigeon-holed in this way, but which instead impinges upon all of 
teaching and all areas of life, within school and without. It should be expected that teachers 
of all subjects, from history and English, to biology and technology, should be concerned to 
exhibit the ways in which moral themes pervade these topics of study. At the same time, 
they will also be expected to be of such a moral character themselves that they provide 
worthy living exemplars of virtue to their students. Despite the skills a teacher might have 
for thinking of the most effective and efficient pedagogical strategies to aid children's moral 
development we would not, it is claimed, think him or her the ideal person morally to 
educate them if they were also known to be a morally reprehensible person. As David Carr 
suggests, this shows how there is an important difference between teaching and other kinds 
of professionalism such as medicine where we do not have the same worries about the 
doctor'S own character as long as they can heal effectively.44 In this way, moral education 
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extends not only beyond specialist lessons and into the rest of school life, but also beyond a 
conception of education as a 'technical practice' and into the personal lives of teachers. 
This last point clearly exhibits one way in which the neo-Aristotelian account of moral 
education I have presented throughout this chapter would prove to be politically 
controversial in the context of contemporary Western societies. As Alasdair MacIntyre has 
recognised, " ... to appoint teachers on the grounds of their moral character is something so 
much at odds with the general beliefs of the dominant liberal culture about education that 
there will be a good deal of reluctance even to entertain this possibility" .45 Equally, the 
notion that children need to internalise a particular set of core values before they can begin 
to think about morality and make moral choices for themselves, will certainly provoke 
opposition from those who do not themselves share a commitment to these core values. The 
'fragmentation' or pluralisation of value that is thought by many to be endemic to 
contemporary liberal societies would seem to foreshadow severe problems for the state in 
justifying this kind of educational enterprise. Where reasonable citizens of a liberal society 
disagree about many of the moral values that would be central to any ambitious programme 
of moral education of the kind I been discussing here, it would seem that pressing ahead 
could only fail to treat these citizens as equally worthy of respect as those others who are in 
the position of seeing their particular moral values and interpretations prioritised by public 
authorities. Whatever its possible "distortions of what it is to acquire a value" 46, the ideal 
of educational neutrality is often thus thought to be the only possible way in which moral 
education can hope to be politically satisfactory. Where the alternative to neutrality is 
thought to be civil strife, it is not difficult to see why many theorists will allot the concerns 
I have been raising up to now a secondary place (at the most) to the prior imperative of 
securing the stability of the liberal state. The problem which presents itself therefore, is 
whether the practical institution of a neo-Aristotelian, virtue-ethical, or character-based 
form of moral education is impossible given the political reality of contemporary liberal 
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societies. Has the account I have given, whatever its merits, committed the sin of being 
merely utopian? In the remaining chapters, I shall address this very issue. 
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Chapter Five 
The Politics of Moral Education: Virtue in the Modern World 
Recent years have witnessed a rising level of popular disquiet about the moral values and 
conduct of younger generations. As it is charged that more and more young people are 
engaging in anti-social and criminal activity (especially of a violent nature) at earlier and 
earlier stages of their lives, many commentators maintain that this is indicative of a more 
general breakdown in respect for social mores and traditional forms of authority. Figures 
such as the Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey, the chief executive of the Schools 
Curriculum and Assessment Authority, Nicholas Tate, and Frances Lawrence, the widow of 
the murdered London headmaster Phillip Lawrence, have all notably contributed to the 
controversy regarding this perceived 'moral decline', and have identified the institution 
which they think should shoulder much of the responsibility for this regrettable process, as 
well as being the proper focus of our attempts for renewal. This institution is education. 
Carey, for instance, told a recent conference that "values and morals do not grow on trees 
or fall like manna from heaven" and that" ... we want people who leave school to be good 
citizens and good neighbours, not just stuffed heads and effective contributors to the 
economy" .1 Schools therefore have a definite responsibilty for the proper moral upbringing 
of the children entrusted to their care. Tate has complained similarly that many teachers are 
so overwhelmed by the fear of engaging in indoctrination, that they are unable to properly 
fulfill the requirements essential to worthwhile forms of moral education.2 For many of the 
contributors to this debate the answer to our present predicament is clear to see. There is a 
simple choice to be made between an education founded upon a clearly defined moral code 
and an amoral education, for to teach an indeterminate morality is to teach no morality at 
all. In the cause of renewal therefore, we must aim to discover our socially shared morality, 
and be forthright in our efforts to reproduce it in the minds of schoolchildren. 
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It is of course proper to retain a healthy degree of scepticism about claims such as these. 
Ours is certainly not the only age in which people have seen reason to voice concerns about 
the degenerating state of morality amongst the young. In fact, there is little to suggest that 
this is not a feature common in some way to the thought of all ages. Equally, we should 
remain wary of joining in with the reactionary scapegoating of schools and teachers that so 
often seems to be a corollary of such thoughts. It is easy to see why the apportioning of 
blame in this manner can prove particularly attractive for those keen to deflect criticism 
away from the failings of aspects of our society for which they themselves have 
responsibility. Such notes of caution do not, however, mean that there are no deficiencies in 
the way that we go about the moral education of the young that call out for analysis and 
remedy. Indeed the claim that such deficiencies do in fact exist is central to my arguments 
thus far. Yet this may, at first thought, appear to indicate a slightly paradoxical situation. 
For as Damon and Colby have noted in a recent article looking back at the last quarter of a 
century's research into moral education, the perceived decline in the behaviour of young 
people to which I have here referred, has occurred during precisely the same period in 
which the academic field of moral education has in fact thrived.3 Should we not have 
expected this development of the discipline to have had a positive effect upon the behaviour 
of its primary agents of concern? What other practice thrives so much when it is evidently 
failing by reference to almost every available indicator? 
We could, of course, tell a rather different story about the relationship of these two 
variables, making reference to the way in which the decline in the standards of young 
people's behaviour is in fact the reason why moral education has thrived to the degree it 
has. It has existed upon a diet of our moral concern. On this view, the success of moral 
education is to be judged according to the way in which it stems the degenerative tide, like 
the proverbial boy's finger in a dyke. Yet although there is no doubt that this suggestion has 
its merits, I would suggest that a rather more accurate perspective is produced by 
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combining these two divergent ways of explaining the situation. Moral education must of 
course cope with a wide variety of social factors that are beyond its control. If society is 
breaking down we cannot expect the classroom to stand apart from this process like an oasis 
of calm. It is not so much that it should accept the influence of these wider influences as 
though it could not do anything to sift the bad from the good (a fatalism which underlies 
Values Clarification), but that any effective education must be capable of dealing with its 
subjects (the children) not as mythic or ideal types, but as they actually are. And 'what they 
are' is not dictated by any absolute conception of human nature or rationality, but by the 
interplay between these base facts about human beings and the conditioning provided by the 
contingent features of social development. This view allows us to see how moral education 
is importantly and necessarily dependent upon the nature of the society in which it operates, 
but is in no way its mere prisoner. For it is such education that plays one of the most 
important roles in determining the way in which our children, and thus our society, 
develops for good or ill. 
In previous chapters I have been concerned to show that the approaches to moral education 
which have dominated this recent period have not only failed to stem the morally 
degenerative tide, but have also actually assisted the processes which provide this tide with 
its destructive impetus and power. Impressed by the plurality and uncertainty of moral 
beliefs and practices in contemporary times, they have taken this to debar educators from 
promoting any of these beliefs and practices above others, save for those aspects of moral 
thought which may (or may not) be taken as forming a kind of formal husk within which 
various particular contents sit equally well. To go beyond this barrier would be to open 
teachers to the charge that they are not educating, but indoctrinating the children for whom 
they are responsible. Yet not only, I have argued, does this provide an insufficient degree 
of elementary moral instruction to those children who do not yet possess the capacity to 
make serious moral choices, but it also encourages a view of morality which sees it as 
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predominately a matter of personal preference - precisely the kind of view which many 
consider to at the root of our present difficulties. Thus, in search of a viable alternative, I 
have considered the way in which moral philosophy in the last two decades or so has seen 
something of a turning away from the kinds of moral philosophy which have underpinned 
these particular approaches, fostering a return to fashion of the long disregarded 'virtue 
ethics' tradition, grounded for the most part in the work of Aristotle. Encouraged by these 
developments, some writers on moral education have begun to articulate ways in which a 
virtue-centred model of moral education might indeed prove an attractive alternative to 
present orthodoxies.4 My arguments thus far have been largely concerned to detail and 
indeed advocate the potential benefits of this kind of approach. In the present chapter, I 
shall investigate whether such optimism about the prospects of a virtue-centred moral 
education is reasonable. As I have already suggested, this will in good part depend upon the 
way in which educational recommendations of this sort can be adequately integrated with a 
preferred account of the political nature of the society which they are intended to both 
support and shape. For if there is unresolved conflict between these two aspects of theory, 
it is quite possible that our hopes for educational reform may prove to be irredeemably 
utopian. 
To recap, virtue-ethics is conventionally differentiated from moral thought in both the 
Kantian and utilitarian traditions in two main ways. Firstly, whilst any such tradition values 
those habits, dispositions and traits of character which promote thought and action in 
accordance with their understanding of what is good or right, the virtue-ethicist is distinct in 
considering these to be the primary location of moral significance. The reason why one 
should not, for example, deliberately maim people for fun is not that it serves to diminish 
aggregate utility (as a utilitarian would maintain), or because it represents an attachment to 
a universalizable principle which one could not rationally wish to consistently hold (as Hare 
might have claimed), but because it is cruel. Secondly, and consequently, correct moral 
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conduct in any particular situation is not understood as being derived from some general 
rule or principle (such as 'acts of cruelty are wrong'), but as being the conduct which a 
person of virtuous moral character (Aristotle's spoudaios) would have performed in those 
circumstances. It therefore represents an agent-based rather than an act-based approach to 
ethics. 
How then, might such an approach to ethics be a preferable model upon which to base our 
attempts at the reformulation of moral education? We have found, so far, that it possesses at 
least three importantly advantageous features. Firstly, a central problem of the 
contemporary approaches I been concerned to criticise (Values Clarification, and the 
theories of Lawrence Kohlberg and John Wilson) derives from their common denial of the 
notion that moral judgement is an attempt to respond to the way things really are - that 
value is there to be found in the world, not to be projected onto it by our preferences. This 
non-cognitivist view would seem, however, to run contrary to much of our ordinary 
experience of engaging in moral reasoning and choice. If we are not attempting to respond 
accurately to something real - to 'feel its pull' so to speak - then there would seem to be 
little to account for the pains we often go to in making sure that a moral choice is the right 
one. It is integral to virtue-ethics that the worth of one's character, and the choices we 
make, are subject to more objective criteria than any of those which non-cognitivist theories 
can provide, and that these criteria relate to more than just the formal logic of moral 
language. 
Secondly, virtue-ethics rejects the role given to ethical rules and principles in orthodox 
accounts of moral reasoning and education. It is claimed that the centrality which they are 
often afforded represents a commitment to ethics mode led upon science or law, and falsely 
represents moral thought as a process of deduction from the general to the particular. 5 An 
education based around such a model would therefore ill-equip children to cope with the 
infinite variety of concrete circumstances in which moral action is called for, possibly 
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resulting in either an overloading of the kind of judgemental abilities in which they have 
been educated, or an inflexible denial of the extenuating differences between circumstances 
in which the same rule is appealed to. Virtue-ethics is alone able to encompass the idea that 
the complexity and unpredictability of concrete moral situations leads to moral reasoning 
being essentially uncodifiable in terms of rules or principles. It is the developed sensibility 
and sensitivity to circumstance of the virtuous, practically wise, agent (the phronimos) that 
enables him or her to correctly choose the right course of action, not their powers of 
deduction. 
The third advantage has to do with the place of the affective dimension within the moral 
life. In denying the Humean bifurcation between reason and passion, virtue-ethics avoids 
problems which have afflicted both VC and Kohlberg's approach. VC placed moral 
judgement firmly within the sphere of emotive response and, because it accepted Hume's 
distinction, could not grant rational argument any place within morality. As I have said 
before, it would seem oddly counter-intuitive that we could not envisage a place for 
rationality in distinguishing between the ethical merits of kindness and cruelty. In 
attempting to remedy this problem, Kohlberg relocated morality within the cognitive 
domain, thus enabling rational argument to assume a moral importance, but combined this 
with a dismissal of the role of supposedly irrational feelings and sentiments. Children must 
be taught to control these passive responses so as to ensure a clear path for reason to take. 
Many critics have felt that such an intellectualist view of the nature of moral judgement 
obscures the constitutive role that emotion plays in the acquisition of many virtues6, and 
would therefore have very real difficulties in explaining fully why we may be motivated to 
act in the ways that reason demands of us. Virtue-ethics differs from both approaches in 
conceiving the source and starting-point of morality as being the promotion and refinement 
of a child's positive affective responses, and a disciplining of their negative ones. This takes 
place through a process of critical habituation (ethismos) to virtuous conduct, during which 
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a child develops those aspects of rationally ordered sentiment and emotionally enriched 
cognition which are the mark of the virtuous person.7 
A problem arises, though, in that it might well be claimed with some confidence that these 
are advantages in theory only. As I have been concerned to investigate the promise of 
virtue-ethics as a foundation for the practical enterprise of moral education, we will need to 
see how this may work out in reality if this charge is to be successfully rebutted. 
Fortuitously for this task, there have indeed been some efforts in recent years to model 
school practice in moral education upon approaches which eschew intellectualist 
orthodoxies in favour of a broader development of character. This has become a rapidly 
expanding area of interest and practice in the United States, where a large number of 
'character education/development programmes' have already been instituted in schools with 
the support of prominent politicians and educationalists.8 The former US secretary of 
education, William Bennett, perhaps the most well-known advocate of this kind of 
approach, has spoken and written upon numerous occasions concerning the need for 
American society to concentrate upon the educational development of a set of widely shared 
virtues in order to avoid impending moral catastrophe. In 1986, for instance, he stated that: 
In defining good character we should include specific traits such as 
thoughtfulness, fidelity, kindness, diligence, honesty, fairness, self-discipline, 
respect for law, and taking one's guidance by accepted standards of right and 
wrong rather than by, for example, one's personal preferences ... There is a good 
deal of consensus among the American people on the elements that constitute good 
character traits ... Not only is there a consensus among the American people on 
the elements that constitute good character, most Americans want their schools to 
help form the character of their children.9 
As I suggested earlier, recent years have seen similar arguments rise to prominence in the 
UK. Public figures such as the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Chief Rabbi, Jonathan Sacks, 
and Frances Lawrence have accused schools of neglecting their responsibility to produce 
morally good young people. Criticisms of a similar (and more secular) kind have also come 
in recent books from cultural commentators Richard Hoggart lO and Melanie Phillips.1I Yet 
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one of the more interesting contributions to this debate has come from the aforementioned 
Nicholas Tate, chief executive of the Schools Curriculum Assessment Authority which 
oversees the increasingly centralised regulation of what is taught in English and Welsh state 
schools. This interest derives not so much from the detail of what he has to say, but from 
the evidence it provides that those with concrete responsibility for the administration of our 
schools are considering an American-style promotion of character education. A 
consideration of his arguments might therefore provide us with some insight into the 
promise held by a concretely instituted program of moral education, based more or less 
upon the kind of virtue-ethical or character-based model I have been advocating. 
Tate's prime concern would seem to be the rise of the dreaded 'relativism', the 
phenomenon which he sees as being chiefly responsible for the parlous state of 
contemporary morality and moral education. He bemoans the 'moral relativism lurking in 
deep corners of our collective psyche that leads some to feel that education is simply about 
helping children to clarify their own values and make informed choices' .12 Citing research 
from Cambridge University, he tells us that teachers are apparently so anxious not to offend 
minority viewpoints that they reject entirely the distinction between right and wrong and 
present morality as "largely a matter of taste or opinion" . In practice therefore, it would 
appear that moral education is considered as a task beyond the pale for worried teachers or, 
where it is attempted at all, goes little further than the kind of Values Clarification which 
we have found so unsatisfactory. If this is the case, it would appear that some serious 
efforts at reform are certainly required. As an initial response, Tate has himself called for, 
and overseen, the establishment of a national forum of 150 religious leaders, teachers, 
business-people and community leaders to begin the formulation of a modern day version of 
the Ten Commandments, a contemporary ethical canon to provide the centrepiece of moral 
education. 
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Yet when he refers to the negative influence of 'relativism' upon British culture, it is not 
entirely clear what Tate understands this concept to mean. Sometimes it refers to the idea 
that morality is a mere matter of taste or opinion - a rather vague definition which 
encompasses both 'subjectivism', where the truth value of a moral statement is relative to 
the consciousness of its utterer, and 'emotivism' which takes moral statements to be solely 
expressive of subjective taste or opinion and thus not capable of truth at all. At other times, 
relativism is taken to be the widely held idea that moral values differ from culture to 
culture, and that we have no independent rational means of ascertaining which of these are 
superior (although as Tate idiosyncratically uses the term 'cultural relativism' to refer to the 
"view that no value inheres in cultural products" , this idea remains undifferentiated in his 
account I3). This is not a merely semantic issue. Relativism of the sort described by the first 
definition does indeed present extreme difficulties for any moral educator, for if morals are 
simply expressions of personal preference, unassailable by any objective standards, then it 
would appear difficult to justify the imposition of any particular moral viewpoint (however 
pluralistic) upon learners. 14 It is this unfortunately commonplace notion which does indeed 
seem to underpin much of the unsatisfactory practice in our schools. But if it is the second 
concept of relativism that is meant however, this need not necessarily be such a problem. 
Relativism in this second sense encompasses a complex range of meta-ethical views. In its 
more extreme variants, it might refer to the claim that morality derives from a "diversity of 
equally valid modes of thought and ways of life" across the boundaries of which we may 
make no non-ethnocentric judgement. 15 This view is indeed widely encountered in 
educational circles and makes very little sense, for if we cannot evaluate alien cultures 
because they are 'equally valid' , how is it that we are able to make such claims about their 
validity in the first place? Equally, this formulation will not allow us to understand the 
unproblematic idea that moral reform can be instantiated by the rightful pressures of a 
minority - that, for instance, William Wilberforce could have been justified in fighting 
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against the 'equally valid' acceptance of slavery in our particular culture. For such reasons, 
cultural relativism is best expressed as a more sceptical thesis - that the standards particular 
to our culture cannot apply cross-culturally or, alternatively, that there are no culturally 
independent standards to which we can appeal in making a moral judgement and what we 
are justified in so judging depends upon the cultural standards we do have at our disposal. 
Although this leaves open the possibility that other cultures may be so far removed from us 
that they, in Bernard Williams' words, "present no real option for us", and thus cause our 
evaluative vocabularies to 'break down' when we attempt to assess their behaviour, this 
kind of cultural relativity is far less disabling. 
Whatever the plural and fragmentary nature of contemporary Western societies such as the 
UK, they nevertheless contain few, if any, cultures whose ways of life present 'no real 
option for us', and great amounts of at least surface-level moral agreement across the 
cultural groupings who generally populate our schoolrooms. Indeed, it can be argued that it 
is the level of this often unnoticed level of general agreement that throws our disagreements 
into relief, for without it we would have difficulty understanding the very issues we were 
disagreeing about. 16 In a very broad sense, therefore, there does exist an important level of 
cross-cultural moral consensus on the merits of a wide variety of virtues such as courage, 
honesty and kindness. The ordinary practices of schools, from discipline to the assessment 
of work, tend to implicitly reinforce values such as these without being parts of any 
acknowledged program of moral education. There will certainly be situations where our 
best efforts at understanding the meaning of a moral view from outside its particular 
cultural context will not be enough, and we may feel unable to judge confidently. This is 
the kind of situation we find ourselves in when addressing issues such as the extent to which 
school dress requirements can be relaxed to accommodate the wishes of the parents of 
Muslim girls (as well as the girls themselves). But such moral uncertainty is also evident 
within mainstream culture regarding issues such as abortion and euthanasia. In both cases 
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we may go about things in the right way but still not be guaranteed success. This level of 
recognition of cultural variance and moral pluralism need not, however, endanger a belief 
in the objective truth status of which moral values are capable and in their centrality to a 
sound education. 
As we shall see, some writers have maintained that the kinds of moral consensus I have 
described here do not possess the kind of depth that would be required to provide a sound 
foundation for an education in virtue. Nevertheless, we should at least see that the issue is 
nowhere near as clear-cut as many cultural conservatives imagine it to be. Tate, along with 
many of his co-complainants, seems to be supplying a kind of 'slippery slope' argument in 
which any criticism of the idea of morality as an unchanging code (such as a set of 
commandments) available for unproblematic reference and enforcement by people in all 
cultural circumstances leads inevitably to the most facile formulations of subjectivism and 
relativism, and eventual amoralism. It is a mistake for Tate to infer that morality not being 
a mere matter of personal preference in any way necessitates it being universally applicable 
sub specie aetemitatis in the way he implies. In a sense, they see Platonism and emotivism 
as the only alternatives, thus overlooking (amongst other things) the rather more nuanced 
understanding of the moral life represented by the Aristotelian tradition. This argumentative 
dualism is a particularly unfortunate characteristic of the popular discussion of education. 
Tate's narrow understanding of the shape moral education must take to resist the advances 
of relativism also exhibits a rather over-optimistic faith in the power of moral principles and 
their didactic inculcation to improve moral behaviour. He seems to imagine that all schools 
have been lacking is a series of lessons in which children are told that right's right, wrong's 
wrong, and, so to speak, that's that. In many ways though, the problem is not so much that 
children do not know that certain ethical principles are right and demand adherence, but that 
they are left uncertain about what such adherence would consist in. The moral decline to 
which we refer may not so much be represented by a loss of belief in central moral tenets, 
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but by increasing threats to the integrity and judgemental abilities of the well-intentioned. 17 
A child may very well have been taught that honesty is good, but should he or she always 
tell the truth even though it could conflict with a promise of secrecy given to another? And 
what is the value of honesty at all if classmates can express their allegiance to this value 
when it is asked of them, but continue to lie as if nothing has changed? It is in answer to 
these sorts of quandaries that an emphasis upon the need for a renewed canonical 'set of 
rules, precepts and principles' proves unhelpful. This is a matter about which the kind of 
Aristotelian virtue-ethics I have described diverges sharply from the kinds of moral 
education envisaged by Tate and the American character educators. As we have seen, 
Aristotle does not consider virtues of character to be traits of obeying certain kinds of rule, 
but as the very bases of morality (of which rules are mere summations). The central place 
in moral education given to rules of behaviour by recent commentators suggests an 
overridingly conservative concern with the preservation of 'law and order' at the expense 
of other ideals. As David Carr suggests: 
All too often this conservative perspective has inclined to fasten upon what is 
rigid, inflexible and superficial in our understanding and appreciation of the 
nature of values, ideals and principles - a kind of rules for their own sake legalism 
- which actually stifles independent and creative thought and enquiry and impedes 
real progress towards the development of genuine moral attitudes. 18 
It is this conservatism which perhaps best accounts for a reluctance to consider the way in 
which phenomena such as the prevalence of culturally relativist viewpoints in popular 
discourse are often regrettable yet understandable results of broader structural and political 
conditions. In modern societies, where the stable communities of old have been broken 
down by economic demands for increased mobility in the labour market and more dispersed 
forms of production, it is unsurprising that moral judgement becomes a more difficult task. 
As we become less sure of our own moral identities we are faced with more and more 
unfamiliar situations in which moral decisions are called for, and to many scepticism about 
the importance of morality may seem like the only coherent response. In embracing these 
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ideas, we may feel able to stress, against Tate, that morality need not be understood as an 
unchanging code as if written in stone, but as subject to continual and imaginative 
interpretation and revision as we confront new situations in life that demand a moral 
response. And as I have suggested in previous chapters, there is no need to think that an 
acceptance of this certain contingency and 'open-endedness' about morality should 
endanger our proper confidence in its centrality to a full human life and thus its educational 
importance. Rather, in attempting to understand the reasons why morality is increasingly 
seen to be under threat, we must attend to those wider processes that contribute to the 
erosion of its foundation in stable communities. It is the political conservatism of Tate and 
the American character educators that prevents them from fully acknowledging the 
importance of the place occupied by educational institutions within wider society, and the 
degree to which the nature of this social and political order impinges for good or ill upon 
the success of moral education - an institution which need not be considered as a mere 
mechanism to guarantee the continuation of the status quo. Tate concedes that 'relativism 
cannot be dissociated from consumerism' but sees consumerism as a mere cultural 
'fashion', an aspect of pop culture of which we can rid ourselves by means of curricular 
reform. I suggest that we have good reason to doubt this optimistic view of the potential for 
schools to carry out all that we hope for from moral education, as well as the conservative 
forms many critics hope for it to assume. 
In conceiving of the educational enterprise as though it were self-contained and self-
referential, the writers I have discussed here depart little from the 'intellectualist' moral 
educationalists they seek to oppose. Although they differ concerning what should be taught 
in school, and how it should be taught, they both see the school-gates as representing the 
boundary of where moral education takes place. In this way, they subscribe to a view, as 
Tony Skillen has phrased it, " ... of the child as that-which-gets-educated-at-school and of 
the school as that-which educates the child. " 19 Although we might think of this as a largely 
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unproblematic conception for traditional curriculum subjects such as, say, mathematics or 
geography, it would seem to present an unfortunate distortion of the way in which moral 
knowledge and character is acquired in practice. As I have suggested when discussing the 
practical shape of an habituation to virtue, special lessons in the skills of reasoning can 
represent only a small part of the learning environment for morality (as well as only a small 
part of what morality is) when compared to the influence of, for instance, family, friends, 
and the popular media. The central place of these and other factors in the character 
formation of the young renders redundant any model of moral education which rests upon 
the assumption that it takes place solely in the confines of educational institutions. As Ruth 
Jonathan has made this point: 
As moral educators, we may sincerely endeavour to give clear and consistent 
messages to the young, but preaching thrift in a society based on waste, teaching 
persistence where opportunism is admired and rewarded, encouraging 
commitment where the deluge of information is alienating, and fostering 
compassion in a social ethos which blames the victim is far from being a task 
whose success depends principally on the rectitude and conceptual understanding 
of the teacher,20 
It is for this reason that the response of those contemporary critics who offer the 
educational re-imposition of a shared moral code as the solution for moral decline seems to 
me so inadequate. They have a fairly clear conception of the kinds of regrettable 
educational practices which need to be opposed, but have struggled to break fully free from 
some of the other problematic assumptions which underlie them. The contributing factors to 
moral decline, assuming that this process is more real than apparent, will clearly be wider 
and more complex than those which may be controlled by alterations to the curriculum or 
management of schools. And moreover, the influence of these further factors may serve not 
only to hinder the efficacy of proposed educational solutions (in the way described by 
Jonathan), but even to counteract the very ideals which underlie attempts at their 
imposition. For example, many avowedly liberal educators see the intended promotion of 
autonomy via a neutral presentation of moral and religious alternatives as a means of 
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promoting the personal autonomy of those being educated. For to do otherwise would be to 
privilege some moral and religious alternatives over others and thus compromise a student's 
right to make decisions about such matters free from interference. This is an aspect of 
contemporary liberal educational practice which often stands accused of fostering a sense of 
nihilism or decisionism amongst the young. If all moral alternatives are presented as being 
just as good as each other, it is argued, there should be little surprise if children come to the 
conclusion that it does not matter what they commit themselves to, or if they choose to 
forego moral commitment entirely. This, of course, is very far from the intention of those 
earlier representatives of the liberal tradition, whose commitment to the value and fostering 
of autonomy was part of the articulation of a distinctly perfectionist ideal of social and 
moral progress - an ideal which gained its appeal from being contrasted with the social 
rigidities and moral heteronomy of its age. This is suggested, for instance, by these remarks 
of L.T. Hobhouse from 1911: 
The liberal does not meet opinions which he conceives to be false with toleration, 
as though they did not matter. He meets them with justice, and exacts for them a 
fair hearing as though they mattered just as much as his own. He is always ready 
to put his own convictions to the proof, not because he doubts them but because 
he believes in them.21 
Abstracted from some broader view of and project for society, modern neutralist pedagogy 
becomes less of a tool for the promotion of autonomy, and more akin to a surrender to the 
forces of social conditioning - forces which are certainly not uniformly of an autonomy-
promoting nature. In approaching moral education, therefore, we must be careful to 
exaggerate neither its power to emasculate corrosive outside influences, nor the extent to 
which it is a mere prisoner of these influences. We must instead attempt to provide an 
understanding of the way in which moral education contributes an important part of the 
mutual development of society and individual, and of how this development may best be 
turned toward the good. 
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We might well think that the virtue-ethical tradition I have described throughout would be 
well-placed to encompass these sort of observations about the role of society in the moral 
development of the individual. Indeed, Aristotle's work in ethics is itself inextricably linked 
to his understanding of politics. The purpose of the Nicomachean Ethics was not to present 
some foundational account of morality, justifiable to any rational agent, but to offer advice 
to actual and prospective statesmen (politikos) about how they should properly discharge 
their practical responsibility for the moral education of the young. And it is central to such 
education (paideia) that it takes place within a polis that properly fosters those virtues 
arising from a shared life, and whose laws promote human flourishing (eudaimonia) . 
.. , to obtain a right training for goodness from an early age is a hard thing, unless 
one has been brought up under right laws ... [I]t is not enough to have received the 
right upbringing and supervision in youth; they must keep on observing their 
regimen and accustoming themselves to it even after they are grown up; so we 
shall need laws to regulate these activities too, and indeed generally to cover the 
whole of life. 22 
This emphasis upon the social and political context of moral education is by no means a 
theme confined to ancient thought, but one which is apparent in the work of a number of 
modern philosophers. As is well known, Hegel was critical of those ethical views (which he 
termed Moralitiit) which presented morality as something an individual could create for 
themselves, abstracted from the nature of the community in which they lived. Instead, he 
saw education as a vital part of the developmental culture (Ri/dung) of an ideal and rational 
ethical community (Sittlichkeit) - a conception notably similar to Aristotle's polis. More 
recently, Aristotelian and Hegelian themes were both evident in the work of John Dewey 
who stressed (in his usual obtuse style) that: 
All virtues and vices are habits which incorporate objective forces. They are 
interactions of elements contributed by the make-up of an individual with elements 
supplied by the out-door world ... Since habits involve the support of environing 
conditions, a society or some specific group of fellow-men is always accessory 
before and after the fact. 23 
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Nevertheless, with a few notable exceptions, one struggles to find any detailed 
consideration of the social and political context of virtue in recent works on moral 
education, or in moral philosophy more generally. Yet if one accepts Aristotle's view upon 
this topic, the development of moral virtues is a process which can only properly take place 
in particular kinds of social setting,24 To ignore this when making practical educational 
recommendations this would be to run a risk of potential futility. Moral education must be 
an integral part of a wider social and political vision, and if moral education is taken to be 
in need of reform, this vision must accordingly be one of transformation. The questions one 
is led to ask, therefore, concern the ways in which a virtue-ethical model of moral 
education may conflict with the theory and practice of contemporary liberalism and, if it 
does so conflict, the kind of transformation that is called for. An Aristotelian stress upon the 
breadth of influence upon the development of character already suggests some potential 
difficulties of this sort. One might, for instance, have to take more seriously the ways in 
which children come to imitate the moral lives of role-models presented to them by the 
media. It is not hard to foresee that cherished liberal values surrounding the issue of 
censorship might well be compromised here. Similar difficulties follow from the rejection 
of a technicist understanding of the way in which moral values are learnt in school (the idea 
that the teacher is a mere 'deliverer' of an ethical curriculum, rather than an ethical agent 
themselves). For this leads to a correspondingly increased emphasis upon the role of the 
teacher as an embodiment of moral virtue, worthy of emulation by those they teach, which 
would seem to countenance a level of interference with the private lives of teachers which 
conflicts with contemporary legal practice and with which a liberal may find it difficult to 
concur.25 
In what remains of this chapter, I shall consider how some recent developments in 
educational thought may indicate another way in which liberal societies provide a difficult 
context within which to situate the model I have been outlining here. And whereas the two 
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examples I have given above reflect some of the possible conflicts between a preferred 
model of moral education and certain prized liberal values, the issues that I am to consider 
now raise the question of whether a coherent shared program of moral education for the 
young of contemporary liberal societies is possible at all. And whatever their differences, 
this is a question concerning which Values Clarificationists, Kohlbergians, and their 
conservative critics exhibit little doubt. 
For the last two or three decades, the concept of a 'skill' has assumed a great importance in 
educational debate. Prime Minister lames Callaghan's Ruskin College speech of 1976 set 
the tone for future Government White Papers in pinning much of the blame for Britain's 
economic decline upon education. There was a desperate need, he argued, for a strong 
emphasis to be placed upon the development of those vocational skills which would be of 
use in the workplace. Too much schooling ignored the value of these skills, and rested 
content with merely filling the heads of children with knowledge. In a 1989 lecture 
Professor Sir Graham Hills, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Strathclyde, maintained 
that Britain's traditional emphasis upon the acquisition of knowledge at the expense of skills 
was an example of intellectual snobbery of which we could well be rid. For skills «enrich 
in a way that knowledge does not... humanize in a way that knowledge cannot. .. [and] can, 
in stark contrast to knowledge, be the bringer of great wealth and prosperity" 26. Between 
these indicative statements, 'skills' (or more precisely 'basic', 'key', 'core' or 'generic' 
skills) have assumed an almost pre-eminent position in much (particularly official) 
educational discourse. Every educational good is now to be conceived of in terms of its 
positive outcomes upon the skills of its recipient. 
The prevalence of skills-talk is a matter which has aroused some degree of critical ire from 
those who have questioned the validity of conceiving of so much of education in such 
terms, and the denigration of knowledge that so often seems to be carried with it. For now, 
however, this is not my concern. I merely want to draw attention to the way in which skills-
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talk is gradually beginning to encroach upon those matters which are the concern of moral 
education. It is one thing, we may think, for there to be such a thing as 'essay-writing 
skills' or 'numeracy skills', but quite another for there to be 'honesty skills' or 'practical 
wisdom skills'. Yet these thoughts do seem to be becoming apparent in educational 
literature. The vehicle for moral education allocated by the national curriculum is what is 
known as 'personal and social education' (PSE), and the curricular materials for such 
lessons now seem to structure learning around the acquisition of skills. For example, 
Macmillan's 'Personal and Social Education Course for Young People from 11-16 +' 
includes books such as The Skills of Friendship, and another (Self Esteem) which discusses 
"The skills involved in both accepting positive comments and handling negative 
feelings ... " .27 Even for those who are critical of much of what goes on in the name of 
moral education, the language of skills has had its influence. According to one recent study, 
for instance, the standard practice of US character-educators is to steer clear of all mention 
of values, and refer instead to the promotion of "life skills, workplace 'know-how' skills, 
or citizenship skills" .28 In a similar vein, one of the proposals which Nicholas Tate has 
made as part of his attempt to re-invigorate moral education is for the establishment of a 
new 'critical reasoning skills' A-level course which will deal with issues of ethical 
importance. 29 
One might at first imagine that there is much in the idea of moral skills that sits well with 
the virtue-ethical educational approach I have been discussing. I have, for instance, stressed 
the way in which the acquisition of moral values is not a purely intellectual process like 
learning calculus, but is matter of an habituation centred upon the experience of moral 
performance. Like skills, therefore, ethical knowledge is irreducibly practical. This is what 
Aristotle meant in separating theoretical wisdom (sophia), which aims at nothing beyond 
itself, from both the technical skill (techne) involved in production (poiesis) and the 
practical wisdom (phronesis) required for excellence in action proper (eupraxia). Indeed, 
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Aristotle relied upon an analogy between skill and virtue to introduce the notion of 
habituation in Book Two of his Nicomachean Ethics, 
... the virtues we do acquire by first exercising them, just has happens in the arts. 
Anything that we have to learn to do we learn by the actual doing of it: people 
become builders by building and instrumentalists by playing instruments. 
Similarly, we become just by performing just acts, temperate by performing 
temperate ones, brave by performing brave ones)O 
But as we have seen in a previous chapter, even though he rests again upon this analogy 
when discussing practical deliberation in Book Three, Aristotle was equally concerned to 
point out those ways in which the possession of a skill differs importantly from a virtue of 
character. Although both are acquired by means of training and experience, a contrast 
seems to exist in the case of virtue between being a virtuous person and acting in a way a 
virtuous person would, whereas in the case of skill it does not. It is this distinction upon 
which Aristotle relies in circumventing the apparent circularity of ethical habituation in 
which one becomes just by performing just acts, but would need to be already just to be 
able to perform them. He says that" works of art [techne) have their merit in themselves; so 
it is enough for them to be turned out with a certain quality of their own." 31 In other words, 
we are only interested that the product or performance is turned out in the shape 
characteristic of the skill in question, so that there would be no way that someone who 
consistently scored high scores at archery could not be termed a skillful archer. In the case 
of virtue, however, we would say that it is not enough to simply perform a virtuous action 
as one must also be acting from virtue. The saving of a child from a dangerous precipice is 
not a fully courageous action if it is performed to avoid punishment, to display one's 
athleticism, or out of ignorance of the danger (in which case it would be an example of 
recklessness). The reason why a virtuous action is performed must therefore be equally 
expressive of the virtue. Because they must be grounded in a set of these motivational 
propensities, we would also say that virtues are distinguishable from skills in that they are 
not detachable from a person's character. They are not a set of abilities which we can use 
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or not use as we wish without threatening our 'ownership' of them, but are the dispositions 
of which our identity is comprised. It is the proper responsibility of the courageous person 
to consistently act in the way which courage requires, and to make sure that they are in the 
right emotional (i.e. fear suppressing) condition to so act. 
Aristotle argued that the kinds of deliberation required for skill and for practical wisdom 
differ also. With the former, the deliberator proceeds with a fixed end in sight and searches 
for the most technically efficient means to produce this end - a process that is, in principle, 
articulable in terms of a set of rules. In the ethical case, however, the phronimos does not 
usually deliberate about how to achieve his or her set idea of what 'being virtuous here' is, 
but attempts to find out quite what it is that would best constitute virtuous action in these 
circumstances. For this process there is no corresponding rule-book. Much of this I have 
discussed in more detail earlier in this thesis, but from what I have said briefly here, it 
would seem that any form of moral education that proceeded in terms of the promotion of a 
variety of so-called 'moral skills' would be unacceptable. Moral virtues are not just things 
that people can do, but ways people live, and ways people are. We should surely be aiming 
to produce morally good people, not just people who are able to act in the manner of the 
morally good when it suits them to do so. Equally, despite the fact that many of the 
proponents of skills in education maintain that such skills are, compared to knowledge, 
readily transferable to all manner of different situations, it is hard to see how teaching 
someone moral skills can possibly produce these benefits. As there is no rule-book for this 
particular subject matter, one must rely on the ability to perceive such situations in the 
morally correct manner - an expression of virtue which is not just a matter of performance. 
As was the case with Nicholas Tate and the character-educators, the advocates of skills rely 
on a dualistic view which encourages their problematic conclusions. For the former, a 
rejection of the idea that morality is subjective and unteachable means that it must instead 
be understood as a code of clearly defined principles which may be transmitted into the 
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minds of children. For the latter, criticism of this 'theoretical knowledge' model produces 
the conclusion that morality must instead be a matter of the skills needed to 'process' moral 
information. Both approaches thus ignore the remaining alternative - that moral knowledge 
is neither episteme nor techne, but phronesis. 
Why then, we might ask, should approaches which reduce virtues to skills have such an 
attraction in an area to which they are so unsuited? One explanation for its popularity is that 
it represents a movement towards coherence and uniformity in educational aims. If the 
value of teaching all other subjects is defined in terms of the skills that they promote then 
morality, if it is to be of educational importance, must similarly have its own skills to be 
developed. The character of such uniformity is perhaps understandable when so much of 
the impetus behind curricular reforms arises from the same source - business management. 
For those of a more cynical turn of mind, one might add that a conception of moral ity 
which emphasises performance over character, and in which the performance may spring 
from considerations other than the purely moral, is by no means unfitting with typical 
managerial concerns. And it is the influence of these concerns within education which also 
serve to make attractive a conception of teaching quality and inspection which grades 
success solely in terms of the achievement of behavioural objectives, as opposed to anything 
rather more difficult to quantify. Although these are perhaps some of the more obvious 
explanations for the encroachment of skills into the domain of moral education, it is 
interesting to consider a way in which this process may signify something about the 
possibility of this kind of education within a liberal society. May it also, therefore, be 
shown to have any kind of political importance? 
As we have seen, from an Aristotlelian viewpoint a watered down and indeterminate 
conception of virtue, floating freely across different concrete accounts of human 
flourishing, is not truly a conception of virtue at all. For without a specific understanding of 
the moral good for the sake of which the virtue is valued, we cannot differentiate virtuous 
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behaviour from externally similar performances. Yet, this is precisely the kind of 
conception which is at work in much of what considers itself to be virtue-theoretical work 
in education. Perhaps one of the best examples of this is the recent book by philosopher of 
education Patricia White, entitled Civic Virtues and Public Schooling: Educating Citizens 
for a Democratic Society.32 Here, White sees herself to be exploring a range of virtues 
which underpin and support a liberal democratic social order, amongst which she includes 
such worthy aspects of character as courage, hope, friendship and self-respect. In 
articulating the merits of these 'virtues', she does not concede that they constitute parts of 
anyone particular, to use Rawls' term 'comprehensive'33, account of well-being. Rather, as 
'liberal virtues' they are to be seen as character-traits which are equally at home in any of 
the various comprehensive and reasonable accounts to be found in liberal societies, and in 
this way they live up to an ideal of neutrality between them (an ideal which is at the core of 
her understanding of liberalism).34 But as I have been concerned to suggest with reference 
to Aristotle, it is not clear how traits which fulfill this free-floating function can at the same 
time adequately fulfill all of those functions required for virtues to be satisfactorily 
differentiated from skills when and where their verbal ascriptions remain identical. In 
expressing these doubts, I share the judgement of White's project offered by David Carr, 
who maintains that 
.. , White (and others who have argued in this vein) hopes ... to have the cake of a 
non virtue-theoretical liberal-democratic conception of moral and political 
association - but to eat it, as it were, virtue theoretically. To be precise, she wants 
all the benefits of conceiving such undeniably positive values ... as virtues -
without any of the costs of commitment to specific conceptions of human 
aspirations, which such dispositions as courage, honesty and hope ordinarily incur 
in order to warrant legitimate characterisation as moral virtues.35 
Perhaps the most historically important example of a debate concerning the conflation of 
virtue and skill was that of the denunciation of the Sophists by Socrates. Protagoras, 
Gorgias, and their fellow Sophists in fifth century (BC) Greece rejected the idea that there 
could be objective knowledge in any area. What mattered, therefore, was not the supposed 
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truth of any particular proposition, but rather its effectiveness. In offering themselves as 
paid teachers, they sought to convince their potential customers among the wealthier 
echelons of Greek society that they need not detain themselves with traditional educational 
pursuits, but concentrate upon the development of the useful skills of practical life which 
could bring about success. The Sophists offered themselves as expert teachers of these very 
skills of effectiveness, pre-eminent amongst which in the burgeoning Athenian democracy 
of the time was rhetoric, the power of persuasion. As the Protagoras of Plato's dialogue 
states; 
... the others treat their pupils badly ... teaching them arithmetic and astronomy 
and geometry and music - here he glanced at Hippias - but from me he will learn 
only what he has come to learn. What is that subject? The proper care of his 
personal affairs, so that he may best manage his own household, and also of the 
state's affairs, so as to become a real power in the city, both as speaker and man 
of action. 36 
An interesting feature of the way in which Protagoras presents the case for teaching skills 
such as these. is that throughout this dialogue he continuously uses the terms techne and 
arete as synonymous for his purposes. Political skill and political virtue are one and the 
same.37 We know that Socrates (again as presented by Plato) was to insist that there existed 
an important distinction between these two terms in that arete referred specifically to an 
ethical quality, and that some time later Aristotle was to take a similar view. Also, we know 
that the pre-Socratic era saw no particular difficulty in using techne and arete 
interchangeably - for then the latter referred simply to 'excellence' however it was 
understood within a particular community, most especially to those excellences which 
contributed to the community's prosperity and stability, and the former to any activity that 
aims at some particular end. In commending excellences they did not yet make any 
distinction between those which are, to use A.W.H. Adkins' terms, 'competitive' (such as 
rhetoric) and those which are 'co-operative' (such as justice).38 In this linguistic context, the 
otherwise puzzling assertion of Protagoras that those early Greeks who lacked political 
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techne were provided with it when Zeus sent them aidos (decency) and dike (justice) begins 
to make some sense, as these were just success-ensuring excellences like any others,39 
Yet in Adkins' discussion of Protagoras' exposition, he finds reason to ask whether the fact 
that he is " ... confusing co-operative excellences with administrative and political skills" 
reflects" a confusion of thought prevalent at the period" or is a deliberate ploy for which 
Protagoras had particular motives. 40 In expressing sympathy for the latter view, he suggests 
that Protagoras was actually trading upon a certain ambiguity of the Greek of the period in 
order to appeal to as many sections of the Athenian public as possible. Poorer citizens, for 
instance, may have been troubled greatly by the claims of Sophists that they could provide 
effective and necessary political skills that only the wealthy could afford. He allays their 
fears by suggesting that in having already received aidos and dike (as Greek society imparts 
this to everyone), they also thereby possess political techne. This, Adkins argues, exploits 
both the vagueness of 'political techne' to include these qualities, and" ... the vagueness 
and range of arete and techne to imply that all possess the skills and qualities which these 
terms are capable of denoting and commending". The result being a picture that" ... 
anyone who was not agathos (virtuous) in terms of the traditional evaluation [to do with 
wealth and social position] would be likely to applaud" .41 In other parts of his exposition, 
Protagoras seems to be making more effort to appeal to a different group - namely those 
who had grown wealthy during this period of Athenian expansion, and aspired to the 
political prominence traditionally reserved for certain families of the hoplite class. 
Especially attractive to such people would have been his suggestion that political virtue/skill 
is not" innate or automatic" (a matter of nature, or phusis) but" acquired through care and 
practice and instruction" 42, which he is himself "better than average" at imparting. 
As well as having its own historical interest, this ancient case mirrors strikingly the view of 
contemporary liberal society presented by Alasdair Maclntyre in a lecture entitled How to 
Seem Virtuous Without Actually Being So.43 Here he maintains that the commonplace usage 
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of virtue terms in such societies is unable to provide the degree of determinacy that is 
required of any systematic and coherent moral standpoint. In common with the conflation of 
virtue and skill we see in the arguments of Protagoras, such usage provides something for 
everyone by creating, in Adkins' words, "a smokescreen or captatio benevolentiae" .44 Like 
the modern educationalists I have considered in this chapter, Protagoras sells virtue 'on the 
cheap'. And although in one way it might appear that this is more democratic in terms of its 
social inclusiveness, the kind of 'moral skills' which represent the alternative to a 
systematic and coherent account of the virtues have implications which are far from being 
accordant with a democratic ideal. For Maclntyre, it is this very fact that explains the 
contemporary popularity of virtue concepts understood in this way, and (by implication) of 
the approaches to moral education which are based upon them. 
Ours is a political culture deeply fragmented by fundamental moral disagreements. 
It is also a political culture whose public rhetoric is well-designed to disguise and 
to conceal the extent of that disagreement by invoking an idiom of consensus with 
regard to values. In order to function effectively that rhetoric must be able to 
make use of sentences which both command widespread assent, and yet which are 
at the same time available for the expression of sets of quite different and 
incompatible moral judgements ... Thus a large and largely unnoticed gap exists 
between the nature and grounds of those ascriptions of the virtues which figure so 
notably in commonplace usage and public political rhetoric, and those verbally 
similar ascriptions which give expression to some systematic and coherent account 
of the virtues. And this gap functions so as to protect from scrutiny the 
presentation of self in contemporary public and political life of those holding and 
aspiring to public office. For what our contemporary political culture requires 
from those who claim public and pOlitical authority is an appearance of virtue 
congruent with the rhetoric of shared values. And both that appearance and that 
rhetoric are well-served by the indeterminacy of the virtue-concepts of 
contemporary commonplace usage.45 
Accounts of the kind provided by both Nicholas Tate and Patricia White would therefore 
seem to share the failings of moral skills talk in mistakenly presupposing the existence of a 
substantive language of virtue which can function as the basis for a revitalised national 
programme of moral education. Earlier in this chapter, I criticised Tate for working with an 
ill-defined notion of relativism to serve as a 'straw-man' counterpoint for his own 
educational prescriptions. I suggested that there was a considerable amount of available 
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ground between the poles of radical subjectivism and an absolutist belief in the existence of 
a realm of universal moral principles - ground filled by an important amount of moral 
agreement about the relative worth of many virtues across different groups in a plural 
society. Yet if Maclntyre is to be believed, this level of apparent agreement is a purely 
verbal chimera, fulfilling none of the functions required of a coherent understanding of 
virtue concepts. For him, the morally fragmented nature of contemporary liberal societies 
means that any shared program of moral education, let alone one explicitly based around 
the virtues, must be rationally indefensible. In a sense therefore, he would agree with the 
criticisms offered by Lawrence Kohlberg of those who see the promotion of virtues of 
character as being at the core of moral education. For he agreed that moral disagreement 
was the stumbling block for these claims, as " ... the problem is not only that a virtue like 
honesty may not be high in everyone's bag, but that my definition of honesty may not be 
yours" .46 If such education is to possess a determinate and substantive moral content it 
would have to take place within the context of a coherent ethical tradition, and this is most 
definitely not what contemporary liberal society represents. The attempts by recent figures 
to renew moral education simply by discovering a teachable moral code upon which we can 
all agree are therefore doomed to failure. Theirs is political language which is, to use the 
words of George Orwell, " ... designed to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind" .47 
Liberal moral education is little other than a delusive education in rhetoric. 
Of course, whereas Kohlberg saw moral diversity as necessarily invalidating a virtue-based 
approach, MacIntyre sees the fact that the virtues sit unhappily within plural liberal 
societies as a good reason to doubt the merits of this kind of social order. These, of course, 
are rather drastic conclusions, and many of us will not want to share with MacIntyre the 
view that we are living through a "new dark ages" 48, where" rival and mutually 
antagonistic accounts of the virtues require as their social counterpart rival and mutually 
antagonistic institutionalized modes of moral education" .49 Indeed, many of those who have 
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begun to advocate a return to virtue-ethical models of moral education may disagree with 
both Maclntyre and Kohlberg, and remain hopeful that there is no necessary contradiction 
between their preferred pedagogic practices and the core values of liberal society. In doing 
so they would attempt to show that Maclntyre has severely exaggerated the degree to which 
contemporary liberal societies are best characterised as a mess of fragmented and competing 
moral positions. Actually, they maintain, such societies possess important and substantial 
levels of moral agreement that goes beyond the merely verbal to the extent that it is 
sufficient to support a coherent account of the virtues underlying liberal social and political 
orders. Indeed, this has become a live issue of interest within contemporary political theory, 
and a number of writers have begun to introduce Aristotelian themes in their work whilst 
firmly denying MacIntyre's pessimistic prognosis.50 
Rebutting MacIntyre's challenge in a rather different way, other contemporary liberals have 
resisted the idea that a resuscitated Aristotelianism should impinge in any way upon the 
politics of societies which are so fundamentally different in their nature from the Athenian 
polis. The function of contemporary political authorities should only be to pursue those 
policies which can be justified to all those citizens holding reasonable understandings of the 
good life. We may have good reasons to prefer an Aristotelian mode of moral education for 
our children, but these reasons simply cannot be political ones. This is because they form 
part of a comprehensive moral view, commitment to which should not be part of the 
justifications offered by a liberal state for the character of its public policy. As 
contemporary societies are characterised by the variety of often conflicting conceptions of 
the good held by their citizens, this circumscription is necessary for the state to be able to 
justify its decisions on the most fundamental matters similarly to all. 51 In this way, they 
offer a negative response to a question asked by the philosopher of education, Robert Nash; 
"is it possible to adapt Aristotle's ethics to our own time without a socially destructive 
splitting off into self-contained" communities of virtue?" '52 In the remaining chapters I shall 
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attempt, by means of a consideration of the work of both Maclntyre and various theorists of 
a more liberal bent, to discover what hopes we may have of being able to reply to this 
query in the affirmative. 
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Chapter Six 
Is Moral Education a Forlorn Hope? 
As I have suggested in the previous chapter, there are good reasons for us to be sceptical 
about the arguments of many of those who have criticised the contemporary theory and 
practice of moral education. These arguments have rightly drawn attention to ways in which 
recent forms of moral education have tended to be over-reliant upon a controversially non-
cognitivist and intellectualist understanding of its subject matter, and I have supported 
ensuing attempts to advocate the idea of character development as providing a superior 
theoretical foundation. Indeed, it is to contribute to such a project that most of what I have 
said thus far has been intended. Yet despite such areas of broad agreement, these arguments 
have all too often failed to consider whether or not the relationship between the practice of 
education and the character of wider society is one of mutual support. This is a question 
which is of critical importance when education is to aim at the development of moral 
character, a process which is especially resistant to being confined within specific 
institutional environments. To ignore it is to consider only part of the picture, and thus run 
the risk that one's recommendations are rendered futile by the adverse influence of those 
parts of the picture which have been allowed to recede from view. This stress upon the 
inextricability of education and politics is one that has a clear antecedence in Aristotelian 
thought, and is supported with most vehemence in contemporary philosophy by Alasdair 
MacIntyre. 
In a previous chapter, I have discussed MacIntyre's work as part of what I have termed an 
'historicist' response to those who had seemed to conceive of the questions of moral 
philosophy as though they were eternally unchanging, adequately comprehensible without 
reference to the historical context within which they were raised. In this way, I considered 
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him alongside Bernard Williams and Charles Taylor as providing an important critique of 
the kind of philosophical position that has underpinned the contemporary approaches to 
moral education I have been concerned to reject. It is also clear that the kinds of worries I 
have raised concerning the possibility of concretely instituting a theoretically preferable 
educational model have derived in great part from an historicist way of perceiving these 
issues. Given that I have now begun to consider the possibility of practically circumventing 
those potential problems to which I have alluded, my focus has shifted from morality to 
politics or at least has extended to encompass political considerations. My intention from 
this point on is to take the preferability of a neo-Aristotelian model of moral psychology 
and pedagogy as already established (however premature this may be), so that I can begin 
to investigate the possibility that resources exist which hold out some hope of reconciling 
this model with a feasible normative political theory. I freely admit that this is to follow a 
somewhat unusual path, as it has certainly been more conventional to consider the 
justification of educational practices from the standpoint of an antecedently established 
moral or political theory, yet it is nonetheless a path which I consider to be potentially 
instructive. As this will be my aim, it is appropriate here to introduce this further 
consideration of Maclntyre's work by situating it within the variety of political philosophy 
with which it is most popularly associated - 'communitarianism'.1 
Although it is something of a recurrent theme in philosophy, with roots in the ideas of such 
various figures as Aristotle, Vico, Hegel, Wittgenstein and Oakeshott2, the connection 
between morality and 'community' has been stressed in recent political thought largely in 
response to the early 1970s reassertion of liberal theory by John Rawls in the form of his A 
Theory of Justice. 3 Almost single-handedly responsible for the re-invigoration of normative 
political theorizing after some perhaps premature reports of its 'death', Rawls attempted to 
refute consequentialist theories (especially utilitarianism) by drawing upon certain aspects of 
Kant's moral theory. Building upon the second formulation of his categorical imperative 
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(roughly that we should treat other humans 'as ends rather than as means'), he sought to 
assert the necessary priority of 'the right over the good' (and thus the deontological 
conception of ethics over the teleological with regard to justice). Rather than arguing for the 
rational superiority of a conception of justice in terms of its propensity to produce a certain 
end-state, Rawls attempted to structure our existing intuitions concerning 'justice as 
fairness' - the desire for social institutions that do not distribute advantages for some 
compared to others in a merely arbitrary way. 
To this end, Rawls utilized a form of social contract theorizing that asks us to picture 
ourselves behind a so-called 'veil of ignorance', where we lack any of those morally 
irrelevant features of personhood that would give rise to unfairness in the making of the 
contract. This would include such features as our social and economic class, our ethnic 
background, and our particular conception of the good life. Rawls argued that rational 
choosers in such a situation would be able to agree upon a certain workable notion of 
justice, comprised of two principles arranged in lexical priority. The first principle would 
require a system of basic social and political liberties for all citizens which could not be 
overridden except in situations of extreme economic necessity. The second would ensure 
that social and economic inequalities would result from offices that were open to all subject 
to equality of opportunity and be justified only if they benefit the worst off.4 The contract 
would therefore have produced a conception of justice fitting a liberal egalitarian political 
agenda similar to that traditionally associated with the Democratic Party of the United 
States. 
Rather than focusing upon the practical political implications of 'justice as fairness', the 
force of the communitarian critique has largely impacted upon the ontological and 
methodological issues where Rawls is taken to be representative of contemporary liberal 
theory more generally. At the most abstract level it is charged that his contractarianism 
provides a falsely emaciated picture of the self, stripped of all the identities, interests and 
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projects that ordinarily and necessarily supply it with an identity.s There is perhaps no 
problem in imagining ourselves to be (using Michael Sandel's terms) 'unencumbered' or 
'antecedently individuated', if this helped guide and structure our thinking, but to grant 
moral priority to such an imaginative fiction is, for communitarians, an illegitimate step 
beyond this. Instead of "brave naked wills", as Iris Murdoch has described the self as 
pictured in post-Kantian moral and political theory6, we are asked to see ourselves as 
necessarily socially implicated or embedded, incapable of being abstracted from our social 
and linguistic worlds to serve the demands of liberal theorizing. To use MacIntyre's words, 
what is being denied by communitarians is that we can in some way 
... assume an abstract and artificial - perhaps even an impossible - stance, that of 
a rational being as such, responding to the requirements of morality not qua 
peasant or farmer or quarterback, but qua rational agent who has abstracted him 
or herself from all social particularity. 7 
Rawls' account of the self as rational ends-chooser is also seen to exemplify the 'asocial 
individualism' of liberal theory. Claims are here being made about both the social origin of 
our aims and self-understandings, and the necessity of their social content. Communitarians 
challenge the idea that the good life can be pursued or even understood independently of the 
communal practices which imbue our lives their with value. We are all, they claim, in some 
way dependent upon our social setting for our capacity to live meaningful lives. Many of 
the goods that we might wish to pursue are incapable of being understood as constellations 
of individual preferences or interests - rather, they are irreducibly communal. This applies 
not only to those values often thought to be in conflict with liberal modernity, such as 
patriotism or aristocratic honour, but also to core liberal values themselves. Autonomy, for 
instance, is claimed to depend not only upon the state keeping out of people's lives, but also 
upon the existence of meaningful social options, and traditions which stress the importance 
of critical thought. In emphasizing the value of individual autonomy without acknowledging 
its social presuppositions, liberal theorists stand accused of offering a picture of modern 
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society as "citizens of nowhere who have banded together for their common protection".8 
In doing so they risk endangering the continuation of the social practices to which liberals 
standardly attach value .9 
Another common claim of the communitarian critique is that liberalism rests upon a 
sceptical or subjectivist view of 'the good'. 10 If there are no rational grounds enabling the 
state to favour anyone conception over another, prioritizing the freedom of the individual 
to follow their own particular vision of the good life can seem to be the only legitimate 
political response. This would appear to be an important foundation for demands for state 
neutrality, whereby, in Rawlsian terminology, liberal justice would rest upon the 'thinnest' 
possible conception of the good, so as to be fair to 'thicker' conceptions between which 
preferences are not justifiable. For the state to rely on controversial conceptions of the good 
which are not shared by all citizens when making its decisions is to subject a proportion of 
its citizens to unjustifiable coercion. Of course, not all such 'anti-perfectionist' arguments 
are premised upon moral scepticism or subjectivism. For many liberal theorists, it is only 
by strictly adhering to neutrality of aim and procedure that the state can accommodate the 
demands made by the morally fragmented nature of contemporary societies - what Rawls 
calls the" fact of pluralism" .11 Here, the threat of civil strife outweighs the attractions of 
state policy based upon a particular moral view, even when this view is nevertheless held to 
be universally applicable. 
Other liberals defend neutrality as a means for the furtherance of other values. Will 
Kymlicka, for instance, has claimed that state neutrality can be seen as a means by which 
civil society is given the room it needs to flourish and foster valuable lives .12 Yet whatever 
way the regulative ideal of neutrality is defended, communitarians, and indeed certain 
liberals 13 , have continued to describe it as either or both unachievable and/or undesirable. 
Impossible in that a neutral state cannot remain neutral when considering the wishes of 
those who would challenge the core aims which justify its existence l4 , and undesirable if it 
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disallows the kind of perfectionist political decisions which are required to foster values that 
are seen as more important than the procedural value of neutrality itself. Once again, this 
latter claim can be made on behalf of values which are distinctively liberal (such as freedom 
or autonomy) as well as those more characteristically associated with anti-liberal critique. 
In the next chapter I shall give some more sustained attention to the ways in which liberal 
theorists may respond, or have responded, to these communitarian challenges. As these 
criticisms of liberalism largely mirror those I have made of recent forms of moral 
education, there is perhaps good reason to imagine that the best responses may go some 
way to answering the question that has motivated my discussion of these issues. That is to 
say, what kind of political theory is best able practically to accommodate a virtue-ethical 
model of moral education in contemporary societies? But before turning to the plausibility 
of broadly liberal answers to this question, I should turn first to the communitarian 
arguments themselves, for it is towards this viewpoint that the reflections of the last chapter 
were leading us. 
Despite the large degree of similarity in their attacks upon liberal theory and practice, the 
ambiguity of communitarianism as a normative political force is exhibited both in the 
reluctance of the central theorists to engage in political advocacy, and in the marked 
differences in what is produced when this is attempted. Some (notably Taylor and Walzer) 
seem to envisage a kind of 'super-liberalism' where the individualist and sceptical 
tendencies of modern society are corrected to encourage the development of its communal 
goods within a generally autonomy and diversity-fostering environment. Others, of whom 
MacIntyre is the most prominent representative, wholly reject these amendatory intentions 
and argue that it is not simply the shortcomings of liberal theory that require correction, but 
the socially pathological state of liberal modernity in toto, within which any idea of shared 
communal goods is, and can only be, a fiction. More radical changes would be needed if 
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these goods are to exist at all. What, then, are the consequences of this most extreme 
position? Is all hope lost? 
As we have seen already, Maclntyre is suspicious of any argument for a return to an ethics 
of virtue (and its associated form of moral education) that does not take full account of its 
necessary embodiment in the institutional forms of the wider society. And when we 
consider the characteristic social, political and economic forms of modernity, these seem 
very far from the realities of any historical example of societies which fostered the virtues 
as he presents them. 15 Taken together with his view that the traditional 'metaphysical 
biology' of Aristotle's teleological account of proper human functioning is invalidated by 
scientific developments, this would seem to provide little room for anything other than 
pessimism about the possibility of a revival of the virtues. As he himself asks; "if we reject 
the biology, as we must, is there any way in which that teleology can be preserved?" 16 Yet 
despite his continuous tone of regret for the passing of an era in which moral language 
could play a truly meaningful part in our lives, MacIntyre's recent work has begun to point 
towards ways in which teleology, and its concomitant ethics of virtue, could perhaps be 
profitably re-invigorated in the modern age. Although After Virtue offered only doom-laden 
prognoses of the modern condition, it was in this work that the central conceptual categories 
of such a re-construction were identified. These categories being; 'practice', 'narrative', 
and 'tradition'. Concerning the first of these, Maclntyre explains, 
... by a practice I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially 
established human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity 
are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which 
are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result 
that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved, are systematically extended. 17 
Thus, for example, the activity of kicking a football skill fully is not in itself a practice but 
the game of football is, and planting turnips is not a practice but farming is.18 Practices 
contain internal, shared goods, not only in the value of what is produced but also in those 
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excellences which sustain that good-producing practice (such as courage or self-control). 
These goods and excellences are such that they cannot be understood or experienced outside 
of developed engagement with specific practices. This is what differentiates them from 
external goods, such as glory or financial reward, which are not practice-bound in this 
sense. It is those dispositions which represent excellence in the achievement of internal 
goods that ground MacIntyre's account of the virtues. An education in virtue, therefore, 
will follow the general procedure laid down by Aristotle of introducing children to the kinds 
of activity which offer the opportunity for their character to be systematically shaped and 
extended by the experience of acting in ways which are characteristic of the fully virtuous 
person. This is experience found only within the context of practices focused upon the 
pursuit of goods which are internal to them, where these practices subject the desires and 
preferences of the initiate to the authoritative standards which define their activity. 19 
Those other forms of education which restrict themselves to pedagogical techniques which 
do not involve participation in actual 'living' practices (in the hope, perhaps, of not pre-
determining a child's choice of which practices are valuable and which are n0120), will 
succeed only in introducing children to those objects which can be adequately 
comprehended in a non practice-specific way - in other words, to external goods. It is this 
kind of educational practice which is unable to initiate children into what Aristotle thought 
was the realm of mature ethical choice (prohairesis), and which is today fostered in the 
endemic cause of 'skills'. Moral skills, if we recall, are qualities which share certain aspects 
of virtues in the full sense, but which do not constitutively involve the shape of one's 
character. As such, they do not make such heavy and politically controversial demands 
upon moral education. For education, in search of neutrality, to remain outside of the 
variety of modes of commitment available to children thus unavoidably favours one 
particular conception of the good life - that of a life free from commitments not chosen 
according to one's own reflective desires as constituted at the time of choice. And if the 
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intentional shaping of these desires remains beyond the remit of education, there is no way 
in which it may aspire to a similarly intentional education of the virtues as opposed to skills. 
Nonetheless, It is clear that we are all engaged in more than one activity that may 
satisfactorily be described as a practice, and that there is a distinct possibility that the 
requirements of these may conflict. The virtues of one's life as an artist or soldier, for 
instance may not always fit too harmoniously with the duties of being a good and virtuous 
parent. It is precisely this consideration which underlies much of the reluctance for 
education to foster and encourage participation within certain practices amongst others. But 
although MacIntyre is willing to embrace what he considers to be the Sophoclean insight 
about the existence of irresolvable tragic conflicts, he suggests that many of these apparent 
difficulties resolve themselves once the engagement in practices is viewed correctly in the 
context of the unity of one's life as a whole. Just as any human experience or action is most 
intelligible as part of a temporal sequence which extends into both past and future, the good 
life has the form of a narrative, an unfolding story oriented as a 'quest' to find the nature of 
the good life.21 This narrative conception of life adds further virtues to those required in 
and for practices as 'one needs a more general form of courage and temperance to enable 
one to withstand the dangers and temptations besetting one's life as a whole; one needs 
wisdom and judgement, integrity, constancy and patience' .22 Once the question" What am I 
to do?" is seen as integrally connected to the question "Of what story or stories do I find 
myself a part?" 23 the problem of choice amongst the demands of variant practices loses its 
air of arbitrariness. The narrative of a unified life provides the teleological framework 
which is required for these choices to aspire to rational justification. Those dilemmas in 
which a clear answer seems unavailable between the claims of two conflicting goods will be 
like this because they are tragic, not because our incoherent moral culture has rendered 
them irresolvable. 
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Lastly, MacIntyre stresses how the roles and practices, engagement in which constitutes the 
narrative unity of a life, depend for their existence upon an institutional and communal 
embeddedness in the traditions of thought and action which lie behind them. For" we all 
approach our circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity ... [This] constitutes the 
given of my life, my moral starting point" ,24 And just as practices and narrative lives both 
allow for and require distinct human goods and virtues, these traditions rest upon qualities 
which ensure their own continuation. So, for instance, a tradition such as the game of 
football requires not only the existence of the game as a practice, but also those means 
(both intellectual and institutional) by which particular examples of the practice are given a 
wider context (we might think of the existence of leagues, historical records of results and 
championships, and means by which the game is taught), and by which it is transferred and 
developed across generations. Without all of this, it may be possible to kick a ball into a net 
or to someone else, but it will no longer be possible to 'score a hat-trick' or assume the role 
of 'midfield playmaker'. And, more centrally, it will not be possible to achieve those kinds 
of internal goods and virtues which rest upon these tradition-fostered concepts and roles. 
The importance for education that MacIntyre attaches to the social context provided for 
practices by tradition is exemplified in his 1985 lecture entitled The Idea of an Educated 
Public.25 Here, he describes teachers as "the forlorn hope of the culture of Western 
modernity" entrusted with a mission which is "both essential and impossible" ,26 This is 
because the two major purposes we require them to serve - to teach children to think for 
themselves, and to fit them for a role in society requiring recruits - are mutually 
incompatible. And, as we might expect from MacIntyre, this regrettable condition is not the 
result of any philosophical necessity, but is produced by an historical characteristic 
separating post-Enlightenment Western societies from earlier, more morally coherent, 
cultures. 
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What modernity excludes is the possibility of the existence of an educated public; 
and ... it is only where an educated public exists, and where introduction into the 
membership of that educated public is the goal of education, that both the overall 
purposes presupposed in modern education systems can be realized.27 
It is improper, on this account, to advocate educational aims without considering whether or 
not there exists the culture and institutions required for their social embodiment. Where the 
tradition presupposed by educational proposals has fallen into decay, these proposals can be 
little more than futile. This is the problem which, for MacIntyre, besets contemporary 
education. Among the consequences of the so-called Enlightenment project, he claims, is 
that our culture now lacks the resources for securing rational agreement" on what it would 
be relevant and important for members of a contemporary educational public to share in the 
way of belief, in the way of perspective, in the way of debate" .28 Because this sort of 
consensus is essential to provide a framework within which the kind of debates and 
disagreements which define a tradition can take place, its absence has meant that thinking 
has gradually become the preserve of specialists and professionals. The kind of educated 
public which MacIntyre describes as existing within the culture of eighteenth century 
Scotland has simply crumbled away. Thus, contemporary controversy between advocates of 
a broad and reflective 'liberal education' and their 'vocationalist' opponents becomes an 
example of the kind of disagreement which MacIntyre thinks has been rendered unavailable 
for rational conclusion. It is only when the life of the reflective thinker is itself a kind of 
vocation, that these two aims may be reconciled. In the absence of an educated public, this 
"ghost haunting our educational systems" 29, such a reconciliation remains beyond our 
means. 
The position in which we find ourselves is not one that permits easy solutions. MacIntyre is 
very clear that his argument is not a call for the recreation of an educated public. This is a 
concept which has" no way of taking on life in contemporary society" .30 Any attempt made 
to resuscitate those educational curricula which had in the past served such a public, would 
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simply ignore the extent to which these intellectual traditions have been assaulted by the 
very same processes which are responsible for the disappearance of the public itself. Moral 
philosophy, for instance, no longer serves to articulate the debates concerning some specific 
tradition, but has been remade as a professionalised discourse, existing abstractly above all 
social and traditional specificities. In such a guise, its re-introduction to a more 'humanized' 
curriculum could do little to return us to those social and cultural conditions which were 
themselves responsible for moral philosophy being something else entirely. The same 
judgement must also be passed upon those contemporary commentators who propose 
broadly Aristotelian curricular reform as an answer for our moral malaises. For they are 
arguing against the background of cultures in which practices, and with them the morality 
of virtues, have been consigned to the margins. And in ignoring the way in which their 
proposals are rendered futile by these conditions, they merit equally MacIntyre's 
characterisation of the so-called Frankfurt School of critical theorists, as " ... unwittingly 
collaborating as a chorus in the theatre of the present" .31 
With the hope that politicS or education could deliver us from the problems of our 
contemporary condition extinguished, MacIntyre's argument seems at this point little other 
than a counsel of despair. Indeed, all After Virtue can offer to save us from the "new dark 
ages" is that "what matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community 
within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained" ,32 And even if this 
recommendation were to appeal to us, a more fundamental problem besets this book's 
advocacy of the Aristotelian virtue-ethical tradition. For how can MacIntyre make this case 
when his argument rests upon the assumption that appeals to standards (whether of 
rationality or morality) outside of all traditions are appeals made to fictions? Either this is 
true and the rational superiority of Aristotelianism cannot be demonstrated to the members 
of other traditions or none (which is what, he stresses, most of us are), or his defence of 
this particular tradition buys advocacy at the expense of theoretical consistency. The choice, 
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therefore, seems to be between a disabling relativism, and a universal ism which would 
contravene the very claims supporting his condemnation of post-Enlightenment moral 
philosophy. A later postscript to After Virtue, however, sees MacIntyre concede that this is 
a problem and respond by outlining a mode of historicism which will supposedly allow the 
rational superiority of one tradition over another to be exhibited without positing the 
existence of eternal and objective standards overarching all traditions. This is to be judged 
... in the ability of one particular moral-philosophy-articulating-the-claims-of-a-
particular-morality to identify and to transcend the limitations of its rival or rivals, 
limitations which can be - although may not always have been - identified by the 
rational standards to which the protagonists of the rival morality are committed by 
their allegiance to it, that the superiority of that particular moral philosophy and 
that particular morality emerges.33 
By means of such encounters, Maclntyre claims that the adherents of certain traditions are 
rationally justified in thinking that they subscribe to the "best theory so far" .34 Further in 
the postscript we are told that although an historicist defence of Aristotelianism may "strike 
some critics as a paradoxical as well as Quixotic enterprise" 35, this is what he intends to 
provide in the successor volume to After Virtue. Yet by the time Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? was published in 1988 it was clear that the nature of Maclntyre' s project had 
altered somewhat. The most marked change being that his previous rather general 
commitment to Aristotelian teleology had developed into an argument from the avowedly 
Christian perspective of Thomism (the tradition based upon St Thomas Aquinas's fusion of 
Augustinian and Aristotelian world-views). This is consequent upon the book's" ... outline 
narrative history of three traditions of enquiry (these being Augustinianism, Aristotelianism, 
and the Enlightenment rationalism of David Hume) into what practical rationality is, and 
what justice is, and in addition an acknowledgement of a need for the writing of a fourth 
history, that of liberalism" .36 Central to this project is Maclntyre's account of the nature of 
a rational tradition (of which there may be many, there no longer being a simple dichotomy 
between tradition and modernity per se) which is composed of a stress upon the coherent 
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and searching character of thought, and the common features which allow this to continue 
(most especially the existence of shared conceptual frameworks, and ideas of what the 
central problem of the tradition is). Canonical texts, and their authoritative interpretations, 
are in this way essential to the development and survival of any rational tradition. To be 
rational does not depend upon an ability to argue from some kind of neutral, independent 
ground (an assumption MacIntyre attributes to liberal thought), because "progress in 
rationality is achieved only from a point of view." 37 Thus, 
... to be rational is to see the world from the right institutional standpoint, and to 
engage in the formulation, elaboration, rational justification and criticism of 
accounts of practical rationality and justice ... from within some particular 
tradition in conversation, cooperation and conflict with those who inhabit the same 
tradition.38 
The development of traditions begins from the" condition of pure historical contingency, 
from the beliefs, institutions, and practices of some particular community which constitutes 
a given" .39 As time goes on, the tradition will be revised continually and reformulated in 
order to cope with conceptual and textual uncertainties and to meet the challenges that arise 
from new situations. The continuation of the shared beliefs and allegiances constitutive of 
the tradition is aided by the institutionalisation of those virtues required in its central 
methods of enquiry, which enable it to meet most adequately the challenges it may face. By 
being constantly pushed towards areas of internal problematic, the tradition is best able to 
overcome the onset of an 'epistemological crisis', when its intellectual resources are tested 
to their breaking points, and the tradition ceases to make rational progress. Only radical 
new theories which can explain the previous impasse are able to prevent the tradition from 
dying. A tradition which had shielded itself from areas of internal problematic would find 
that its resources for meeting such a challenge had withered and would thus founder. In this 
way, MacIntyre attempts to show how his re-formulation of virtue ethics can be clearly 
distinguished (both theoretically and pragmatically) from any reactionary moralism which 
enforces 'rules for their own sake' , and sees reflective thought as a dangerous practice to be 
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discouraged. Only a tradition alive with debate and opportunities for critique can hope to be 
fully resilient. 
Continuing this project, a defence of Thomism as the tradition best equipped to account for 
the failures and inconsistencies of its rivals (and thus most justified in regarding itself as the 
'best theory so far') is contained in MacIntyre's 1988 Gifford Lectures, subsequently 
published as Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. Here he discusses the conceptions of 
moral enquiry that are embraced within the traditions of Encyclopaedia (this being the 
Enlightenment reason of the Scottish thinkers largely responsible for the Ninth Edition of 
the Encyclopaedia Brittanica), Nietzchean 'genealogy', and Thomism (represented by the 
Pope Leo XIII's encyclical letter of 1879, Aeterni Patris). Once more rejecting any notion 
of tradition-independent standards against which these largely incommensurable conceptions 
can be judged (a mistaken belief that constitutes the main failure of the 'Encyclopaedists'), 
MacIntyre maintains that arguments from the context of the tradition-constituted learning 
that is central to his own Thomism are best able to account for the failures of its rivals. The 
replacement of tradition by Enlightenment rationalism as an objective means of appeal for 
academic conflict (exemplified by Adam Gifford's request for his lecturers to "treat their 
subject [natural theology and the foundation of ethics] as a strictly natural science ... just as 
astronomy or chemistry is" 40) foundered with the destruction of the educated public that 
made this appeal possible. Similarly, attempts at rational progress made from a Nietzschean 
perspective are undermined by that tradition's nihilistic incompatibility with the 
institutionalisation of the means of academic moral enquiry that are essential for such 
progress. 
One of the notable features of this later work is that MacIntyre's pessimism appears 
diminished, or at least he is now rather less resistant to utopianism. 41 In moving from rather 
vain hopes for a renewal of neo-Aristotelianism (as in After Virtue), to an apparent embrace 
of some sort of pluralistic contest of traditions, he evidently feels that he has supplied the 
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means by which his own Thomism can demonstrate its rational superiority over rival world-
views. On this account, moral education will consist of "a number of rival and conflicting 
programs, each from the standpoint of one specific contending view" whereby" the 
adherents of each viewpoint will have to provide for the education of their own young from 
their own point of view" .42 MacIntyre's own preferred tradition of pedagogy would 
proceed in line with an Aristotelian model, informed by the insights of St Thomas' Summa 
Theologiae and the Thomistic concept of synderesis (man's natural appreciation of the 
precepts of natural law), whereby censorship and indoctrination provide the means of 
initiation into" the key systematic controversies between the various competing rival 
standpoints" .43 Only when someone is tutored to a certain level can their own critical 
freedom be relevant to the ideal of rational progress. "What we grasp initially in 
understanding the binding force the precepts of the natural law are the conditions for 
entering a community in which we may discover what further specifications our good has to 
be given" .44 
At the uppermost levels of moral education or moral enquiry, MacIntyre' s account 
necessitates the rejection of any notion of the university as an arena within which any and 
all moral traditions can be given room to make rational progress. This vision, he argues, 
derives from the Encyclopaedic faith that rational consensus amongst all rational persons 
can be obtained via unconstrained debate. Even if this fideism does not have the adherents it 
once had, it is still embodied in the institutional form of the contemporary university which, 
he claims, effectively renders impossible any kind of progress in rational enquiry at all. For 
such progress to be made possible, we must recognise his tradition-centred understanding of 
rationality, and reconceive the university as a place of constrained disagreement within the 
context of a shared traditional framework that drives enquiry into the most rationally 
profitable areas. They would thereby become 
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... places where conceptions of and standards of rational justification are 
elaborated, put to work in the detailed practices of enquiry, and themselves 
rationally evaluated ... not an arena for conflict in which the most fundamental 
type of moral and theological disagreement was accorded recognition. 45 
This vision dispenses with any notion of the university as a place for free, tradition-neutral 
learning, and rests upon re-introduction of the kind of belief requirements for admission and 
appointment that underpinned the profitably consensual nature of their preliberal 
precursors. It was thus, MacIntyre believes, that "Cleghorn was rightly preferred to Hume 
for the chair in moral philosophy at Edinburgh." 46 Only the clash of rival traditions in the 
form of academic debate between the best representatives of their respective universities 
can give new impetus to the rational moral enquiries that have for so long been emaciated 
by the imposed fictions of the Enlightenment. These proposals would indicate that the 
pessimism of After Virtue has been somewhat tempered with the provision of a coherent 
vision of education in contemporary society. MacIntyre now seems to believe that he can 
display the rational superiority of this vision without having to rely upon a metaphysically 
problematic account (such as he finds in Aristotle) of the universal functional character of 
the virtues which underlie it. He has focused upon the way in which virtue ethics must be 
relative to their institutional embodiment within various traditions, without being forced to 
concede that there is therefore no way in which anyone form of embodiment can be said to 
be rationally inferior or superior to another. MacIntyre would appear to have avoided the 
pitfalls of relativism (which would have scuppered any attempt to distinguish an education 
based upon virtues from one that merely cements dominant social mores), without having to 
rely, as many of today's conservative 'character educators' do, upon an overly monistic 
view of the nature of human flourishing. Yet despite these attractions, I still see good 
reason to doubt whether MacIntyre has fully resolved his difficult relationship with the 
pluralism of modern societies. In the critical account I will present in the remainder of this 
chapter it is this issue of pluralism (in all its senses) that will figure most heavily. 
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Let us consider, first of all, MacIntyre's most central conceptual category - that of the 
practice. For it is this concept which does most of the work involved in grounding an 
Aristotelian understanding of the virtues within a reasonable account of our social lives. 
How then does the institution of education relate to this vital conceptual category? Some 
commentators, such as John and Patricia White, have expressed sympathy for some of 
MacIntyre's educational views, maintaining that a consequence would be that" ... the 
liberal division between equipping pupils to choose a life-plan and moral education will be 
replaced by something more unitary" .47 The replacement would see moral education based 
not upon abstract classroom exercises but upon participation in practices. Virtues would be 
learnt via the experience of the shared goods that such practices sustain. Children would not 
be discouraged from choosing a certain way of life for fear that it would hamper their 
autonomy or the extent of subsequent choice, but would be actively encouraged to involve 
themselves in practices through which their moral education in the virtues of cooperative 
activity could take place. The value of moral education is thus essentially that of introducing 
children to practices within the context of a particular tradition. This is an understanding of 
the development of virtue which largely mirrors that I have provided earlier in this chapter. 
Yet although it is undeniable that one of the functions of the institution of education is that it 
prepares the ground for children to enter into a life of participation within practices, I fear 
that this portrayal is not entirely accurate. For one thing is it unclear on the account 
provided by the Whites exactly what type of practice or, indeed, how many different 
practices children should be introduced to for the purpose of virtue development. This is not 
merely a complaint that we are not provided with this information, but that the nature of 
their account in actual fact precludes its provision. For despite the attraction the Whites see 
in MacIntyre's vision, they remain essentially wedded to a broadly liberal political theory 
which is unable to countenance the kinds of restrictions of choice (in the modern rather than 
Aristotelian sense) that the vision necessitates. What they have seen beyond is the idea that 
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the educational safeguarding of children's autonomy requires that concrete moral practices 
be considered only in abstraction. Teachers should not discourage children from 
participating in a particular practice for the fear that their future choices may be prejudiced 
by the experience for this would preclude virtue being developed at all. The Whites would 
still be unable to accept, however, that the participatory experiences from which children 
get their taste of the virtues which surround the achievement of internal goods should form 
part of a deliberate curriculum imposed by the representatives of some particular tradition 
and aimed at the replication of their own 'bag of virtues'. Their praise is for a brand of 
MacIntyre 'lite' which is unable to form a part of the wider scheme of MacIntyre's critique 
of modern liberalism.48 
The other problem with this account of a MacIntyrean education is that it would make the 
contribution of education to the development of virtue merely instrumental. The value of 
the school would be gauged in terms of the effectiveness of its means of introducing 
children to practices - education becoming purely a means to this end. Throughout his 
work, MacIntyre has been resistant to this idea and has consistently maintained that the aim 
of education is intrinsic to the activity itself. In his 1964 article Against Utilitarianism, for 
instance, he argued that the aim of education 
... ought to be to help people to discover activities whose ends are not outside 
themselves; and it happens to be of the nature of all intellectual enquiry that in and 
for itself it provides just such activity. The critical ability which ought to be the 
fruit of education serves nothing directly except for itself, no one except those 
who exercise it.49 
It is this same view which is carried forward into his most recent work. His vision of the 
post-liberal university as a participant in a systematic debate between the representatives of 
different traditions of thought is heavily dependent upon the educational system being 
weighted towards the provision of initiates to this most testing of intellectual arena. For it is 
only if rational enquiry serves as the motor of the educational system that can we be 
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confident that the debate at university level is really performing the function which 
MacIntyre requires of it, and not merely something similar but less significant in terms of 
his account of the epistemological justification of traditions. Only by ordering its 
educational institutions so as to foster this intrinsic aim at the expense of any competing 
considerations can a tradition hope to meet the criteria for success and survival he has laid 
down in his defence of his theory against charges of relativism. 
Yet just as Maclntyre' s views on the issue of educational aims seem little altered from his 
earlier article to his most recent work. I would argue that one of the main difficulties of the 
latter is just as recognisable in the former. For it is notable that the argument from Against 
Utilitarianism which I have cited above is very open to criticisms of equivocation. 
MacIntyre has inferred that the furtherance of intellectual enquiry is the sole aim of 
education solely from the premise that education should have a non-instrumental end in 
itself. Why. one might ask. can we not accept the very same premise but identify a different 
intrinsic aim of education, or claim that intellectual enquiry is only one amongst a package 
of intrinsic aims? In his later work. essentially the same problem is encountered once we 
return to the question of how education is related to the concept of a practice. 
If education should not be understood as a mere method of introduction to practices (where 
virtue is really taught), but actually possesses its own internal good, as MacIntyre claims, it 
surely takes on the character of a practice itself. This conclusion is supported by 
MacIntyre's recent stress, in reply to Charles Taylor's claim that there are goods and 
virtues which exist independently of practices, that the notion is rather more exhaustive than 
many have thought. Practices, he states, are not merely certain types of craft in a narrow 
sense (such as is represented by his oft-mentioned fishing crew), but also" the shared 
making and sustaining of the types of community within which the common good can be 
achieved - families, farming households ... , local forms of political community" .50 It would 
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seem strange in this context to think that education or educational institutions could not also 
be thought of in this way. 
Yet if we are to understand education itself in terms of a practice, this surely runs into 
conflict with his identification of the furtherance of intellectual enquiry as its sole aim. If it 
is possible to make a case for the existence of shared goods and virtues specific and internal 
to the practice of education that differ from (and perhaps even conflict with) the promotion 
of intellectual enquiry, his argument begins to have difficulties. If enquiry is not the sole 
aim of education then the academic conflict of traditions cannot be guaranteed to supply 
sure evidence of rational superiority (thus re-introducing the spectre of relativism), and if 
education is denied the status of a practice then it is beholden to instrumentalist accounts of 
its value which would serve to make MacIntyre's grounding of the virtues in practices seem 
rather haphazard. Only a harmony between these two ideas can support his educational 
proposals (and indeed his wider theoretical schema). 
Even if one were to accept the argument that education must have intrinsic aim(s), and that 
the promotion of intellectual enquiry is at least one amongst these, it would be difficult to 
deny the claim that there exist additional goods which are equally or also intrinsic to the 
practice of education. For example, in MacIntyre's scheme where progress towards the 
ideal of rational superiority is the dominant aim, it would not seem to matter how much 
time such progress took as long as it aided the ultimate success of the tradition of which it 
formed a part. This, however, would be to ignore the merits of what we might call 
timeliness - the urgency of an educational practice. Education is not just an abstract process 
leading towards general developments of rationality, but is also an institutional activity for 
which limited resources are most often focus sed upon a relatively short and specific period 
of the lives of those being educated. The virtues of education involve doing the right thing 
at the right moment, and it is this aspect which Maclntyre appears to overlook in his 
concern to safeguard the wider justification of his theorising. 
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The possible conflicts within the practice of education which are ignored by Maclntyre are 
not missing, according to a recent article by Amelie Rorty, from the thought of Aristotle.51 
As she claims, 
Even in the best of states, under the best of conditions, the ideal Aristotelian 
educator is pulled in a number of different directions, to fulfill radically different 
aims whose relative priority is constantly in question ... These tensions do not 
indicate cracks and flaws in Aristotle's theory; on the contrary, they reveal his 
proper sensitivity to the complexities and tensions within the phenomena 
themselves. He can - as many commentators press him to do - reconcile these 
tensions at a formulaic and abstract level of theory construction; but he recognises 
- as many of his commentators do not - that such general principles do not by 
themselves resolve the dilemmas of the politician and the educator. 52 
The main areas of tension identified by Rorty concern questions of whether education 
should aim at the development of each individual or at the general aims of the po lis (we 
might place our concern over timeliness under this category), whether it should promote the 
life of contemplative wisdom or that of civic excellence, and where the boundaries should 
be drawn between the education of the free citizen, capable of prohairetic choice, and the 
education provided for those he considered unsuited to self-rule. The account of the purpose 
of education provided by MacIntyre answers questions such as these in terms of its one 
overriding concern - the promotion of intellectual enquiry. If this necessitates the 
sublimation of the needs of the individual to the requirements of his or her tradition, or a 
devotion of attention to the most intellectually promising students, then so be it. 
The extent to which Maclntyre's understanding of Aristotle is at odds with Amelie Rorty's 
is evident in the account he provides in Chapter Eight of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
Under the heading of "Aristotle on Practical Rationality" , he offers an interpretation which 
explicitly denies that Aristotle could have countenanced any notion that there exist conflicts 
of the kind she describes which were beyond rational resolution - "the apparent and tragic 
conflict of right with right arises from the inadequacies of reason, not from the character of 
moral reality" .53 To this extent, Maclntyre does not essentially depart from Rorty's 
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interpretation as she is merely concerned to amplify Aristotle's recognition of the 
complexity of educational practice, not to claim that it was beyond the abilities of the 
phronimos to resolve such conflicts and choose correctly. Where MacJntyre does move 
beyond her interpretation, however, is in his insistence that the choices of the phronimos 
will presuppose his or her prior identification of some ultimate end. "The deliberative task 
of rational construction is then one which issues in an hierarchical ordering of means to 
their ends, in which the ultimate end is specified in a formulation which provides the first 
principle or principles from which are deduced statements of those subordinate ends which 
are means to the ultimate end." 54 
It is difficult to imagine a clearer statement of what I have referred to in previous chapters 
as a 'blueprint' or 'grand end' view of Aristotle's writings on the nature of practical 
deliberation. The nature of this controversial interpretation marks a move on behalf of 
MacIntyre away from the 'open-endedness' of After Virtue (where the good life for man, 
the summum bonum, was identified as a 'quest' for answers to the question of 'what is the 
good life for man?'), towards a rather more determinate vision. It is this movement that is 
at the heart of what we could describe as Maclntyre's newly found non-pessimistic self. In 
his Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry we see the fullest evidence of his vision in an 
account of St Thomas' work (and the Thomistic tradition) to which he confirms his own 
allegiance. 
In this work, MacIntyre presents an overall picture of how, on the Thomistic view, the 
moral practice of what he likes to term the 'plain person' is essentially integrated with the 
moral enquiry that has as its telos ("some conception of the finally completed work" 55) the 
discovery of an account of eudaimonia for all human beings. Moral enquiry is a craft 
which exists to perfect moral practice as 
... every moral agent no matter how plain a person is at least an incipient theorist, 
and the practical knowledge of the mature good person has a crucial theoretical 
component; it is for this reason that Aristotle and Aquinas agree that we study 
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philosophical ethics; not only for theoretical goals but so as to ourselves become 
good. 56 
and furthermore, 
... the moral life is the life of embodied moral enquiry and those individuals who 
live out the moral life as farmers, or fishermen or furniture-makers embody more 
or less adequately in those lives, devoted in key part to their own crafts, what may 
often not be recognised as a theory, the product of the theorists very different 
craft, but which nevertheless is one. 57 
MacIntyre's embrace of the kind of 'blueprint' view in which moral practice presupposes 
some more or less determinate theoretical picture of its telos seems to stem largely from a 
fear of the kind of arbitrariness with which he charges both post-Enlightenment thought and 
the moral practice of contemporary societies. In rejecting what he sees as the ambitious 
cosmology, the 'metaphysical biology', of Aristotle's function argument, MacIntyre does 
not rest content with the thought that there may actually be no sense in the idea of the 
'blueprint' or 'grand end' (as claimed by McDowell, Wiggins and other writers I have 
discussed previously) but instead seeks to find some alternative but no less (and indeed 
rather more) determinate candidate for this position. As Charles Larmore has contended: 
His master argument supposes that we can ensure the objectivity of some moral 
belief, not if we simply justify it contextually by reference to others held constant, 
but only if we can show that as a whole they get us from untutored human nature 
to some extramoral telos .58 
This serves to illustrate how MacIntyre's problem with the idea that there may exist plural 
and irreconcilable sources of value within a practice, stems from a wider problem with the 
idea that there may exist plural and irreconcilable sources of value per se. Although After 
Virtue praised Sophocles' insight into the true nature of moral tragedy as well as 
recognising the open-ended nature of the human telos, both of these claims have receded 
from MacIntyre's more recent, avowedly Christian work. Now, within MacIntyre's meta-
traditional scheme, it is only via a belief in a single good of education (intellectual enquiry) 
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serving a single and determinate account of the human good that a moral tradition may hope 
to achieve rational justification. The avoidance of a crippling arbitrariness presupposes 
these strictures on our understanding of eudaimonia and the nature of an educational 
practice. 
It is as part of this 'quest' that St Thomas and his concept of synderesis becomes so central. 
In the philosophy of St Thomas, the role of synderesis is to supply an analogy in the moral 
case to the role of nous in theoretical science. It allows for the apprehension of the ends of 
deliberation, which enables proper and virtuous deliberation to take place. This, we should 
note, goes beyond the place I have attributed in a previous chapter to something called 
phronesis-nous in Aristotle, which concerns itself with the discerning appreciation of the 
particulars within each context of moral judgement. Maclntyre does not go so far as to 
impute the presence of synderesis to the thought of Aristotle, but he is keen to emphasise 
those elements of his writing which emphasise a strong degree of theoretical continuity 
between the two philosophers. 
My approach thus far has been rather different, and has sought to focus upon a kind of 
Aristotelian scholarship which rejects the model of deliberation and (ultimately) moral 
justification which Maclntyre is so concerned to promote. I will not return to the detail of 
this kind of interpretation here, but would maintain that an allegiance to a broadly 
Aristotelian understanding of moral virtue and deliberation (and the education which is 
intended to promote it) is in no way threatened by a belief in either the autonomy 59 or 
plurality60 of morality. This is a belief which does not seek to replace a cosmological 
foundation for the teleology of virtue ethics with a theological alternative, but instead seeks 
to redefine expectations of what it is for this kind of moral viewpoint to be justified and 
quite what it is we are hoping to justify. In this context, we should not feel corralled by 
Maclntyre's dire warnings that any notion of education being a discrete and sovereign 
practice61 with plural goods of its own must somehow lead to the abandonment of rationality 
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in our moral thought and practice. Rather, we will understand the particular natures of both 
education and morality rather better - as complex forms of thought and action for which 
there is no available and comprehensible blueprint of their perfected natures ready to be 
applied in situations of practical choice. 
Before leaving the issue of pluralism in Maclntyre's work, it is important to note how his 
arguments for an increasingly monistic view of human flourishing and educational practice 
also now rest upon a pragmatic acceptance of a broader social or political pluralism as an 
instrumental means of effecting rational progress of enquiry. This pluralism, which 
concerns the intellectual and institutional environment in which the rationality of traditions 
can be put to the test, cannot be a merely temporary measure as the necessity of contest 
provides the only consistent guarantor of the motivation for traditions to develop their own 
intellectual and critical resources. Equally, Maclntyre's championing of syncretic projects 
such as that undertaken by St Thomas would indicate that the co-existence of a number of 
different competing traditions could hold a further kind of promise. 
Yet it is notable that Maclntyre has little or nothing to say about how this pluralistic arena is 
to be maintained beyond a possible victory on the part of one of his 'competitors'. Are we 
to suppose that it is a natural state that does not require any supra-traditional politics in 
order to preserve the pluralistic institutional order? If this kind of politics is required, how 
are we, on MacIntyre's account, to comprehend the practice that it is (and its concomitant 
goods and virtues) when it exists outside of all tradition? For all that MacIntyre castigates 
the fractured nature of contemporary moral thought and practice, his entire scheme of 
epistemological justification would seem to rest upon the permanent existence of this 
fracturing. His attitude to moral pluralism is in this way inescapably Janus-faced, the 
continued existence of 'sin' becoming our only sure route to salvation. In the light of this, 
should we not ask whether the original 'pull' of MacIntyre's argument - that the moral 
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disagreements of the modern age were a source of regret - has lost much of its original 
power? 
Even if one were to be generous to Maclntyre's schema and allow for the unproblematically 
continued existence of competing moral traditions, it still seems far from guaranteed that 
this would provide the sure motor of rational justification and progress he describes. For 
just as his desire to see a system of moral beliefs justified in toto seems to betray a 
particularly modern anxiety in the face of disagreement, this modern anxiety would also 
potentially infect the very traditions he wishes to see compete for justification. In describing 
his hope (in the final chapter of Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry) for an intellectual 
environment whereby the University of Paris of 1272 (as a highpoint of Thomism) could 
battle with the 1968 University of Vincennes (as a respective highpoint of Nietzscheanism), 
he avoids the problems resulting from the fact that such a situation could only result from a 
self-conscious act of recovery of past institutional and intellectual forms by their 
contemporary sympathisers. 
For how certain can we be that these acts of renewal, motivated by a self-conscious 
dissatisfaction with certain features of the modern age, will not unavoidably infect the 
traditions with this very self-consciousness? If we are to agree with Bernard Williams' 
contention that there is "no route back from reflectiveness" 62, we would have very great 
reason to doubt that this certainty could be maintained reasonably. This infection would be 
most problematical when a tradition is not new and conceptually open-ended but is a 
renewal of an older tradition with clearly defined intellectual limits. In the case of such a 
renewal it is not clear that its continuation would be seen to stem from the 'legitimate' 
means of developing the tradition's intellectual capacity to cope with challenge. It is very 
possible that when challenges approach which are known to have previously proved fatal to 
the tradition, a cynical shielding from such problems would appear to be the most efficient 
defence. 
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These doubts about the faith that MacIntyre shows in the unanimity of traditions, and my 
stress upon the dangers of the elitist education which he advocates, serve to make his 
particular variety of communitarianism less and less attractive. Without any guarantees of 
the impetus to rationality, innocence and loyalty that MacIntyre thinks are inevitably 
engendered by his tradition-based pluralism, his arguments take on the character of either 
naive optimism or a confidence trick. Perhaps he now believes that faith in God supplies 
these guarantees which will enable us accept his account of an education in the virtues. He 
has, of course, not provided any arguments as to why we should accept his appeal to the 
'final guarantor' to be morally binding. If in the end it all comes down to faith, it does not 
appear that we have travelled very far away from our initial pessimism. For us unbelievers 
it is hard to see how MacIntyre's golden age could be recovered in an undistorted form, 
and this is perhaps no bad thing. 
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Chapter Seven 
A Liberalllome for Virtue 
In the second part of this thesis I have been investigating the relationship between moral 
education and political theory. Although I have at no point claimed that the account of the 
nature of morality and of an education for moral judgement advocated in the first part of the 
thesis is in any sense complete, I believe that this arguably premature shift in focus does 
possess some justification. For as we investigated the educational implications of an 
understanding of morality based upon an account of the virtues, it became increasingly 
clear that these implications could not be fully appreciated without the provision of some 
further account of the compatibility of this educational vision with the wider social and 
political character of the societies for which the vision was thought appropriate. In the last 
two chapters I have explored a position at one extreme of the continuum of possible 
responses to this, maintained with most philosophical sophistication by Alasdair MacIntyre. 
This position involves the claim that there is a hopeless incompatibility between the social 
and political context of liberal modernity and,on the other hand, an education in virtue 
conceived in a recognisably neo-Aristotelian form. The somewhat negative conclusions I 
have drawn about MacIntyre's view have held out the promise that there may be some way 
in which we can hope to retain certain of the broadly liberal values we were wary of 
conceding to MacIntyre on the altar of his religiously imbued and rather restrictive 
understanding of a virtue-based moral order. But as we shall see in this concluding chapter, 
there are a great number of ways in which we may look to achieve this reconciliation 
depending to a large degree on what values or procedures we see to be at the core of the 
liberalism we wish to preserve. 
Before turning to the main tasks of this concluding chapter, however, I should first reaffirm 
some of the caveats that have circumscribed my project here. As I have made clear in 
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previous chapters, my discussion of the extent of this compatibility - of how far 
contemporary society is able to provide a suitable context for the proper development of 
virtue - has departed from the conventional manner of approaching this topic. For I have 
not sought to draw upon or justify some broad account of the proper activities of the state in 
political society and to extrapolate from that to justify a form of education which is fitting to 
the necessities and limitations of state action which the account prescribes. Instead, I have 
taken the development of moral virtue to be our core concern and have looked to political 
thought to provide us with an understanding of how we might realistically hope for a 
society which is able to provide a suitable home for that development to proceed in the way 
I have described in the first part of the thesis. This is a method for which I have claimed 
greater antecedence in Aristotle's general approach to politics and ethics than in any 
modern or contemporary thought. In many ways, of course, this delimits my project in such 
a way that neither political theory nor moral pedagogy is advocated to the extent it might 
be, for I have been concerned mostly with the nature of their interrelationship. Yet this 
should not in any way be understood to imply that I would take a mere coherence between 
politics and pedagogy to be any indication of the value of either - merely that the lack of 
such coherence should be seen as a greater failing than it might otherwise have been. To 
this extent I am certainly arguing, at least implicitly by the pragmatics of my methodology, 
that education should not be seen as a mere instrument of our political ideals. 
It is with these thoughts in mind that I shall continue to investigate certain aspects of 
political thought through, as it were, the 'lens' of education. We know that an Aristotelian 
conception of the development of virtue (ethismos) carries with it certain requirements of 
the wider social and political context within which it is to take place. There must exist some 
degree of common understanding of the good for which virtue is exercised for in the 
absence of this we would have no way of, amongst other things, differentiating those who 
have been habituated to true virtue from those who have merely learnt to imitate virtue. It is 
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the question of whether this kind of common understanding exists, and if so to what extent, 
that is at the heart of our investigation of the practical promise of an Aristotelian vision of 
moral education that seemed set to offer a valuable alternative to the educational views that 
have predominated in the second half of this century. 
We have already assessed certain non-liberal ways of answering this question. For many 
conservative critics of contemporary culture and educational practice the answer resides in 
the re-imposition of a set of guiding principles that they see as universally applicable to 
virtually any social contexts. For these writers, the last few decades have witnessed a 
wavering from this true path into a regrettable state of fractious diversity - a state that has 
been fostered by the errors of late twentieth century educational practices. But just as 
education bears most of the blame for inducing this state, it is also seen by these writers as 
our great source of hope for correcting the ills of our contemporary society. This correction 
can be effected by a return to methods of education which prioritise the inculcation of a 
determinate moral code over any fashionable but misguided efforts to promote the 
autonomy or individuality of those being educated. The moral consensus we are looking for 
is therefore something available for unproblematic (re-) imposition through the medium of 
education.) 
At the other end of the scale, however, we have seen that Alasdair MacIntyre understands 
education to be not the 'great hope' of Western modernity, but rather its 'forlorn hope'. 
This is because he understands modern societies to be so morally fragmented that 
educational institutions are actually incapable of performing the culturally restorative role 
we require of them. The set of core principles identified by the conservative critics as our 
potential cure are, for MacIntyre, a mere imaginative fiction - the moral counterparts of 
social practices and institutions which we are unable to recover from history. Instead, we 
must recognise that liberal modernity itself precludes the existence of any coherent shared 
programme of moral education. This being so, we are forced to relinquish our faith in one 
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of these two ideals. Whilst many (such as the advocates of Values Clarification) have been 
willing to make this choice by denigrating any efforts at the replication of moral values as 
an unjustifiable and illiberal enterprise, Maclntyre follows the alternate path by maintaining 
that the claims of virtue necessitate the complete rejection of liberal modernity. 
One of the central thrusts of my argument so far has been that the problems facing any 
attempt to institute this 'coherent and shared programme of moral education', based upon a 
virtue-ethical understanding of morality, are neither as simple nor as insuperable as these 
viewpoints encourage us to think. It is certainly rather unrealistic to believe, as many 
cultural conservatives seem to, that education can do all the work necessary to rid us of all 
the social ills that periodically give rise to popular concern over the moral values of our 
culture. Even if we were to grant that the social ills are more real than apparent, our 
institutions of formal education (schools, colleges and universities) will and should have 
only part responsibility for the task of moral development. We tend to think it only right 
and proper that much of this responsibility is left to the family or to the various positive 
learning experiences which take place outside of formal education. Equally, even where 
other social forces are less benign than those described here, and perhaps greatly harmful to 
the development of virtue, it is often hard to see how we might be able to insulate the 
process of moral development from these forces without greatly infringing individual 
liberty. If we are to grant the importance of the wider nature of political society to the 
sustenance of moral development, but do not wish to follow MacIntyre in his belief that 
liberalism cannot provide a home for virtue properly understood, we will have to pay great 
attention to how we should understand the various responsibilities and limitations which 
should properly govern public authority in these areas of life. And as we shall see, the 
responsibilities and limitations that are prescribed by different conceptions of liberalism and 
the role that moral education (and education more generally) has to play within it, will be 
understood largely in terms of a number of core concepts which are at the heart of any such 
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project. It will be the role and value given to such varied concepts as democracy, liberty, 
equality, autonomy, governmental legitimacy, and parental rights of guardianship which 
will largely define any coherent attempt to justify an education in virtue within a liberal 
political order. 
As we saw in the first part of this thesis, it is certainly true that an Aristotelian 
understanding of virtue and its development is greatly at odds with many approaches to 
moral education which we would see to be part of the liberal tradition. At its heart, any 
Aristotelian understanding will have a number of common features. It will hold the proper 
aim and responsibility of educators to be the promotion of the well-being or eudaimonia of 
those under their charge. This responsibility will be discharged by educators in working to 
shape the character of their charges in such a manner that they become able to discern and 
act on account of objectively valuable reasons for action. The discernment involved here 
will not be confined to a narrowly intellectual process such as that involved in recalling 
historical facts or drawing logical connections, but will constitutively involve the operation 
of educated sentiments and emotions. It will, nonetheless, be a rational activity. The 
increasing experience of the moral learner in choosing their course of action on account of 
the appropriate reasons for action will be assisted both by the measured (but often 
inculcatory) interventions of the educator and by the character of the social practices and 
political order within which these practical choices are being made. These factors will 
combine to produce a developmental process towards the attainment of virtuous character 
such as that exemplified by those moral agents whose lives provide us with the best 
exemplification of what well-being comprises. 
This understanding is thereby committed to a number of philosophical positions which are 
alien to much of what we understand as liberal views concerning politics and education. 
Notable amongst these positions are, variously: (1) that there exists some rationally 
defensible notion of the good-life for persons to be promoted by political and educational 
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activity; (2) that moral values are more than just subjective impositions of our will, but are 
objectively available (in the practical form of reasons for action) for human discernment; 
(3) that these reasons for action are too complex and context-dependent to be derived from 
or summated by any set of moral principles (however large); (4) that a certain kind of 
upbringing is required for the development of the virtue of practical wisdom (of which 
ethical discernment forms a part); (5) that this upbringing will involve the conscious 
shaping of educable sentiments and emotions; (6) that the development of virtue will require 
the involvement of the learner in social practices and the associated inculcation of beliefs 
and attitudes that have not, at this stage, been freely chosen by the learner herself; and (7) 
that the development of virtue may best be (or, more strongly, can only be) effected by 
those who are themselves virtuous. 
As we have seen throughout this thesis, the approaches to moral education which have 
conventionally been thought to be most fitting to liberalism have tended to be associated 
with contrary positions concerning many of these claims. These are: (1) that no form of life 
can be claimed to be more appropriate for humans than any other - the good-life being, if it 
is anything, that which is freely chosen by individuals in line with their own preferences 
properly constrained only by certain limitations imposed by duties to others; (2) that no 
overwhelmingly convincing case can be made for the rational availability of objective moral 
values; (3) that becoming an educated moral agent involves being able to justify one's moral 
decisions according to some logically coherent set of moral principles; (4) that moral 
agency does not require the possession of a certain set of character traits; (5) that moral 
education should develop a rational understanding of moral issues and the nature of moral 
decision-making free from the clouding effects of emotional responses; (6) that moral 
educators must not indoctrinate learners with beliefs and attitudes which they have not been 
able to choose for themselves (and connectedly, that political authorities should not permit 
or foster any such inculcation); and (7) that a moral educator's fulfillment of the 
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responsibilities of their technical practice is not essentially related to the private matter of 
their own moral character and way of life. 
Of course these are not necessary and/or sufficient claims for all liberal theories of moral 
education. Most such theories would depart from at least one or two of these. Of those we 
have considered, Values Clarification would seem to hold to all six whilst Kohlberg's neo-
Kantian thought is at least ambivalent with regard to (2). Nevertheless, this schematic 
presentation does at least indicate some of the issues which will be at the heart of any 
essential conflict claimed to exist between liberal and Aristotelian understandings of moral 
education. Although certain theories have indeed rejected all of the Aristotelian claims as 
irredeemably illiberal, we will now try to see how one might hope to reconcile a degree of 
commitment to the kind of Aristotelian view sketched here with some coherent defence of a 
recognisably liberal values in politics and education. But not only this, we shall also need to 
satisfy ourselves that this reconciliation is rather more than mere toleration but actually 
involves some coherent integration between political and educational thought. Any number 
of theories may maintain, for a variety of reasons, that it is not appropriate for governments 
to rule out entirely the efforts of those who seek to educate in the Aristotelian manner. It 
might be thought, for instance, that although a Kohlbergian pedagogy was to be preferred 
in general, it was more important for governments to respect the rights of parents to choose 
the way in which their children are educated (especially concerning controversial topics 
such as morality or religion). Even if the rights of parental guardianship were not believed 
to extend so far a liberal might feel that overruling the choices of parents in such areas was 
to endanger the precarious stability of a liberal state. Nevertheless, such justifications of 
toleration will not suffice for our current task if they are provided in the context of 
overwhelming social forces which serve to make the provision of a coherent education in 
the virtues (as we have understood them) a near impossible task. For a political theory to 
truly take the claims of virtue seriously it must attend to its entire range of sources -
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extending from formal education to include the political culture, the family and the various 
so-called intermediate associations of civil society, existing between these two domains. 2 
Some of the objections to the Aristotelian positions described here can perhaps be seen best 
as little more than conventional counterparts of liberal thought. Others might also be 
interpreted as rejections of certain elaborations of Aristotelian ideas rather than of the core 
concepts. To see how we may be able to smooth over some of the conflict which we may 
expect let us consider the first of the positions I have presented, concerning the idea of the 
'good life'. As we know, Aristotle understood there be to a determinate end for which 
human beings are by their nature suited, and which all humans have an interest in seeking. 
This he termed eudaimonia - a word that is now conventionally translated as 'well-being' 
(rather than the more traditionally common 'happiness') - and is comprised of a life lived in 
accordance with virtue. To many liberal ears, the idea that there is a particular kind of life 
which humans should lead and which educators and politicians should encourage them to 
lead sounds immediately offensive. It brings to mind a snobbish and totalitarian picture of 
human perfection to which all of us, in our infinite variety, are to be expected or even 
forced to conform. Liberalism, one might argue, should oppose any such view in the name 
of freedom and diversity - allowing all individuals the opportunity the lead the life they see 
fit to live as long as it does not interfere with the right of others to do similarly (the so-
called 'harm principle'). 
Yet looking more closely at Aristotle's account of eudaimonia in his Ethics we find very 
little to justify such fears. Although there are occasions at which his descriptions of certain 
virtues sit oddly with contemporary mores (the aristocratic account of megalopsychia or 
'great mindedness' does so particularly), he did not attempt to specify to any determinate 
degree what the life of virtue comprised. Indeed, it is a central part of his understanding of 
ethics that the courses of action that embody virtue cannot be specified in abstraction from 
the concrete circumstances of ethical choice. Eudaimonia may certainly be a life of virtue, 
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but there is no single portrait of living well that can be applied to all people in all 
circumstances of life. Ronald Beiner explains this point by drawing a connection between 
ethics and aesthetics: 
All [artistic) activities, in some fashion or other, strive after 'the beautiful work'. 
It would be ludicrous to employ aesthetic theory to dictate a single binding route 
to the creation of beauty. On the other hand, it would be equally crazy to suggest 
that there are no standards whatever in the evaluation of relative success or failure 
in the realisation of 'the beautiful work' ... The truth lies neither in some kind of 
monistic algorithm nor in the concession to orderless diversity. Rather it is a 
matter of embodied judgement.3 
The Aristotelian contention is that all good lives will be lives of virtue, not that all virtuous 
lives will be identical. Valuing courage, for instance, does not mean that we should 
encourage everyone to live the life of a soldier or a tight-rope walker. Virtues can be 
displayed in innumerable different situations by people living enormously variant lives. 
What they will have in common is being courageous, but this seems very far from the sort 
of limiting monism which liberals might have anything to fear from. The important point to 
which Beiner draws our attention is that an Aristotelian view allows us to retain confidence 
in our ability to draw some proper distinction between a life lived well and a life lived 
badly. To justify our judgement that an alcoholic or a violent criminal is not living a good 
life should not require us to specify the content of the perfect life with which they may be 
contrasted. There is just as much variety to be expected between different lives of virtue as 
there is between lives filled with degradation and vice. 
If the notion of eudaimonia can lose so much of its apparent menace then what of the other 
sources of controversy? Certainly the scepticism of response (2) should not be seen to be an 
essential part of liberal thought. Many liberals have indeed grounded their political 
recommendations on the basis of some kind of scepticism or subjectivism about moral 
value, or about the possibility of knowing about value. 4 The lack of any rational basis for 
prioritising any value or set of values over any others would seem to indicate that the 
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government should not act as if there were such a basis but should instead retain a neutral 
stance between all values. On this view, citizens would thus be liberated from the activities 
of governments who used their authority to assert their own preferred set of values. The 
main problem with this line of reasoning, as most liberal writers have recognised, is that 
although the protection of liberty could follow from such scepticism or subjectivism it is 
equally possible that it would deny us the resources to make any morally founded 
arguments against forces which actually threaten liberty. We could say that such threats 
lacked rational justification but not that they were morally problematical. This certainly 
seems unsatisfactory for any realistic account of the legitimacy of liberal government. In 
general, most contemporary liberal theorists are less concerned about the ontological status 
of moral judgements per se than about the machinery of the state being used to promote any 
such judgements. And, as Ronald Dworkin has explained, the reason for this concern for 
limits on state action can be seen as intimately connected with a keen respect for the 
importance of moral values. He maintains that if we believe that "each person should be 
free to choose personal ideals for himself, then this is surely because the choice of one life 
over another is a matter of supreme importance, not because it is of no importance at all." S 
There would not seem to be any insurmountable obstacles in the way of a liberal accepting 
Aristotelian positions (3), (4) and (5), concerning the role within morality and moral 
development of principles, character and the emotions, but some more difficulty might be 
thought to follow from (6) and (7). The first of these concerns the acceptability of educators 
acting to mould the character of those who have not rationally chosen for this to take place -
an activity which would seem to violate those persons' autonomy understood as their ability 
to choose their value commitments for themselves. The kind of directive character 
development which the Aristotelian understands to be an essential and pre-conditional part 
of moral education is ruled out of court by many liberal educators as an example of 
indoctrination rather than of education properly so-called. But it is not so clear that this kind 
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of education really does violate the autonomy of anyone. There is no particular reason to 
suppose that liberalism must be wedded to the view that educators should respect all 
decisions made by children about how they conduct themselves. A liberal can certainly hold 
that children lack the necessary aspects of rationality required to be capable of fully 
autonomous decisions and that, this being so, directive education could not be said to be 
violating their autonomy in any way. That same liberal might, however, still object to 
directive education on the grounds that it violates the autonomy of the adults these children 
are in the process of becoming. By acting to encourage a child to become one kind of 
person rather than another, their future choices are said to be biased by this initial 
'groundwork' and are thus not fully autonomous. But, as Bennett and Sher have argued, 
this argument is not entirely conclusive as "although it purports to demonstrate that 
directive moral education violates moral autonomy, it really only shows that such education 
does not contribute to moral autonomy." 6 This is because we have no very promising 
reasons to think that the effects of directive education upon a person's character must 
prevent them from being motivated by their appreciation of moral reasons (which is in itself 
a fairly strong interpretation of the requirements of autonomous action).7 We are all brought 
up with some set of values which we may consolidate, reject or revise as we develop into 
adult moral agents - it is simply not an available option for children to be insulated from 
any influence upon the content of their valuations until they are in a position to make fully 
rational moral choices for themselves. Indoctrination may be a proper charge against 
attempts to bring up children in such a way as to prevent them from making any real moral 
choices in adulthood (a process we would more readily term 'brainwashing'), but it is of 
little concern when applied to reasonable attempts to prepare the moral sense of children 
who are not yet capable of making rational decisions for themselves. 
The relationship of teachers' private lives to their educational practice (at issue in claim (7» 
is certainly a question which could have controversial implications. In previous chapters I 
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have used this as a convenient example of the way in which an Aristotelian understanding 
of the nature of moral development will diverge from conventions of law in liberal 
societies. Because of the agent-centred character of the Aristotelian view any account of 
moral education based upon this will be committed to the position that the moral character 
of both the school (its ethos) and the teachers within it will be the foremost factor of 
influence upon the development of its students' own characters. The notion of character 
used here implies the suffusion of moral commitments within all of the desires, choices and 
actions of a moral agent, and the notion of moral education implies that this cannot proceed 
in any way in which real desires, choices and action of the educator are not essentially 
implicated. The dual effect of these two elaborations is to make any attempt to characterise 
moral education as a morally neutral technical practice wholly alien to the Aristotelian. This 
will evidently conflict with a liberal concern to separate the public discharge of one's duties 
and the rules which govern this, from the private domain of an individual's own moral and 
non-moral commitments. 
Liberal societies ordinarily do consider the private rectitude of teachers and others working 
with children to be an important issue when permitting people to be employed in such 
positions. Yet these considerations, often concerning previous criminal convictions, are 
perhaps best seen as matters of utilitarian predictive rationality rather than as a concession 
to the Aristotelian view. Certain persons are to be debarred from the teaching profession 
not because of any essential link thought to hold between educational practice and the moral 
character of the educator, but because of the predicted likelihood that these persons will 
improperly carry over their personal preferences into their activities in school. On this 
basis, a clear distinction between private character and professional practice can still be 
considered justifiable despite the acknowledgement of the need to protect children against 
the possibility that some may transgress its boundaries. A technicist interpretation of 
educational practice is in no way an essential part of a liberal view, but we have seen that 
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its rejection in the context of moral education can be the cause of some conflict with wider 
liberal practices. Nevertheless, an acceptance of the Aristotelian alternative would serve to 
expand our sense of the range of influences, both intended and unintended, that teachers 
can exert upon the children under their charge. If it is to take the nature of these influences 
seriously, a liberal society will have unavoidably to concern itself with the judgements 
involved in balancing the rights of teachers to privacy with the responsibilities it has to 
foster the proper moral development of children. The place of liberal values will be seen 
less in the question of whether these judgements have to made than in the nature of those 
judgements which are. 
Of course, these brief considerations do not exhaust the complex questions surrounding the 
relationship between liberalism and the core commitments of any neo-Aristotelian 
understanding of morality. Nevertheless, I hope that I have provided some reason to believe 
that this relationship need not be as straightforwardly conflictual as we may have thought. 
There are certainly many varieties of liberal theory which are incompatible, and these have 
tended to be the varieties expressed most clearly by the practices (or more often limitations 
on practices) of contemporary moral education. Prominent amongst these incompatible 
interpretations are those which see the core of liberalism to be the promotion of 
individuality or autonomous self-creation. Inspired by the thoughts of Mill, Kant and/or 
Nietzsche, such a view does not understand the role of moral education to be one of 
encouraging attachment to any particular moral values, but as encouraging children to reject 
the influence of tradition or convention and choose their own values from an entirely 
detached standpoint. Yet this is not the only way in which we can understand liberalism. In 
what remains of this chapter I shall discuss two other kinds of liberalism - both of which 
would seem to show more promise of being able to accommodate an education in virtue. 
I have already suggested that a liberal accommodation of a neo-Aristotelian virtue-ethical 
viewpoint could be of two kinds - toleration or integration. These strategies might best be 
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seen as different ways of responding to the central question posed for us by Maclntyre: 
Does the amount of disagreement concerning the good in liberal societies mean that a 
shared programme of moral education (understood in the Aristotelian manner) is 
impossible? The first kind of response is to accept that disagreement about the good is 
indeed as prevalent in liberal societies as Maclntyre describes. This being so, liberalism 
should abandon its misguided hope of imposing a liberal way of life on all people, and 
allow the adherents of different conceptions of the good (including the general Aristotelian 
conception) to live their lives and educate their children largely in accordance with these 
conceptions. Liberalism would retreat to being a theory of politics rather than of life itself, 
whereby policies aimed at the maintenance of basic justice and political stability would be 
legitimately justified on the basis of public reasons which can be shared by all. The second 
development of liberalism I shall discuss does not concede so much ground to Maclntyre's 
prognosis. Instead, it seeks to formulate a kind of liberalism which itself incorporates an 
Aristotelian understanding of the legitimate moral purpose of political authority as the 
promotion of well-being. Or, to look at it from another angle, it reinterprets the political 
implications of Aristotelianism in a way that gives our liberal concern for plurality and 
diversity its due. Either way, the liberal state's responsibilities would extend to take an 
active role in promoting the qualities of mind and character (the virtues) which constitute a 
liberal understanding of well-being. 
For politicalliberals8 (the term now usually applied to those adopting the first of the 
strategies described above) it is the prevalence of reasonable disagreement about the good 
that serves as the main rationale for their reformulated variety of liberal theory. We should 
note two features of this claim. Firstly, this prevalence is not thought to be, as Maclntyre 
portrays it, an aberrational state which may be blamed upon faulty thinking about morality 
and politics. Rather, it is thought to be, as John Rawls phrases it, "the normal result of the 
exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional 
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democratic regime."9 In other words, where disagreement is permitted, disagreement will 
out. Also, although Rawls uses the term "the fact of reasonable pluralism" to describe this 
feature of contemporary societies, we should not think that any difficulties have been 
resolved by bringing out the moral pluralism in Aristotle's account of well-being. For 
disagreement between reasonable people will, on this view, extend to include controversies 
concerning not only the nature of the good life but also the validity and extent of pluralism 
itself. 10 Given this, the aim of liberal thought should be to extend the principle of toleration 
which it has traditionally applied to religion to philosophy itself. I I 
This defining strategy of political liberalism, variously termed as one of 'discontinuity' 12 
'avoidance'l3, or 'epistemic abstinence'14, recommends that the aims of the liberal state 
(which for Rawls remain loosely as summarised by the two ordered principles of justice 
described in A Theory of Justice, applying only to the 'basic structure' of society) must be 
justifiable to all reasonable citizens. Not only is the legitimacy accorded by this scale of 
justification valuable in itself but in its absence the liberal state would endanger its own 
stability. For this kind of legitimacy to be possible, they maintain, political aims cannot be 
founded upon, or publicly defended by, any of the various 'comprehensive' doctrines that 
co-exist within democratic societies. This category includes both first order moral 
prescriptions (whether religious or secular, liberal or illiberal) and second order views 
(realism, subjectivism etc.) about the nature and status of these. Instead, political values are 
to be supported by what Rawls calls 'public reason'15 - a mode of thought available to all 
suitably educated citizens and which arises from the limited degree of value consensus that 
does exist in democratic societies. This involves political argument and justification 
proceeding by means of an appeal to reasons which can be shared by all citizens, whatever 
their own particular attachments to various wider doctrines about the nature and content of 
morality. As described by Stephen Macedo: 
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What political liberalism asks of us is not to renounce what we believe to be true 
but to acknowledge the difficulty of publicly establishing any single account of the 
whole truth. It invites us to put some of our (true) beliefs aside when it comes to 
laying the groundwork for common political institutions. In accepting this 
invitation, we are not moved by the power of those with whom we join but by 
respect for their reasonableness. We do not seek to respect pluralism or diversity 
as such but reasonable pluralism. 16 
To the extent that the proponents of these wider doctrines are, if reasonable, able to accept 
this requirement for the bracketing of their own beliefs when certain political matters are at 
issue, they illustrate the existence of an 'overlapping consensus' in a pluralist society which 
serves to uphold the political liberal strategy itself. And in refusing the legitimacy of 
attempts to base political policies upon comprehensive moral doctrines, the state remains 
neutral between these and thereby respects the rights of individuals to choose their 
conceptions of the good for themselves, free from the undue influence of the state. 17 
Of course the complexity of the arguments for political liberalism (especially as provided by 
Rawls) have been only hinted at here. Nevertheless, we are in a position to consider some 
of the implications which this general approach to liberal theory has for our educational 
concerns. These implications will concern both the nature of the system by means of which 
we discharge a public responsibility for education, and the nature of the curriculum and 
pedagogical practice within those institutions which comprise this system. It may seem, for 
instance, that liberalism should be committed to fostering a system of common schooling, 
whereby children from different cultural, ethical and religious traditions are educated side 
by side. For those brands of liberalism which aim at the promotion of autonomy and 
individuality, common schooling would appear to be one of the most effective tools to 
encourage this end result (or at least to challenge some of the main sources of heteronomy 
and homogeneity). Yet if children were obliged to attend this kind of school, funded from 
the receipts of compulsory taxation of the representatives of various comprehensive moral 
traditions and viewpoints, it would be difficult for a politicailiberal state to permit very 
much in the way of a determinate moral education. For, to a large extent, common schools 
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would be unable to educate in any way which was not neutral (in terms of its justification) 
between these different traditions and viewpoints. This would rule out Kohlbergian 
approaches aimed at fostering moral autonomy as much as religiously inspired efforts to 
inculcate a faith in God. The content of the moral education which remained justifiable 
would be comprised by those elements which derive from, or are necessary to support, the 
'thin' conception of the good which political liberalism itself represents. Schools would 
thereby be acting in part to develop the various" ... forms of thought and feeling that 
sustain fair social co-operation between its citizens ..... 18 The cognitive abilities involved in 
appreciating the demands and possibilities of 'public reason' would be taught and fostered 
together with the associative attachments to the values of toleration and fairness which are 
pre-conditions of reasonableness. This indicates that the development of virtue would be a 
definite responsibility of the liberal state. It is recognised that liberalism must not ignore the 
character of its citizenry as an irrelevancy or inappropriate matter of concern, but should 
acknowledge that the continued stable existence of a just liberal polity is greatly dependent 
upon this. 
But this is still rather distant from the kind of Aristotelian moral education we have been 
considering throughout this thesis. For one thing, the virtues which are justifiably to be 
developed by a political liberal state are extremely attenuated - limited to those states of 
character which can attract the approbation of all reasonable persons comprising a society's 
overlapping consensus and which can be justified by means of public reason. 19 This will 
certainly not be enough to develop all of the virtues that are required across a person's life. 
Also, even those virtues which may be developed are understood in a non-Aristotelian way. 
Political traits and skills are to be developed which may indeed produce hoped for results in 
terms of the behaviour of citizens and an ensuing state of political stability. But these traits 
and skills are virtues only in the sense described by Rawls in his A Theory of Justice - " ... 
strong and normally effective desires to act on the basic principles of right. .. 20 They are the 
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motivational counterparts of intellectual commitments both to the principles underpinning 
the processes of political liberalism and the principles which are themselves justi tied by 
means of the operation of these processes. As we know, Aristotle understood the operation 
of virtuous judgement to be such a complex and contextually dependent matter that it would 
necessarily outstrip any efforts to summarise it in terms of adherence to principles. But in 
the context of the public legitimation of political action required by political liberalism, it is 
hard to see how moral education could extend much further than the promotion of belief in 
certain consensual principles and of the motivation to act in accordance with that belief. For 
to push our educational efforts into those 'deeper' areas of character which form the 
grounds for any differentiation between virtues and skills would be to transgress beyond the 
domain of consensus and into the ground occupied by wider moral doctrines. I shall return 
to this thought a little later. 
This attenuation of virtue, both in terms of its range and its depth, is not itself any surprise. 
Political liberalism is of course not to be seen as an attempt to provide us with a satisfying 
conception of a fully rounded moral life, for the provision of these conceptions is the 
defining function of comprehensive doctrines. Political liberalism adopts a stance of 
neutrality concerning both the merits of competing comprehensive doctrines and the very 
question of whether this function of comprehensive doctrines is itself something of value. 
Yet despite this lack of engagement, we are able to see how this view may be, on the 
surface at least, better prepared than other varieties of liberalism to accommodate efforts at 
moral education based upon the development of virtue (in all is potentially deeper senses). 
For although political liberals do not seek to justify their views by means of any appeal to 
the merits of virtue ethics (they are of course precluded from doing so), we might judge that 
one consequence of the withdrawal of liberal strictures from a great deal of life is that 
virtue is allowed the room to breath which it is denied by competing varieties of 
comprehensive liberalism. Whereas MacIntyre saw the claims of virtue to necessitate the 
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rejection of liberal modernity in favour of a return to localised ethical communities, 
political liberalism would seem to offer a kind of compromise position whereby the liberal 
state becomes an overseer of, and arbitrator between, the claims of these divergent 
communities. Indeed, I have earlier argued that MacIntyre's ambivalent attitude towards 
moral pluralism had led him to ignore the necessity for some such socially overarching 
authority which had the purpose of preserving the diversity of moral traditions which was 
so essential to his non-foundational epistemology,21 In this way, one might see the virtue-
ethical tradition as forming just one of the many comprehensive doctrines which themselves 
overlap to provide the consensual justification of political liberalism. 
On this interpretation, the development of virtue could properly take place outside of those 
institutions, such as the common school, which are limited to practices which can be 
justified by public reason. We might therefore envisage a variety of different schools within 
a society, each reflecting the preferred moral and pedagogical views of a different group of 
parents. Just as MacIntyre has written of the University, we could imagine religious schools 
joined in a pluralist system by those devoted to the promotion of Millian individuality or 
Kantian autonomy, all co-existing beneath the tolerant umbrella of a political liberal state 
permitting them the opportunity to teach according to the pedagogical agenda of their own 
comprehensive doctrine. So, where this agenda prescribes an Aristotelian approach to the 
development of virtue then that is what will take place. 
But just because an Aristotelian pedagogy is to be tolerated22 in schools, this does not mean 
that it will thereby truly form part of a fully Aristotelian conception of ethismos. To return 
to one of the central themes of this thesis, we will have to be satisfied that this school-based 
pedagogy is not rendered ineffective by the overwhelming forces of contrary social 
conditioning emanating from outside the classroom. It is these more general sources of 
moral education - the mass media, business practices, social welfare arrangements, court 
judgements - which form such a large part of a wider Aristotelian conception of moral 
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development, and which will need to be in some harmony with our preferred form of 
school-based pedagogy if that is not to represent a mere pipedream. As explained by 
Amelie Rorty: 
One thing seems clear, indeed trivially clear: the better the political and economic 
system, and the more just are the social arrangements, the easier it is both to be 
and to become what we are pleased to call 'morally decent'. The worse social and 
political and economic arrangements are, the more difficult it is to present good 
lives as rewarding models, the more difficult and the more costly it is to integrate 
personal satisfactions with public decency. This should not be surprising. After 
all, a good polity is one in which the activities and traits that conduce to the public 
good are, at the very least, in harmony, if not actually identical with those 
exercised in the long range flourishing of individuallives.23 
In what way may these observations affect our judgement of political liberalism? Certainly, 
it is not possible for a faithfully Aristotelian form of education to exist in an entirely 
uncompromised form. For Aristotle did not recognise the sharp distinction between public 
and non-public forms of practical reason that is at the heart of the political liberal project. 
Instead, all instances of choice (whether they concerned decisions in a political referendum, 
marital infidelity or table manners) called for the expression of virtues which were united 
under and ordered by the common end of eudaimonia. Deliberations about social welfare 
arrangements would therefore be taught as involving the very same virtue of justice, chosen 
for the same conception of the good, as any discussions of fairness within the home. Yet 
this divergence between Aristotelian and political liberal conceptions of moral judgement 
need not prove conclusive. Political liberalism does not maintain that the Aristotelian view 
of the unity of practical reason is wrong or untrue. Rather, it claims that in the context of 
the reasonable disagreements so prevalent in contemporary societies any reasonable 
adherent to an Aristotelian comprehensive moral doctrine will be able to bracket parts of 
this doctrine when controversial political issues are at stake. Thus, political liberalism 
avoids rather than opposes those claims of comprehensive doctrines which run counter to it. 
It asks not that we deny our own viewpoints in the public domain, but that we see reason to 
put them aside in certain situations as a pragmatic compromise to the demands of politics in 
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plural societies. And the reasons why we may agree to put our views aside like this may 
themselves arise from our own comprehensive doctrine (such as an account of toleration as 
a component virtue of eudaimonia). 
Already there are likely to be adherents of certain comprehensive doctrines who would be 
unable to countenance even this level of accomodation with the requirements of political 
liberalism. If, for instance, I believed that only certain classes of my fellow citizens 
possessed the capacity for rational decision-making, I could hardly be expected to put this 
view aside in favour of a public rationality which gave equal status to the beliefs of all 
reasonable persons. In this case my comprehensive moral doctrine explicitly opposes the 
kinds of political attitude and practice required by political liberalism, and in doing so can 
no longer be considered 'reasonable' as it refuses to recognise the reasonableness of 
alternative doctrines. The overlapping consensus underpinning the conception of a stable 
liberal state is thereby not a universal consensus. It is limited only to those doctrines that 
are in a position to do what political liberalism requests of them. 
Despite these limitations, we might judge that it is at least possible for an Aristotelian 
educator to be considered part of 'the reasonable'. As we noted earlier, political liberalism 
would require that all children be brought up to learn those virtues which are required to 
underpin the existence of the political liberal state. In short therefore, the reasonableness of 
an educator or an educational institution will be judged by the extent to which they promote 
the reasonableness of those under their authority. Whatever the nature of their 
comprehensive doctrines children will be educated to observe a proper distinction in their 
practical reasoning between public and non-public matters. This will not mean that an 
Aristotelian educator will have to tell his or her class that what they know to be true about 
justice in one domain of moral choice does not hold true of another. Instead, they may 
teach that they should put aside their true justification of a just choice in certain contexts in 
favour of a strategy of argumentation which serves other, more general goods. 
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But although it is possible for us to reconcile political liberal and Aristotelian education in 
this way. it is unclear that this reconciliation is much more than an academic enterprise. For 
the practical conjunction of these two kinds of education would seem to pose important 
problems. We should not imagine that all of the reasonable adherents to comprehensive 
doctrines enjoy the same relationship with political liberalism. An Aristotelian educator is 
likely to be put in a difficult position by the demand that their belief in the nature of well-
being should be ignored when they come to debate issues of pOlitical importance. Children 
may understandably begin asking why it is that they should ever ignore moral truths which 
they have been taught are of such great importance to their lives. Rather than strengthening 
public reason, we might well imagine that a result of this kind of education would be to 
encourage children to think that any area of life from which their comprehensive moral 
beliefs and commitments are debarred should be accorded less respect as a consequence. 
The educator may of course respond with an explanation for the bracketing of moral beliefs 
which itself draws upon the values of their comprehensive doctrine. But here again, those 
receiving this explanation might be expected to wonder why it is that public reason must 
displace their comprehensive doctrine from important areas of life if this stricture can only 
be justified by appeal to the validity of comprehensive values. In other words, the priority 
of the political is being supported by an argumentative strategy which does not itself accord 
it this priority at all. 
This need not mean that such lessons are impossible to teach, but we should at least 
acknowledge that the task of the Aristotelian educator is very much more difficult than that 
facing those whose comprehensive doctrines are more amenable to political liberalism. For 
although Rawls is clear that his theory is not based upon any scepticism, SUbjectivism, or 
indeed any meta-ethical view about the nature of moral values, it is equally clear that a 
sceptical or subjectivist educator would not be posed the same difficulties by the educational 
demands of political liberalism as would the Aristotelian. For such an educator would be 
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able to utilise the official or public justification for public reason - that the burdens of 
judgement are such that we should not expect others to have the same moral beliefs as we 
have, even if we believe our own to hold true for all persons. This defence has the 
advantage that it offers a morally free-standing argument for a morally free-standing 
conception of politics. But it is difficult to see what use an Aristotelian teacher or school 
could make of this argument. For it would require that children are taught both that there is 
a justified true account of well-being which holds for all persons and that other people 
holding contrary views are just as likely to be correct. To believe in both of these positions 
would seem to require either a schizophrenic mentality, or some other means of avoiding 
the commonplace logic that belief in the second claim provides reason to doubt a belief in 
the first. Neither of these two options are the sorts of state we would wish to see will fully 
promoted by educators. 
These considerations already suggest that political liberalism is less able than we may have 
imagined to permit the practical realisation of an education in virtue. The distance involved 
in straddling the theoretical commitments of an Aristotelian understanding of morality and 
the justification of political liberalism seems just too great for comfort. Yet these difficulties 
increase yet further when we consider the importance of the social embodiment of 
comprehensive moral doctrines and the forms of education based upon them. For even if 
we were comfortable that we could allow for our own comprehensive doctrine to be taught 
alongside a mode of public reason which was limited to certain specific domains, we would 
also have to be confident that we could maintain this proper balance. Given what I have 
said about the educative function of a whole variety of social and cultural forces, we must 
attend to the possibility that our carefully balanced and circumscribed lessons are reinforced 
to such different degrees that their effects depart greatly from their intentions. Where these 
social forces are either governed by the prescriptions of public reason itself (such as 
constitutional arrangements and the tenor of political debate), or exhibit a scepticism about 
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or disregard for moral values (such as many justifications of market economics) their effect 
will surely be to diminish the power of the moral education provided by the Aristotelian 
educator. Where a comprehensive moral doctrine, however reasonable, exists at the 
margins of liberal society both in terms of numbers of its adherents and the social centrality 
of its values and theoretical commitments, political liberalism's promises of neutrality and 
toleration ring rather hollow. 
Of course, these values of neutrality and toleration are not advocated by political liberals as 
a means of maintaining and fostering the diversity of comprehensive doctrines as if this 
were a good in itself,24 Rather, they are values already implicit in the reasonable pol itical 
culture of liberal democracies and which enable a minimal but moral conception of justice 
as fairness to achieve stability in the context of plural societies. The natural result of 
political liberalism may well be that those comprehensive doctrines which have most 
difficulty in accommodating the demands made upon them gradually lose their adherents. 
Yet as this process would not have been a deliberate aim of the state, it is not seen by 
political liberals to be a matter of particular concern.25 Political liberalism honours and 
respects the various comprehensive doctrines in a plural society by offering a way for much 
of the coercive activity of the state to be justified to all - something which would not seem 
possible for the more controversial kinds of liberal theory. It does not pretend, however, 
that it is able to ensure that neutrally-justified policies actually affect all persons and 
doctrines in the same way and to the same degree. Given the enormously complex and 
various factors which influence the social repercussions of any given policy it is thought to 
be sociologically unrealistic to think that governments should aim for any further neutrality 
than that which governs the justification of their actions. In Macedo's words, "there is as 
much substance in political liberalism's conceptions of neutrality and fairness as our shared 
standards of reasonableness - and respect for reasonable disagreement - allow. " 26 
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Political liberalism certainly differs from many comprehensively liberal alternatives in that 
it does not rule out the possibility for citizens who so wish to educate their children, to 
some degree at least, in a deliberately Aristotelian manner. Nevertheless, it cannot offer 
any realistic promise that this will take place in a social context which is of a character 
conducive to their educational aims. If we are convinced both that such a context is 
essential to the kind of moral education we envisage and that it will come into being only 
via acts of political intervention, then we will evidently need to look elsewhere for a means 
of reconciling these thoughts with liberal values. And, as I have suggested already, this 
alternative kind of liberal view will in certain ways seek to achieve this reconciliation by 
actually upholding certain key Aristotelian standpoints itself. Earlier in this chapter I 
suggested that many of these standpoints should not necessarily be seen as contrary to 
liberal values. We have some reason to think that Aristotle's thought, freed from the 
influence of many of its medieval and scholastic interpreters, is in at least some ways 
conducive to many of the values we now consider to be distinctively liberal. In what 
remains of this concluding chapter I shall indicate the promise that this second path of 
reconciliation may hold for us, exemplified chiefly by the work of Joseph Raz. 
To borrow Rawls' terminology, Raz's liberalism is both comprehensive and perfectionist -
thereby aligning it with two aspects of the Aristotelian position (although he does not claim 
such a heritage for his thought). His liberalism is comprehensive in that it upholds the unity 
of moral and political judgement - disavowing any essential distinction thought to hold 
between public and non-public forms of reason in the justification of political decisions. 
And, connectedly, it is perfectionist in that it sees political morality to be "concerned 
primarily with protecting and promoting the well-being of people" - a goal which 
necessarily involves the state acting on the basis of a true and comprehensive account of 
what well-being involves and requires. Raz's liberalism is not a matter solely of the limits 
and strictures thought to apply to the activity of the state (although he does defend such 
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limitations in many areas), but also bases itself upon an account of well-being which holds 
that a good life is a life lived autonomously.27 More precisely, his liberal account of well-
being holds that this" ... consists in the (1) whole-hearted and (2) successful pursuit of (3) 
valuable (4) activities. "28 
Of interest here is the way in which Raz integrates autonomy with a neo-Aristotelian 
conception of the nature and purpose of political morality so that each is seen to require the 
other. As we know, the liberal value of autonomy has often been used to underpin 
arguments against those who believe that the state can properly make and act upon 
judgements concerning the relative merits of different moral positions. For if it is valuable 
that people live a life according to their own moral lights then surely it would defeat this 
purpose if the state were to act in ways to influence their choices concerning such matters. 
Equally, the value of promoting individual autonomy in education was often taken to mean 
that one should permit only those pedagogical interventions which remained entirely neutral 
between competing moral positions (save, perhaps, for the value of autonomy itself). 
Earlier, I suggested that more directive kinds of moral education which did seek to 
influence the beliefs and characters of children in certain definite directions could not 
properly be thought to violate autonomy. In the more general context of the justification of 
political decisions, Raz's view goes beyond this suggestion. He claims not merely that 
perfectionist political policies do not violate autonomy, but also that the protection and 
promotion of autonomy in fact requires policies of this kind. 
Raz maintains that the fact of someone choosing their way of life or moral actions for 
themselves is not sufficient to prove that they are autonomous. For one of the preconditions 
of his concept of autonomy is that there exists an adequate range of options from which a 
choice is to be made. If a social environment is so monistic that only one way of life is 
available, a person could not truly be considered autonomous in willingly choosing this way 
of life and a government would not be upholding the value of autonomy if they and it 
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refrained from influencing this social environment to increase the range of available 
options. Yet even if there were to be a variety of options available in society this would not 
enable autonomous choice if only one of these options were to be morally valuable. To 
reject a plethora of immoral alternatives in favour of acting in the cause of virtue indicates 
that one is fighting for what Raz calls" moral survival" , not living autonomously.29 
Therefore, for the state to uphold and promote a conception of well-being concerned with 
the autonomous pursuit of valuable lives it must act to ensure that people are able to choose 
amongst a variety of valuable alternatives. This will require not only that people are free 
from being straightforwardly coerced into one particular life or that they possess the 
appropriate mental and sentimental capacities for making meaningful choices, but also that 
these choices are truly open to be made in reality. 
It is clear that this understanding of the perfectionist role of the state in promoting the good 
life coheres well with the more pluralistic interpretation of Aristotle I offered earlier. 
Although Raz defends the view that the state is capable of making and acting upon 
legitimate moral judgements about the relative merits of different ways of life, he stresses 
that this must not and cannot result in monistic uniformity, however saintly this way of life 
might be. It must not because, as we have seen, well-being is not only about living a life 
with a certain behavioural content but also about choosing this content for proper reasons 
and in an autonomous manner. It cannot because Raz holds that moral value is plural and 
incommensurable. It is not possible to encompass all valuable aspects of life within the 
context of one's own existence. This is not due to people being brought up in the wrong 
way or living in the wrong kind of society, but because not all values are such that they 
may be combined within a single life. As autonomous individuals we are capable of 
choosing amongst different valuable ways of life, of extending our talents in many different 
worthwhile directions, but we do not have the opportunity to extend in all directions as each 
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way of life will " ... call on different qualities and require the relative neglect of even 
suppression of other qualities which are good in themselves. "30 
Similarly, Raz observes a tendency for values to form "nested structures", whereby further 
values become open to us through a prior commitment to other broader or more 
foundational values within our chosen projects. The converse of the way in which one's 
pursuit of valuable projects makes other valuable projects unavailable to us is the way in 
which selecting one project amongst others creates for us new possibilities of success or 
failure - new sources of value. In other words, many values are 'agent-relative' in the sense 
that certain options become valuable only for those whose lives have followed a certain kind 
of narrative path which enables such options to have a value in the context of a well-lived 
life. We should be careful to note, however, that this does not amount to an endorsement of 
subjectivism. Raz rejects the view that what makes something valuable is the fact that 
someone has chosen it as being so. Rather he is noting that although the value of the 
different options available to a person in a particular context is not critically dependent 
upon whether or not they consider them to be valuable, it can be said that the range or 
nature of these options is such as it is partly because of the chosen projects of the person to 
whom they are available. Something which is valuable for the autonomous, whole-hearted 
and successful pursuit of a life as a philosopher may not be so for those who are pursuing 
athleticism in the same manner, even though both of these broader goals are at the opposite 
end of the value spectrum from those autonomously, whole-heartedly and successfully 
pursuing the arts of burglary or idleness. 
In the context of the intimate relationship holding between moral pluralism and the value of 
autonomy, many liberal fears about perfectionist politics cease to seem quite so appropriate. 
Not only does Raz recognise that there are numerous ways in which one may achieve well-
being, but he also rejects the idea that governments are able to make people autonomous. 
As he explains: 
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To be autonomous, they have to live their own lives for themselves. 
Governments, and other people generally, can help people flourish, but only by 
creating the conditions for autonomous life, primarily by guaranteeing that an 
adequate range of diverse and valuable options shall be available to all. Beyond 
that they must leave individuals free to make of their lives what they will.31 
As this indicates, Raz's conception of the state retains a liberal attachment to the weak 
government, the role of which should extend no further than the provision of the framework 
conditions for the autonomous creation of a pluralistic society. Although this is no kind of 
libertarianism (which implies the view that values are commensurable via economic 
rationality), it places an important limit on our understanding of the place of the state in 
promoting the well-being of citizens. For not only does Raz agree that there are some very 
real reasons for us to be wary of the overwhelming powers of political authority even when 
its aims are justified32 , but his notion of well-being itself precludes any idea that the 
government may be able to ensure its achievement. The state may provide people with the 
opportunity to live an autonomous life, but it is up to them to make the choices which are to 
both lead to and comprise it. Nonetheless, we should recognise that this liberal 
perfectionism goes far beyond any of the other varieties of liberalism we have encountered 
in promising means of concord with many of the core commitments of an Aristotelian 
conception of moral education. 
Although Raz has not written in any detail about the educational ramifications of his ideas, 
it does not seem fanciful to suppose that educational institutions would provide a very 
important means by which the state could fulfil its duty to promote well-being. His 
arguments imply that a perfectionist liberal state will be obliged both to fund those key 
institutions (such as schools and colleges) which help to form autonomous moral agents 
(given that certain values will not be commensurable to individual economic rationality), 
and to grant those institutions operational autonomy to the extent that they fulfil this 
educational role. The state will be concerned that the conditions of autonomy are being met. 
Firstly, therefore, that children are not being coerced or manipulated into an unquestioning 
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acceptance of some or other doctrine. Secondly, that they are being equipped with the 
"mental abilities" required for autonomous decision-making - where these abilities extend 
beyond the narrowly cognitive to embrace the emotional and sentimental aspects of 
judgement that we have discussed in previous chapters. To this extent, the state would take 
sides in the debate about moral education which I have discussed in this thesis, and will see 
it as a responsibility of schools to venture beyond the limitations imposed by the supporters 
of Kohlberg, Wilson, or Values Clarification. This form of education will need to follow a 
difficult path whereby it is actively involved in something like an Aristotelian development 
of character, without being accused of manipulation or coercion. But if we are to remain 
hopeful that liberal values and Aristotelian ideas about moral development are not entirely 
contradictory we must believe that there is a path here to be followed, however narrow it 
may turn out to be. 
Furthermore, it is responsibility of the state to care for the third condition of autonomy that 
provides greater hope that this kind of education has a chance of success. Repeatedly, I 
have been sceptical about those arguments for the education of virtuous character which 
ignore the marginal position this would have within the dominant ethos of contemporary 
liberal societies. We may argue that liberal values and character-education are reconcilable, 
but this is of little use if such an educational form would emerge still-born if practically 
instituted. As we know, the third condition of autonomy is that there exists a sufficient 
range of truly valuable options so that an education which fulfills the first two conditions 
will enable people to exercise their freely developed mental capacities in the service of their 
well-being. Raz argues that for the state to ensure the continued existence of a variety of 
valuable options it must attend to the way in which such options are grounded in what he 
calls "social forms" . One may claim that we have opportunity to follow a variety of 
different valuable lives just as long as the first two conditions of autonomy are met, but 
Raz, coming close to MacIntyre's elucidation of the nature of a 'practice' , recognises that 
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" ... a person's well-being depends to a large extent on success in socially defined and 
determined pursuits and activities." 33 Where these are not of the range and character 
required to support autonomous choice between them it means little to say that we are still 
formally free to make such choices. 
MacIntyre's Janus-faced attitude towards moral pluralism - a state he both abhorred and 
required - meant that he has been unable to articulate any role for political authority in its 
maintenance. By contrast, Raz is explicit in stressing that it is a key responsibility of the 
state (and a source of its legitimacy) to fulfil this function. The liberal state must protect the 
possibility of well-being for its citizens by intervening in civil society where the 
untrammeled operations of market-led economic rationality threaten the co-existence of the 
necessary variety of incommensurably valuable social forms. One might debate the details 
of this approach. For instance, it is not obvious quite what degree of variety is necessary to 
sustain the possibility of autonomous choice, or quite how valuable each social option need 
be. In other words, what is the threshold for autonomy to be enabled? And connectedly, 
would the state's obligation extend any further than the point at which this threshold was 
established? Should we be concerned if there are alternative and perhaps more valuable 
social options which are withering away from a lack of state support even though there are 
options of a sufficient number and valuable available already? 
Whatever the detail of Raz's approach it is by now clear that it would attract criticism from 
both liberal and 'anti-liberal' commentators claiming that he does not appreciate the 
demands made upon politics by the facts of moral disagreement. I shall address these likely 
criticisms in brief here and suggest that both are underpinned by a similarly biased 
conception of the nature of moral disagreement. Political liberals, for instance, may argue 
that a liberal state cannot hope for legitimacy and stability if it dares to make and act upon 
judgements concerning the relative merits of the moral views embraced by its citizens. Such 
matters are just too hot to handle at the pOlitical level. As Macedo claims in discussing the 
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'ballast' which prevents modern Western societies descending into the conflicts of the past 
or of present day Yugoslavia or Lebanon: 
If our political culture is dependent on our political institutions - including the 
work done by the political avoidance of religious controversy - then encouraging 
the politicisation of the deepest and historically most destructive forms of 
disagreement could undermine the culture and jettison the ballast.34 
Yet in defence of the comprehensiveness of Raz's approach, one might respond that 
political avoidance of controversy is not necessarily the best way to ensure that moral 
disagreement does not threaten the stability of the state. Given the wide acceptance of the 
view that moral judgement is not bifurcated into public and non-public forms, the banishing 
of comprehensive doctrines from the political realm might arguably be thought to bring 
about an increase in social tensions. At a personal level for instance, if I felt justified in 
relying upon and expressing my moral convictions in a political context, but was unable to 
do so, my feelings of frustration might not be wholly assuaged by the fact that someone 
with a different moral view but similar intentions was constricted in the same way. This 
constriction could well serve to exacerbate our moral differences and the social dangers of 
disagreement even though we have been treated equally. And of course, where the activities 
of the state have and are seen to have effects which are not similarly equal, as political 
liberals admit they will, such difficulties may be heightened further. 
This is not intended to be a definitive causal story, but at least offers a competing account 
of the effects of including or excluding comprehensive moral doctrines from politics to that 
provided by political liberals. In general, their understanding of moral disagreement and 
plurality seems to be mode led upon the kinds of extreme contemporary and historical 
examples cited by Macedo. Why, for instance, do the most commonly discussed real-life 
exemplars of the strains pluralism places upon politics concern the preferred educational 
curricula of Amish and fundamentalist Christian communities - perhaps our nearest 
analogies to the religious conflicts of the sixteenth century? As well as providing an 
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arguably exaggerated picture of the extent of moral disagreement in most contemporary 
liberal societies (and one which betrays the origin of their ideas in an almost exclusively 
North American context), this model of disagreement also seems to be skewed unreasonably 
towards its cognitive and inter-personal aspects. Moral pluralism is surely not exclusively a 
matter of conflicts of doctrinal belief between different persons or groups of persons. We 
may equally see it evinced in differences of affective character which are irreducible to 
expressions of principled belief (which may be indeed by shared), or in occasions of intra-
personal conflict, of affective or cognitive dissonance within the outlook of individuals. The 
fragmentations characteristic of modernity may in this way be rather more complex, both 
more and less extensive along different continua, than how they are described by Rawls, 
Macedo or Larmore. 
With a more contoured understanding of the nature of moral pluralism, expressed equally 
by the social conditioning of moral weakness35 as by inter-faith skirmishes, we may feel less 
concern with the notion of a perfectionist liberal state. Or, at the very least, we will feel 
rather less convinced that Rawls' overlapping consensus, the achievement of cross-doctrinal 
agreement about the core principles of liberal justice, is a fully appropriate response to the 
demands that plurality makes of politics. As Raz has argued, 
... many factors contribute to the stability of a country's political system: the 
nature of its culture, its history of past conflicts, the depth of feeling concerning 
current rivalries, and so on. The point is that they are only remotely sensitive to 
the existence of anything remotely like Rawls' overlapping consensus. The latter 
is neither necessary nor sufficient, and even were it to exist it would play only a 
partial role in securing unity and stability,36 
In this sense, the kind of agreement upon which the liberal state rests is both 'thinner' and 
'thicker' than how it is portrayed by political liberals. It is thinner in that it is less 
cognitively demanding - a broad and general attachment to ideas about the legitimacy of the 
state may co-exist comfortably with differences of opinion about particular political issues. 
But this comfort is provided by the 'thicker' aspects of agreement, extending into the realms 
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of common sentiment and fellow-feeling beyond mere cognitive identity. In many 
contemporary societies, it does not seem unreasonable to think that these kinds of 
agreement will be enough to ensure the stability of a state which sought to respect its 
citizens by treating them "in accordance with sound moral principles" 37, rather than by 
excluding such concerns from politics altogether. 
Of course, opposition to these ideas should not be expected to arise only from liberals. For 
the thrust of MacIntyre's anti-liberalism is that any attempt to reconcile Aristotelian politics 
or politically-bolstered education in the context of modern plural societies is doomed to 
failure. As for political liberals, the objection would once again be that Raz underestimates 
the serious consequences the facts of moral disagreement have for the justification of the 
liberal state and its activities. In the context of our educational concerns, it may be argued 
that the autonomy of different and incommensurable social forms and pedagogic practices 
will make it difficult to claim that there is a shared justification for all such enterprises. For 
how can we meaningfully claim to be promoting autonomy or the cognitive and affective 
capacities for moral judgement if the nature of these ends is understood in almost infinitely 
variable ways? For MacIntyre, Raz's justification of the state would be more Humean than 
Aristotelian. It does not express the existence of true political virtues, but merely "an 
appearance of virtue congruent with the rhetoric of shared values" which is itself "well-
served by the indeterminacy of the virtue-concepts of contemporary commonplace usage" .38 
As we have seen earlier, MacIntyre sets very particular criteria for something to be 
considered a true instance of virtue. Due to his support for a 'blueprint' conception of 
moral judgement in Aristotle and Aquinas, virtue proper is considered to exist only against 
the background of a full cognitive picture of the content of eudaimonia. The 
incommensurability of different social forms, recognised in their own ways by Raz and 
MacIntyre, means for the latter that any institution which exists outside of these localised 
contexts will find itself without such a cognitive picture. It will trade only in a fictitious 
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simulacrum of virtue. But we have also seen that this 'blueprint' account is far from being 
the last word on these matters as there is considerable support for a view of virtue-ethical 
moral judgement which does not set such cognitive requirements. This view stresses the 
role of the affective dimension and comprehends well-being in a pluralistic and open-ended 
way - as a universal which is brought to bear upon particular instances of virtuous 
judgement in a partial and piecemeal form and which is refined and developed through such 
instances. Given this interpretation, Raz's avowedly general account of the moral purpose 
of the liberal state will not seem so alien to the account of neo-Aristotelian education I have 
supported throughout this thesis. It will offer a generally supportive social environment 
within which this kind of educational practice can proceed with realistic hope. 
The conditions of modernity present the educator with a very particular challenge - of 
bringing children up to be happy, knowledgeable, skilled and virtuous adults with a good 
chance of success in a world characterised by moral disagreement and by despair about the 
capacity of education to halt the decline of moral standards. I have suggested that we should 
accept this challenge as one capable of being met, but as requiring a great deal of thought. 
My arguments began with the suggestion that we cannot hope to educate virtuous adults, to 
reverse any moral decline (if such a thing exists), without adopting an alternative 
understanding of moral judgement and of the education it requires to that which has 
underpinned much of post-war thought about such matters. Furthermore, it is a component 
part of this understanding that educational institutions cannot hope to meet all the demands 
placed upon them without the assistance of political action to rectify the contrary forces in 
society which serve to make their noble efforts near futile. The resultant difficulty is that in 
the context of modern plural societies this kind of political action will only be 
uncontroversial if it is in the service of ends about which everyone agrees. And the only 
kinds of moral education about which this would seem to be true are those which abstain 
entirely from controversial content - precisely those which I had rejected at the beginning. 
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The central question of this thesis has concerned the possibility of avoiding this negative 
conclusion, whether supported by those who see the claims of virtue as a reason to castigate 
liberal modernity or by those who see the fact of moral pluralism as a reason to reject the 
Aristotelian idea of virtue as inappropriate to the conditions of modernity. In this final 
chapter, I have sought to provide a general defence of the thought that such an avoidance 
may be possible. Those educational and political activities which are tolerated or promoted 
by a Razian perfectionist state will not result in the resurrection of Aristotle's polis. The 
social conditions of modernity, its complexity and multiplicity, make this an unreasonable 
suggestion. In such conditions, various social forms or practices will conduct education 
within a context of limitation and support from a state whose political morality will be 
significantly more general. Whilst it will act in a way which favours those educational 
practices which address the development of virtue in a broad enough manner, it will not 
itself intervene in the issues of character and sentiment which such practices develop. To 
repeat quotations from Bernard Williams and Joseph Raz cited in the first part of this thesis: 
In particular, modern complex society functions which are ethically significant are 
performed by public agencies and, if the society is relatively open, this requires 
that they be governed by an explicable order which allows those agencies to be 
answerable. In a public, large and impersonal forum 'intuition' will not serve, 
though it will serve (and nothing else could serve) in personal life and in a more 
closely shared existence)9 
In mass, highly mobile societies, public authorities are particularly ill-adapted to 
judge matters in which having the right feelings, the proper moral sensibilities, is 
of particular importance. They are more suited to dealing with abstract principles, 
with general rights and duties, than with matters of moral character, personal 
relations, etc.40 
These observations indicate the parameters set around any attempt to integrate Aristotle's 
moral thought with the plural conditions of modernity. Just as the success of moral 
education rests upon certain kinds of political action, so the existence of the political order 
which enables these actions rests upon the success of moral education. The co-dependance 
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of politics and education requires the existence of educated citizens - adults whose moral 
virtue extends into the political realm. The concluding suggestions of this chapter indicate 
that an extension of this kind can be meaningfully virtuous without endangering social 
stability. The education of such citizens represents our most hopeful route for developing 
the best aspects of individuals and of the society in which all of us must live. 
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